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Auditor misconduct has played a crucial role in the financial turmoil of the past
decades, but is hardly understood itself. Research to date has focused almost exclusively
on how external regulations can guard the integrity and quality of audit services, but has
ignored the influence of audit firms’ organizational features on auditor behavior. This is a
potentially serious omission as organizational factors may be potential causes for auditor
misconduct, and because organizational practices could be potential remedies to auditor
misconduct. In this dissertation, I seek to redirect the conversation on auditor conduct by
taking an organizational perspective. This dissertation therefore provides compelling
evidence that the organizational context of audit firms indeed has a significant impact on
auditor behavior. In so doing, I show that an exclusive reliance on regulatory reforms may
not be sufficient to foster auditor integrity and that effective remedies to combat audit
failures reside at the level of the organizations providing the audit. I therefore provide
important and innovative contributions to both the Audit and Organizational literatures. 
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PREFACE 
 
Writing this thesis is probably the most challenging thing I have done in my 27 years of life. 
Although only my name appears on the cover of this book, this book would not have been 
produced without the contributions of several people. I am indebted to those people who 
were there for me during my PhD. It is not only because of their tremendous support that 
this thesis exists today, but also, and more importantly perhaps, it is because of them that 
I will keep a fond memory of my PhD. 
 First of all, I would like to thank my supervisors, Hans van Oosterhout and Pursey 
Heugens, for giving me the opportunity to pursue my own interests. The freedom you gave 
me to engage in interdisciplinary research allowed me to have a unique research portfolio 
and therefore a competitive edge on the job market. Hans, thank you for your thought-
provoking comments on my work. These helped me to focus my ideas. Next to your 
contributions to my work, I also won’t forget our dinners. These reminded me of the 
importance of the human side of doing research. Pursey, thank you for reading, re-reading, 
and thoroughly commenting on countless revisions of our papers. Your input has certainly 
contributed to the quality of this manuscript. Thank you for your advice and 
encouragement. Hans and Pursey, thank you for consistently holding me to the highest 
academic standards, in both content and form. 
 Next, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Robert Knechel. We met at a 
graduate Auditing seminar in Maastricht before I started the PhD program. At that time, 
you gave me the confidence to embark on this innovative research route. Throughout the 
PhD program, your work has been a real inspiration. Thank you for your encouragement, 
constructive feedback, and advice. I keep very good memories of our meetings at 
conferences in Bergen, Washington DC, and New Orleans. I would also like to thank Cedric 
Lesage for inviting and hosting me as a visiting PhD at HEC Paris’ department of Accounting 
and Control. My visit to your department definitely contributed to making me an 
interdisciplinary academic. 
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 Before starting my PhD, I had been warned about the solitude doing research 
could entail. I am truly fortunate to say that my PhD has been everything but lonely. Of 
course, I spent many hours alone at my desk, reading articles, jotting down ideas on pieces 
of scrap paper, and staring at my screen, while my computer was staring back at me.  Yet, 
in this process I have been surrounded by a fine bunch of fellow PhDs, whom today I am 
proud to call my friends. Saskia, Tante Saar, thank you so much for a vega-enjoyable PhD 
journey. Together we shared so many laughs, teas, wines, and vegetables (!), for which I 
am so very grateful. You definitely kept my blood pressure, sugar and vitamin levels at 
acceptable degrees. Julija, my dear J, you have been an exceptional friend all these years. I 
will always remember our celebrations with our favourite bubbly while wearing our nicest 
dresses. Thank you for being my confidant, and really supporting me all along. I am so 
happy to have you as a friend.  Push, my partner in crime at conferences in San Antonio and 
Helsinki, thank you for all our laughs, and for the support! Our friendship means a lot to 
me. Teodor, Dr. T, thank you for the wake-up calls about life, for the drinks out and about 
in Rotterdam, and for always bringing your delightful ‘peasantly’ presence.  Yannis, thank 
you for being so real and such a good friend. Amir, the last year and a half of my PhD would 
definitely have been a lot less fun without you. I am very glad to call you my friend. To my 
other fellow PhDs and friends, Steffi Peer, Basak, Maartje, Roxana, thank you for the shared 
talks, drinks, offices, and apartments. 
 I am also truly indebted to my friends outside of academia for listening to my 
never-ending PhD stories, for understanding that I was not always able to visit them, and 
for encouraging me along the way. I owe you! Gala, my oldest and truly amazing friend, 
thank you for always believing in me. Thank you for making me stop and relax at times in 
Corfu, Paris, or Rotterdam. Michael, thank you for all those years of support, for always 
coming from far, and for making sure we see each other regularly. You are a great friend. 
Elisabeth, your genuine interest in my research, your reality checks, and your good sense 
of humor have been so uplifting these past four years. Thank you. Nicole, you might be tiny, 
but you are a huge friend of mine. Thank you for making me understand that life is bigger 
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than a PhD. Emilie J, thank you for the support, and for reminding me that there is a life 
after PhD and that I should not lose track of time. Emilie F, I keep very good memories of 
our time at HEC Paris. Thank you for all the fun! Anastasia, even though I do not see you as 
often as I would want, I cannot wait to conquer the FET with you. 
 My last expression of gratitude goes to my family. My family is unique in many 
ways, but very stereotypical when it comes to how much we care for each other. Michiel, 
you have been and always will be the incarnation of positive thinking. While I tend to 
overthink, you have taught me to stay optimistic and see positivity wherever and whenever 
possible. This has helped me during my PhD. I couldn’t ask for a better quality in my older 
brother. Thank you for your unconditional support and for being so patient. You brought 
Lili into our family, and I am happy that I got to know her. Lili, you have also supported me 
along the way towards my PhD. I really appreciate your encouragements and thank you for 
making the process more enjoyable with your great cooking skills.   
Huub, I am so happy we are together. When we met, you probably did not know 
that an academic career would take us across the globe. I am so lucky that you are 
adventurous and willing to build our future in Canada. This means the world to me.  You 
might not know, but you have given me that extra push in order to complete my PhD and 
find a challenging job. Thank you for your support, encouragements, and for reminding me 
every day how enjoyable life can be. I love you. 
I would also like to thank my father; he made everything possible. He gave me 
unique opportunities, and I have taken advantage of them. Papa, you have always told me 
that I could do anything, go anywhere I wanted, and that you would support my every 
decision. Thank you for believing in me and thank you for the limitless opportunities! I 
wouldn’t be where I am today if it weren’t for you.  
In conclusion, I want to thank my mother. My mother is so much more than ‘just’ 
my mother, she is my wisest advisor, my greatest support, and my best friend. She is also 
the strongest person I have ever met. Without her, I wouldn’t be who I am today. “Thank 
you” does not even come close to my heartfelt expression of gratitude for her, but I cannot 
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find any better words. Mama, I admire your dedication to your children, you always want 
the best for Michiel and me, even if this comes at your own expense. My decision to pursue 
a world-class education meant that I would be away from home, away from you, away from 
spending time together. These shared moments are so normal to us yet so exceptional 
when you think about it. While I was away, I missed these moments, and I know you missed 
them too. Yet, your selfless and unconditional love and support encouraged me to pursue 
my ambitions in Montreal, London, and Rotterdam. Thank you for your infinite support, 
love, and smiles. Sometimes, I wondered whether I had made the right decision to get my 
education so far away from home. You must have asked yourself that same question. Today, 
looking at my academic track record as well as the genuine friendships and worldly 
experiences I made along the way, makes me realize that back then, I must have made the 
right decision. I hope that you agree. I am so proud that you have been on my side all along. 
Thank you.  
I dedicate this work to my grandmother, Meme, who left us too soon. I hope this 
work makes you proud. 
 
“Même pour l’envol d’un papillon, tout le ciel est nécessaire” (Paul Claudel, 1868-1955) 
 
 
Jorien L. Pruijssers 
February 2015, Montreal
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CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
Towards an Organizational Perspective on Auditor Conduct 
It came as no surprise that in late 2014 the Dutch Authority of the Financial Markets (AFM) 
announced that 45% of controlled public interest audits in the Netherlands were 
conducted below the required standards. In a year in which charges were brought against 
KPMG for bribery and tax evasion, and PwC’s private investment club was discovered and 
subsequently dismantled, it became clear that auditors frequently forego professionalism 
in favor of profit maximization. In a profession in which the public interest should prevail 
over self-interest, these developments have tarnished the public’s confidence in auditors’ 
ability to provide independent judgment of a company’s financial disclosures. These recent 
developments have reinvigorated some old debates and raised some new questions about 
auditor behavior. 
Almost a decade ago, serious auditing irregularities stressed the highly 
consequential societal risks associated with auditor misconduct. As a result, regulators, 
professionals, and academics alike struggled with two fundamental questions: (a) what are 
the drivers of auditor misbehavior? and (b) what are potential remedies to safeguard 
auditor integrity? In pinpointing the tensions between professional and commercial 
interests as drivers for misbehavior, auditing regulators had to react quickly due to 
mounting public pressure. In an attempt to restore confidence in the audit, European and 
American regulation was tightened in order to reinstate a balance between competing 
norm sets and objectives. This resulted in the implementation of stricter rules concerning 
auditor independence and the provision of certain non-audit services. The adoption of 
these regulations might have been too quick in the sense that regulators had not conducted 
sufficient research into the underlying drivers of auditor behavior. Moreover, they 
neglected available academic research that specifically refuted the association between 
impaired auditor independence and the provision of non-audit services (Ashbaugh, 
LaFond, & Mayhew, 2003; DeFond, Raghunandan, & Subramanyam, 2002; Kinney, 
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Palmrose, & Scholz, 2004). The recent Dutch evidence questions whether the stiffer 
regulations have been able to prompt the required behavioral changes. As such, the 
longstanding questions relating to the drivers of auditor behavior and the potential 
remedies for safeguarding auditor integrity persist. 
The recent developments in the Netherlands, however, have also fueled new 
questions. Dutch audit firms, the professional association, and the AFM have now come to 
realize that internal organizational remedies (instead of tighter external regulations) are 
probably the most effective way to restore a sound balance between the commercial and 
professional pressures affecting the audit industry. Their conclusion is not only based on 
the apparent lack of success of external regulation, but also on the notion that change 
originating from within audit firms could signal the auditors’ renewed commitment to 
their societal gatekeeping role. They expect that internal organizational practices can have 
a greater impact on auditor behavior than external regulations because of the proximity of 
the organization to the auditor. Despite this new drive to find organizational remedies, not 
much is known about the organization of audit firms (Jenkins, Deis, Bedard, & Curtis, 
2008). Researchers and practitioners need to know which existing organizational practices 
trigger professional behavior; which existing organizational practices trigger auditor 
misbehavior; which new organizational practices could foster professional behavior; and, 
in short, how the audit firm should be designed in order to ensure auditor integrity. 
By incorporating these old and new questions into a comprehensive analysis, this 
dissertation provides an innovative and contemporary perspective on auditor behavior. In 
particular, the three studies included in this dissertation provide compelling evidence that 
the organizational context of audit firms can have a significant impact on auditor 
(mis)behavior. Given the unavailability of public data on audit firm organization and 
auditor conduct, three separate field studies were conducted over the course of 2011-2013 
in the Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany. The contributions of this dissertation lie in its 
distinctive organizational perspective on auditor behavior and in its interdisciplinary use 
of economic, managerial, and auditing literatures to make sense of auditor behavior. The 
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collection of unique field and organizational data further heightens the originality of this 
dissertation’s contributions. 
 
Organizational context of audit firms 
All audit firms are professional partnerships (Greenwood & Empson, 2003). This implies 
that audit firms do not have mandatory disclosure obligations and therefore that non-firm 
personnel know very little about the organizational context of audit firms (Jenkins et al., 
2008). What is known is that human capital is the most important resource in audit firms 
(Greenwood, Li, Prakash, & Deephouse, 2005). Just like any other organization, audit firms 
adopt organizational practices that shape the opportunities and constraints for individual 
behavior (Bowen & Ostroff, 2004). However, unlike other types of organizations, audit 
firms combine organizational practices with conflicting professional and commercial 
objectives (Cooper, Hinings, Greenwood, & Brown, 1996). The resulting incoherence of 
underlying opportunities and constraints for auditor behavior can trigger, often unwanted 
and unintended, behavioral consequences. The three studies included in this dissertation 
analyze different organizational practices in order to understand how the organizational 
context of audit firms influences auditor behavior. This knowledge is critical for designing 
more appropriate organizational remedies for audit firms. 
 
Interdisciplinary perspective on auditor behavior 
This dissertation draws on economic and managerial literatures to show that audit firms 
can have a powerful influence on auditor behavior. The studies in this dissertation use 
theoretical arguments grounded in agency and organizational theories in order to explain 
auditor behavior. In particular, stakeholder-agency theory, tournament theory, and the 
literature on institutional logics each provide a unique perspective on why certain 
organizational practices influence auditor behavior. This dissertation, therefore, provides 
evidence that managerial and economic theories are complementary in understanding 
auditor behavior in the sense that theoretical arguments rooted in organizational and 
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agency theories can explain relevant academic questions and societally important audit 
phenomena. 
 
Dissertation Overview 
Study 1: Organizational antecedents of gatekeeper failure: a stakeholder-agency model 
Gatekeeper failures are a persistent and endemic feature of the modern business 
environment. The dominant response to remedy these failures has been to tighten 
regulation on the provision of gatekeeper services (Bayou, Reinstein, & Williams, 2011). A 
striking fact about the regulatory reforms is that relatively little attention is paid to the 
organizational context of gatekeeping firms. This is a serious omission because 
organizational factors may be potential causes for gatekeeper failure, and because 
organizational practices could be potential remedies to gatekeeper failure. This first study 
sets the stage for the overarching research aim of this dissertation by paying close 
attention to the organizational challenges facing gatekeepers, and auditors in particular.  
 This study draws on stakeholder-agency theory (Hill & Jones, 1992) to develop a 
theoretical model explaining auditor failure. The model identifies the organizational 
antecedents of auditor failure as well as the organizational remedies to auditor failure. In 
particular, auditor failure is conceptualized in terms of auditor agency problems that result 
from the relationships auditors have with clients and third party beneficiaries (Greenwood 
& Empson, 2003; Herrbach, 2001; Sharma, 1997). This study then traces gatekeeper 
agency problems to organizational factors, such as the economic dependence and the profit 
orientation of audit firms (Beattie, Brand, & Fearnly, 1999; O’Keefe, Simunic, & Stein, 1994; 
Zeff, 2003). These organizational factors are believed to establish the organizational fault-
lines of the two external agency problems audit firms have. The theoretical model further 
incorporates corporate governance practices audit firms can use to mitigate these agency 
problems, such as client retention and internal transparency policies (Gendron, 2002; 
Kaptein, 2008). In all, this model allows us to understand why auditor failures occur and 
how they can be remedied. 
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 To empirically test the foundational tenets of our theoretical model we used 
advanced survey techniques to analyze data collected amongst Dutch audit firms (Kline, 
2010; Ping, 2006). Our findings strongly support our theoretical claims. Specifically, we 
find that the economic dependence and the profit orientation of audit firms increase the 
risk of gatekeeper agency problems materializing in the relationships audit firms maintain 
with their clients and beneficiaries. We also show that specific governance practices audit 
firms feature, such as client retention policies and internal transparency practices, reduce 
the risk of gatekeeper agency problems.  
From this, we conclude that effective remedies to combat auditor failures reside 
at the level of the audit firm (Jenkins et al., 2008). In the face of potentially ineffective 
regulatory and enforcement measures (Wyatt, 2004), it is nothing but common sense to 
explicitly target and scrutinize governance mechanisms nested in the organizational 
context of audit firms themselves. It is within these firms that sanctions and rewards can 
most directly be connected to auditors’ behaviors, while firm-level controls are 
considerably closer to the audit process than external controls could ever be. We therefore 
contribute to the audit literature by showing that an exclusive reliance on regulatory 
reforms may not be sufficient (Bayou et al., 2011; Sikka, 2009).  
 
Study 2: Winning at a losing game? Adverse behavioral consequences of tournament-like 
promotion systems  
The second study zooms in a specific organizational practice of audit firms to analyze its 
behavioral implications. In particular, this study analyzes tournament-like promotion 
practices. The central tenet of tournament-like promotion practices is that contestants 
compete for a prize (i.e. a promotion) that is awarded based on relative rank rather than 
absolute performance (Connelly, Tihanyi, Crook, & Gangloff, 2013; Lazear & Rosen, 1981). 
The study establishes that (unintended) detrimental behaviors result from this rank-order 
based promotion practice. This has implications for the design and use of such promotion 
systems in audit firms. 
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 While prior research suggests that tournament-like promotion systems provide 
high-powered incentives to employees to maximize work effort (Becker & Huselid, 1992; 
Conyon, Peck, & Sadler, 2001), a less frequently acknowledged consequence of 
tournament-type incentives is that they can also trigger self-interested and strategic 
behaviors (Dixit, 1989; Harbring & Irlenbusch, 2008; Lazear, 1989; Rankin & Sayre, 2011). 
By building on tournament theory (Lazear & Rosen, 1981; Rosen, 1986; Rosenbaum, 
1979), this study develops a theoretical framework that enables the comprehensive study 
of the behavioral consequences of tournament-like promotion systems in audit firms. This 
model identifies two powerful design parameters of tournament-like promotion systems 
that can trigger self-interested and strategic behaviors. That is, the level of competitive 
intensity (Connelly et al., 2013; Harbring & Irlenbusch, 2003; Lazear & Rosen, 1981) and 
the size of the prize of partnership (Connelly et al., 2013; Ridge, Aime, & White, 2014) are 
thought to induce auditors to either increase their own performance by engaging in self-
interested behaviors (Henderson & Fredrickson, 2001; Hvide & Kristiansen, 2003) or to 
behave strategically by undermining the performance of their competitors (Dixit, 1987; 
Harbring & Irlenbusch, 2008; Lazear, 1989). This comprehensive analysis unpacks the 
mechanisms of why and how tournament-like promotion systems can trigger (unintended) 
detrimental behaviors in audit firms.  
 A large-scale survey amongst non-partnered Dutch, Belgian, and German auditors 
allows us to apply, test, and extend tournament theory to a highly relevant organizational 
context. The non-partnered auditors are of interest because they face the tournament-like 
promotion pressures. The findings support our contention that the design parameters of 
tournament-like promotion systems affect auditor behavior. More specifically, the 
empirical results show that the level of competitive intensity triggers self-interested and 
strategic behaviors. In contrast to the predictions, however, the findings establish that the 
size of the prize of partnership actually reduces strategic behavior and has no effect on self-
interested behaviors.  
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By analyzing the conduct-related consequences of the structure and the implicit 
incentives of audit firms’ promotion schemes, this study refines our understanding of the 
influence of the organizational context on auditor behavior (Francis, 2011; Pierce & 
Sweeney, 2004). This stream of research is relatively rare, especially outside the US. The 
available scholarly work has mainly researched audit firms’ incentive structures at the 
partner level (Knechel, Niemi, & Zerni, 2013; Liu & Simunic, 2005). Equally important, 
however, is to understand the link between the promotion structure and non-partner 
behavior because non-partner behavior will affect non-partner work. Given that non-
partner work is the ultimate input for the partner’s sign-off decisions, audit quality may be 
ultimately affected. 
 
Study 3: Logics under pressure: how strategic responses to institutional complexity undercut 
institutional microfoundations. 
The last study in this dissertation provides a wider institutional perspective on audit firm 
design and auditor behavior. It is one of the first to develop and test theoretical predictions 
on how competing institutional demands can influence individual-level behaviors. 
Specifically, this study explains the organizational mechanism of how the complex 
institutional environment of audit firms influences auditor behavior.  
By building on the institutional logics literature (Friedland & Alford, 1991), this 
study investigates how audit firms internally manage competing institutional logics -or 
institutional complexity- and on how these strategic organizational responses affect 
individual auditor behavior. While prior institutional research has generated insight on the 
organizational level strategic responses to institutional complexity (Battilana & Dorado, 
2010; Kraatz & Block, 2008; Oliver, 1991; Reay & Hinings, 2009), much less is known about 
the individual level behavioral implications of institutional complexity (Greenwood, 
Hinings, & Whetten, 2014). This study suggests that to reconcile the competing 
institutional demands of the professional and the commercial logics, audit firms selectively 
adopt organizational practices embedded in both logics (Cooper et al., 1996). This selective 
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combination of practices can have a distorting effect on auditor behavior. That is, the 
availability of alternative behavioral signals will result in auditors questioning the 
legitimacy of previously taken-for-granted professional behaviors (Greenwood, Suddaby, 
& Hinings, 2002; Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Thornton, 2002). This will trigger institutional 
disruption behaviors which undercut the microfoundations of the professional logic 
(Empson, Cleaver, & Allen, 2013; Jazarbkowski, Matthiesen, & van de Ven, 2009; Lawrence 
& Suddaby, 2006).  
 A field study amongst Dutch, Belgian, and German audit firms allows us to test our 
theoretical predictions. The findings indicate that practices stemming from the 
professional and commercial logics are selectively combined in order to reconcile and 
balance institutional demands. The findings further show that the strategic adoption of 
practices stemming from the commercial logic triggers disruption behaviors that undercut 
the microfoundations of the professional logic and can thus undermine the gatekeeping 
role of the auditor. 
This study therefore concludes that adopting commercial practices in a 
traditionally professional organization can often unwantedly and unwittingly undercut the 
gatekeeping role of the auditors. This implies that auditor failure cannot only be prevented 
through regulatory reforms. Instead, auditor failure could be prevented by adopting 
organizational practices aimed at restoring the adherence to the professional logic that is 
under threat of being supplanted by the commercial logic.  
 
An Organizational Perspective on Auditor Conduct 
Overall, the studies in this dissertation aspire to hone our knowledge on the antecedents 
of and remedies to auditor misconduct. The three studies demonstrate that a crucial factor 
with respect to understanding auditor conduct pertains to the -often neglected- 
organizational context of audit firms. The compelling evidence of the significant impact of 
the audit firm’s organizational context on auditor (mis)behavior provides three timely, 
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practical, realistic, and scientifically robust reflections about the future of the auditing 
profession. 
 First, rather than treating the symptoms of auditor misconduct by limiting the type 
of work auditors can perform, understanding the underlying organizational antecedents of 
auditor misbehavior is fundamental in order to structurally eliminate the source of the 
problem. The frequently forgotten organizational factor of audit firms provides convincing 
explanations for auditor failures as well as potentially powerful remedies to combat 
auditor failures. Second, despite the belief that certain organizational practices manage 
audit firm specific challenges, we should be wary about unintended and undesirable 
behavioral repercussions of certain organizational practices. Even though tying promotion 
to relative performance or basing compensation on revenue generation are believed to 
align auditors’ interests with the interests of the firm, these organizational practices have 
generated a culture where profit optimization and revenue improvement threaten 
professional goals. Last, as the confidence in the audit starts with trust in the auditor, a 
renewed internal commitment to the gatekeeping role of audit firms is an effective remedy 
to re-establish public trust in the auditing profession. Rather than passively implementing 
externally imposed regulation, audit firms can nurture the public’s trust by actively 
adopting internal solutions to combat undesirable behaviors in order to signal their 
intrinsic motivation to honor their gatekeeping role.  
 
 
22_Erim Pruijssers BW Stand.job
Chapter 1 
 
 
10 
23_Erim Pruijssers BW Stand.job
 
11 
CHAPTER 2. ORGANIZATIONAL ANTECEDENTS OF GATEKEEPER 
FAILURE: A STAKEHOLDER–AGENCY MODEL1 
 
Abstract 
Gatekeepers are private professional service providers who pledge their reputational 
capital to mediate financial market transactions burdened by severe information 
asymmetries. Gatekeeper failures have proven to be an endemic and persistent feature of 
the modern business environment, however, and have been particularly prevalent in the 
audit context. Although the dominant response to these failures has been to shape up 
jurisdiction-level regulation, relatively little attention has been paid to the organizational 
challenges facing the firms providing these services. Building on stakeholder–agency 
theory, we develop a theoretical model of the agency problems that gatekeeper firms face 
in regard to their two most salient external stakeholder groups, as well as the corporate 
governance practices they can use to meet these challenges. We test this model using 
survey methods and structural equations modeling on a sample of 112 Dutch audit firms. 
Consistent with our model, we find that organizational factors such as profit orientation 
and economic dependence of audit firms aggravate agency problems in stakeholder 
relationships, while governance practices like internal transparency processes and strict 
client retention policies, mitigate these problems.  
 
 
 
                                                     
1 This chapter is co-authored by Prof.Dr. J. (Hans) van Oosterhout and Prof.Dr. Pursey 
P.M.A.R. Heugens. A previous version of this chapter has been published in the American 
Accounting Association Proceedings (2012). Previous versions have been presented at 
the  European Auditing Research Network conference (2011), the European Group for 
Organization Studies Conference, the American Accounting Association Annual Meeting 
(2012). 
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INTRODUCTION 
In market exchange, an efficient allocation of resources is critically dependent on accurate 
and reliable information being available to all exchange partners. Informational 
requirements are particularly demanding in financial markets, which are often burdened 
by severe informational asymmetries between ‘insider’ suppliers of securities and the 
‘outsiders’ seeking to invest in them (Healy & Palepu, 2001). Insiders may attempt to 
alleviate such asymmetries by disclosing information in order to relieve information 
asymmetries, but such disclosures are not inherently credible. In financial markets, 
efficient exchange will therefore rely on information that is independently verified by 
parties uninvolved in the actual exchange of securities (Power, 1999; Sikka, 2009).  
In advanced market economies, such independent informational services tend to 
be provided by private professional parties commonly referred to as ‘gatekeepers’ (Coffee, 
2006). Paradigmatic examples of gatekeeping services involve auditors providing 
assurance over a firm’s financial disclosures, credit rating agencies gauging the 
creditworthiness of a firm, investment bankers brokering and underwriting complex 
security transactions, and lawyers shaping and safeguarding the legality of these 
transactions (Coffee, 2002, 2006; Choi, 1997; Fox, 2008; Partnoy, 2006).  
In theory, gatekeepers are able to commercially exploit such services because the 
information they provide is more credible than the information their clients disclose about 
themselves (Coffee, 2002, 2006; Healy & Palepu, 2001; Leftwich, 1983). Being professional 
intermediaries, gatekeepers are repeat players who receive only a small portion of their 
revenues from a single client, and therefore have little incentive to deceive market 
investors on behalf of any particular client (Coffee, 2002, 2006; Fox, 2008). Moreover, 
gatekeepers can be seen to pledge their reputational capital, which is a critical asset in 
marketing gatekeeper services, as a bond to guarantee the independence and quality of 
their services, and would rationally be unwilling to jeopardize the reputation built-up over 
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many years for the sake of any single client (Coffee, 2002, 2006; Macey & Sale, 2003; Millon, 
2003).  
 The last two decades have shown a divergence between theory and practice, 
however, as gatekeeper failure has proven an endemic and persistent feature of the 
business environment (Fox, 2008). At the turn of the millennium, no auditor, analyst, or 
credit rating agency timely signaled the poor financial health of Enron (Coffee, 2002; 
Millon, 2003; Sikka, 2009), while less than a decade later, gatekeepers generally failed to 
appreciate and communicate the risks associated with financial institutions such as Fannie 
Mae, Freddie Mac, and Lehman Brothers (Coffee, 2008; Manns, 2009). As a result, resolving 
gatekeeper failure has been a pressing item on the agenda of regulators and enforcement 
agencies, which has led to a tightening of the institutional and regulatory constraints on 
the provision of gatekeeper services (Bayou, Reinstein & Williams, 2011; Defond & Francis, 
2005; Hunt, 2009).  
A striking fact about these reforms, however, is that relatively little attention is 
paid to the organizations that provide gatekeeping services. This is a serious omission, 
because organizational factors at the level of gatekeeper firms themselves, such as their 
economic dependence on individual clients or their profit-seeking motive, may be involved 
as deeper causes of gatekeeper failure. Furthermore, because gatekeeping organizations 
are more closely involved with the verification of corporate information than any external 
institution possibly could be (McNair, 1991; Johnstone, Warfield, & Sutton, 2001), shoring 
up their governance practices potentially provides more effective remedies for these 
failures than those available to external regulators and enforcement agencies. 
In this study, we draw on agency theory (Arrow, 1985; Eisenhardt, 1989), and 
stakeholder theory (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Frooman, 1999) to develop a 
stakeholder–agency model of the organizational antecedents of gatekeeper failure (Hill & 
Jones 1992). We argue that the private professional firms providing gatekeeper services 
face two characteristic agency problems that establish two organizational “fault-lines” that 
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encumber this type organization (Heath, 2009). First, gatekeepers are prone to experience 
agency problems in the relationships they maintain with their clients, as the quality and 
quantity of the services they provide are not easily assessable for clients (Baiman, 1979; 
Sharma 1997). We argue, second, that gatekeepers will face agency problems in regard to 
the third parties who benefit from their services (henceforth: beneficiaries), such as 
investors in security markets, because these beneficiaries are uninvolved in the 
transactions through which gatekeeper services are exchanged (Herrbach, 2001; Wallin, 
1992).  
Because audit firms are paradigmatic gatekeepers facing potential agency 
problems in their relationships with both their clients and the beneficiaries of audit 
services, we develop our stakeholder–agency model of gatekeeper failure in the audit 
context in order to empirically validate the foundational tenets of this model. More 
concretely, we trace gatekeeper agency problems (GAPs) to organizational factors such as 
the profit orientation of audit firms (profit orientation; Fox, 2008; Simunic, 1980; Wallace 
& Kay 2008) and an economic overreliance on a select few clients (economic dependence; 
Beattie, Brandt, & Fearnly, 1999; Johnstone et al., 2001; Khurana & Raman, 2006; Sikka, 
Filling & Liew, 2009), thereby establishing the baseline relationships of our model. We 
subsequently hypothesize that certain governance practices that audit firms have 
developed in response to these agency problems will mitigate the extent to which these 
organizational factors materialize in GAPs, including measures that increase the 
transparency between professionals inside audit firms (internal transparency; Bedard, 
Deis, Curtis, & Jenkins, 2008; Kaptein, 2010) and strict client retention policies that protect 
professionals from excessive client pressures (client retention policies; Gendron, 2002; 
Hackenbrack & Nelson, 1996; Lord, 1992).  
To empirically test these foundational relationships of our stakeholder–agency 
model of gatekeeper failure, we use data on a sample of 112 Dutch audit firms (often with 
multiple respondents per firm), collected through survey methods. To ensure a rigorous 
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interpretation of the results, structural equation modeling with interaction effects (MSEM) 
is used to analyze the data (Kline, 2010; Ping, 1995, 2006).  
Our findings support the foundational tenets of the stakeholder–agency model of 
gatekeeper failure we develop. More specifically, we find that profit orientation and 
economic dependence of gatekeeper PSFs do in fact aggravate GAPs materializing in 
relationships with clients and beneficiaries, while organizational governance practices 
such as the degree of transparency between professionals and strict client retention 
policies within audit firms mitigate the extent to which agency problems materialize in 
relationships with their external stakeholders.  
Our intended contributions to the literature are three-fold. First, we contribute to 
stakeholder–agency theory by developing and empirically validating a stakeholder–agency 
model of gatekeeper failure that could serve as an exemplar for further empirical 
applications of stakeholder–agency theory. This study may thereby help to breathe 
empirical life into a potentially powerful but empirically underdeveloped theoretical 
framework in the management literature. Second, we contribute to the nascent literature 
on the organizational design problems of professional service firms (henceforth: PSFs; 
Greenwood & Miller, 2010; Von Nordenflycht, 2010), specifically those operating in 
professional contexts characterized by strong conflicts of interests (Nanda, 2002), such as 
law and accounting. More specifically, the stakeholder–agency model we develop may 
contribute to our understanding of the corporate governance challenges faced by this type 
of “classic PSFs” (Von Nordenflycht, 2010), as well as the corporate governance practices 
that they may develop to meet these challenges (Greenwood & Empson, 2003; Empson & 
Chapman, 2006). Third, by finding that specific governance practices that audit firms 
feature can significantly reduce gatekeeper failure, this study highlights that an exclusive 
reliance on external regulation may not be sufficient as effective mechanisms can be found 
at the organizational level. 
 
28_Erim Pruijssers BW Stand.job
Chapter 2 
 
  
16 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
A Stakeholder–Agency Model of Gatekeeper Failure 
In order to theorize how organizational antecedents within gatekeeper firms affect 
gatekeeper failure, we develop a stakeholder–agency model of the relationships that 
gatekeepers maintain with their two most critical stakeholder groups (Hill & Jones 1992). 
Drawing from both stakeholder theory (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Frooman, 1999) and 
agency theory (Arrow, 1985; Eisenhardt, 1989), stakeholder–agency theory 
conceptualizes the firm as a nexus of contracts comprising all implicit and explicit 
contractual relations between a firm and its stakeholders, and uses foundational insights 
from agency theory to analyze failures in these relationships (Hill & Jones 1992).  
Stakeholders of gatekeeper firms. Stakeholders are those parties that can affect, or who are 
affected by, the achievement of the firms’ objectives (Freeman, 1984), and are understood 
to include a firm’s shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, and the communities 
and natural environment in which the firm is embedded (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). 
Although gatekeepers may have as many different stakeholders as any other firm, the two 
stakeholder groups that are most critical from the perspective of both gatekeepers 
themselves and the societies in which they operate, result from their economic function of 
mediating transactions in complex exchange. The first critical stakeholder group are the 
clients paying for gatekeeper services in order to be able to market their goods, services, 
or securities. Public firms are a paradigmatic example, as they hire auditors to provide 
assurance over their financial disclosures in order to be able to float their stock on public 
equity markets (Firth & Liau-Tan, 1998).  
Because not all parties who use or rely on gatekeeper services maintain explicit 
contractual relationships with gatekeepers, we need to distinguish a second stakeholder 
group that is not only critical from a societal perspective, but also for gatekeeper industries 
as a whole: the beneficiaries of gatekeeper services. Although this stakeholder group is 
much more heterogeneous and diffuse than the client stakeholder group, its members have 
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in common that they are uninvolved in the contracting processes through which 
gatekeeper services are exchanged. Examples of such beneficiaries are equity investors 
relying on audits of public firms in making investment decisions, and creditors, customers, 
and business partners using credit ratings in making business decisions (Coffee, 2002, 
2006). Being third parties to the exchange of gatekeeper services, beneficiaries are 
particularly vulnerable to gatekeeper failures for reasons that agency theory helps to 
illuminate. 
Gatekeeper agency problems. Agency theory provides a conceptual framework for 
analyzing problems in human cooperation that arise when decision-making is at least 
partially separated from risk-bearing, and where the interests of the decision maker (the 
agent) and the risk bearer (the principal) are imperfectly aligned (Eisenhardt, 1989). The 
principal-agent framework was initially developed to model the welfare implications of 
market transactions burdened by information asymmetry (Akerlof, 1970; Spence & 
Zeckhauser, 1971), but has subsequently been used to analyze a broad variety of 
relationships within both markets and firms (Husted, 2007; Nikalant & Rao, 1994; Ross, 
1973). It has been used to conceptualize agency relationships between: managers and 
shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), controlling and minority shareholders (La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer, & Vishny, 1998), parent and subsidiary companies (Roth & 
O’Donnel, 1996), franchisors and franchisees (Mathewson & Winter, 1985), patients and 
doctors (Scott & Vick, 1999), lawyers and their clients (Rubinfeld & Scotchmer, 1993), 
professionals and their clients more generally (Sharma, 1997), and gatekeepers, their 
clients, and the beneficiaries of their services more specifically (Antle, 1984; Baiman, 1979; 
Herrbach, 2001). In this study, we conceptualize gatekeeper failure as gatekeeper agency 
problems (GAPs) emerging in the relationships that gatekeepers maintain with their 
clients and the beneficiaries of their services.  
Gatekeeper-client agency problems. The relationship that gatekeepers maintain with their 
clients is vulnerable to GAPs because of the nature of the services provided (Fox, 2008; 
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Greenwood & Empson, 2003; Painter, 2004; Sharma, 1997). Because strong knowledge 
and information asymmetries exist between the professionals providing the services and 
the clients purchasing them, the latter are in a poor position to judge the quality of the 
services rendered and the quantity of inputs used to produce them (Baiman, 1979; 
Causholli & Knechel, 2012; McNair, 1991;). As a result, clients are vulnerable to self-
interested professional actions and decisions (Sharma, 1997).  
Audit services are an exemplary case in point. They are often seen as a “credence 
good”, because audit clients cannot easily assess the quality of the services delivered or 
quantity of inputs used in their production (Brivot, 2011; Causholli & Knechel, 2012; 
McNair, 1991). Because audit firms strive to maximize financial returns (Fox, 2008; Macey 
& Sale, 2003; Simunic, 1980) while their clients desire a level of quality optimal for 
attracting external financing (Johnstone et al., 2001), the latter become vulnerable to self-
interested auditor behaviors that reduce audit quality and destroy client value. GAPs are 
therefore prone to surface in gatekeeper-client relationships. 
Gatekeeper-beneficiary agency problems. A second agency relationship exists between 
gatekeepers and the beneficiaries of their services. This is because gatekeepers and their 
clients contract with each other, while the beneficiaries of gatekeeper services are 
uninvolved in this transaction, exposing them to the risk of gatekeepers and their clients 
taking actions that are value-destroying for them (Baiman, 1979; Herrbach, 2001; Wallin, 
1992). In the audit context, for example, directors of public firms may condone or even 
push for substandard auditing in order to conceal earnings management practices or other 
forms of self-dealing, while in turn gatekeepers may succumb to such pressures to retain 
future audit contracts from these clients (Macey & Sale, 2003; Miller, 1992; Moore, Tetlock, 
Tanlu, & Bazerman, 2006). Because beneficiaries only have an implicit contractual 
relationship with the gatekeeper firm (Azariadis & Stiglitz, 1983), they are unable to either 
optimally design or monitor performance of the gatekeeping contract (Goldman & Barlev, 
1974; Herrbach, 2001; Sikka, Puxty, Willmott, & Cooper, 1998). As a result, GAPs, 
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manifested as a broad variety of service quality-reducing behaviors, are prone to 
materialize in gatekeeper-beneficiary relationships (Malone & Roberts, 1996). 
 
The Empirical Context: Audit firms as Paradigmatic Gatekeepers 
In order to further develop our stakeholder–agency model of gatekeeper failure, we resort 
to the audit context to develop and test hypotheses reflecting the agency relationships 
gatekeepers maintain with their clients and beneficiaries. Audit firms are paradigmatic 
gatekeepers because they closely resemble the theoretical gatekeeper model for three 
reasons (Coffee, 2001). First, by providing assurance to investors that the financial 
disclosures of its clients present a true and fair view of their state of affairs (Sikka, 2009), 
auditors effectively provide access to equity markets for public firms (Palmrose, 2005). 
Second, auditors are repeat players in the market for audit services, who pledge their 
reputational capital with each audit contract (Coffee, 2001). Third, the fees auditors earn 
from any single client tend to be small compared to their total revenues, as the high 
concentration of the audit market structurally ensures that the bulk of audit firms have 
numerous clients to which they provide audit services (Barnier, 2010). 
 In an important sense, audit firms are also paradigmatic for the type of 
organization providing gatekeeper services. Being exemplars of “classic professional 
service firms” (Von Nordenflycht, 2010), audit firms are internally owned by a subset of 
their employees and have traditionally been organized as professional partnerships or P2 
firms (Cooper et al., 1996; Greenwood, Hinings, & Brown, 1990) in order to be able to 
attract and retain the human capital on which they are critically dependent (Malos & 
Campion, 2000), secure the autonomy of the professionals providing gatekeeper services 
(Greenwood et al., 1990), signal their independence and professional ethos (Greenwood, 
Li, Prakash, & Deephouse, 2005), or simply comply with professional or legal obligations 
(Von Nordenflycht, 2010). Empirically, the P2 has been the dominant form of enterprise 
organization in gatekeeper services, with law and accounting firms continuing to feature 
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the partnership model of ownership and governance today, while most if not all investment 
banks have historically been of the P2 form (Hayward & Boeker, 1998). Credit rating 
agencies are a notable exception, as they are owned by large publicly listed media 
conglomerates, presumably because the kind of data they use for their services require 
sizeable financial investments (Hansmann, 1996). 
Finally, audit firms have also been paradigmatically involved in gatekeeper 
failures, as the past decade has witnessed a host of failures in the audit industry that have 
had profound systemic ramifications (Carnegie & Napier, 2010). The demise of Arthur 
Andersen, for example, “is not just the story of a single accounting firm, […] it is a story 
about an entire system” as many other audit firms were similarly involved in fraud 
(Squires, Smith, McDougal & Yeack, 2003, p.171). Moreover, the apparent failure of the 
audit industry to identify any of the antecedents leading up to the recent financial crises 
demonstrates that audit failure is persistent (Coffee, 2006; Hopwood, 2009; Sikka, 2009), 
in spite of a host of measures taken to remedy it. Measures like the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 
2002 and the revised Eighth Company Law Directive (Defond & Francis, 2005; Tackett, 
Wolf, & Claypool, 2004) have sought to promote more independent and truthful reporting 
by shaping up the duties and responsibilities of statutory auditors (Bayou et al., 2011). In 
addition, the clarity and quality of international auditing standards have been enhanced 
under the supervision of a group of financial market authorities (Humphrey, Loft & Woods, 
2009), while ongoing public policy debates advocate even more invasive reforms of the 
profession (Barnier, 2010; Humphrey, 2011).  
Although these measures have led to a stiffening of the regulatory and institutional 
context in which audits take place, it is questionable whether they prompt the required 
behavioral changes (Levay & Waks, 2009; Painter, 2004; Wyatt, 2004) and re-establish 
stability and trust in the financial system (Bayou et al., 2011; Carnegie & Napier, 2010; 
Humphrey, 2011; Sikka, 2009). Furthermore, most of the measures taken to date have paid 
relatively little attention to the type of organization providing audit services. This is a 
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serious omission, not only because organizational factors within audit firms may be 
involved as the deeper causes of gatekeeper failures, but also because organizational 
factors, because of their proximity to the audit process, may provide more effective 
remedies for these failures than any external policy measure could possibly furnish. It is to 
these factors in audit firms that we turn now.  
 
Hypotheses Development 
In order to test the foundational tenets of our stakeholder–agency model of gatekeeper 
failure, we develop two empirical models reflecting the two organizational fault lines 
within gatekeeper firms that result from the agency relations they maintain with their 
clients and beneficiaries respectively. More specifically, we will argue that organizational 
factors such as the profit orientation and the economic dependence of audit firms will 
positively affect the materialization of GAPs along these fault lines, while specific 
governance practices that audit firms feature, such as transparency and client retention 
policies, will mitigate the effects of these organizational factors. 
Professional – client (model1): baseline relationship. Over the past three decades, audit 
firms have developed from predominantly professional to more commercial 
organizational configurations (Brock, 2006; Gendron, Suddaby, & Lam, 2006). 
Traditionally, audit firms were organized as P2 organizations (Cooper et al. 1996; 
Greenwood et al., 1990), featuring a strong professional culture, decentralized decision-
making, and mostly informal collegial monitoring practices. This P2 configuration was 
believed to be optimally geared to securing professional autonomy and to tempering 
commercial pressures on professionals routinely facing conflicts of interests (Greenwood 
& Empson, 2003; Moore et al., 2006).  
Yet with the increasing competition due to the saturation of the audit market and 
the start of cross-selling profitable non-audit services (Suddaby, Cooper, & Greenwood, 
2007), audit firms have increasingly moved away from the P2 configuration to the so-called 
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managed professional business (MPB) configuration (Cooper et al., 1996), which combines 
a greater commercial orientation with more centralized decision-making, a stronger 
emphasis on strategic and financial planning, and the adoption of more formal 
organizational controls (Morris & Pinnington, 1998). This move has intensified the 
underlying value conflict between professionalism and commercialism in audit firms 
(Gendron et al., 2006; Hanlon, 1997; Suddaby, Gendron, & Lam, 2009; Willmott & Sikka, 
1997), with the professional logic increasingly giving way to the commercial logic (Macey 
& Sale, 2003; Wyatt, 2004; Zeff, 2003). 
These developments are likely to aggravate the agency conflict between audit 
firms and their clients. Especially the profit orientation of audit firms, which we define as 
an organization’s consideration to profit motives, increases the pressure for auditors to 
prioritize the pursuit of profit over professional objectives (O’Keefe, Simunic, & Stein, 
1994; Wallace & Kay, 2008; Zeff, 2003). Prior research has identified profit maximization 
as a driving force in the audit industry (Simunic, 1980), and has documented that the wave 
of mergers and acquisitions that took place in this industry have led to higher profit 
margins (Owen, 2003). Although as residual claimants the partners are most sensitive to 
the profit motive, this is also true for non-partner auditors when the profit orientation of 
the firm is translated into the compensation plans and career perspectives of the auditors 
(Agoglia, Hatfield, & Lambert, 2010; Knechel, Niemi, & Zerni, 2013). The dominant up-or-
out promotion system, for example, and the risky deferred compensation incentive 
structure that it involves (Malos & Campion, 2000), creates hyper incentives for non-
partner auditors to engage in strategic behaviors, which may ultimately harm client 
interests (Causholli & Knechel, 2012).  
One particularly salient type of GAP that results from an overly strong profit 
orientation of audit firms involves the overcharging of clients (Causholli, Knechel, Lin, & 
Sappington, 2012). As audits are executed on a fixed fee basis (Ettredge, Bedard, & 
Johnstone, 2003), firms cannot easily recover cost overruns but they can overcharge their 
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clients nevertheless (Causholli & Knechel, 2012; De Villiers, Hay, & Zhang, 2012). 
Overcharging refers to behaviors like billing more than what would be appropriate for the 
level of service supplied, shifting hours between clients, or more subtly charging senior 
fees when a junior carried out the work without refunding the client (Ribstein, 2003). 
These behaviors not only dupe the client financially, but also compromise the 
informational value of the audit, as overcharging often materializes through economizing 
on service quality, decreasing effort, cutting audit costs, or reducing auditor expertise 
(Causholli & Knechel, 2012). Less tangible but equally important is that an excessive profit 
orientation undermines the sense of professionalism and its associated attitudes of care 
and skepticism that a valid and reliable audit requires (Wallace & Kay, 2008; Wyatt, 2004). 
We therefore hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 1: the degree of profit orientation will be positively related to the prevalence of 
overcharging. 
 
Professional – client (model 1): moderation effects. In order to secure their future business 
and existence, audit firms are pressured to adopt corporate governance practices that 
mitigate the extent to which organizational factors engender GAPs. When detected by 
parties outside the firm, such behaviors could destroy a firm’s reputation, which serves as 
an important signal for the quality and reliability of its services (Podolny, 1993; 1994; 
Power, 2009) and allows firms to charge premium fees and attract and maintain better 
human capital than less reputable competitors (Hay, Knechel, & Lin, 2008; Greenwood et 
al., 2005; Simon & Francis, 1988). Given the long-standing prominence of collegial 
monitoring practices in the professions (Lazega, 2001) and its centrality in traditional 
professional configurations such as the P2 (Greenwood et al., 1990), a governance practice 
that may be particularly effective in restraining GAPs is an internal transparency policy 
(Kaptein, 2008).  
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Within audit firms, an internal transparency policy serves to make those behaviors 
visible to fellow professionals that, due to their complexity and decentralized location at 
the professional-client interface, are difficult to monitor hierarchically, let alone by 
external professional associations or enforcement parties. An internal transparency policy 
may be an effective mechanism to enhance the detection and deterrence of overcharging 
in audit firms, because it enables peer-monitoring practices that have long been 
established in the professions and that professionals tend to accept as legitimate (McCabe, 
Trevino & Butterfield, 1996; Kaptein, 2010).  
Peer monitoring involves individuals observing and reacting to peers’ behaviors 
(Loughry & Tosi, 2008). Research has established that peer monitoring can simultaneously 
reduce hidden actions—such as employee theft, unprofessional behavior, escalation of 
commitment, and other forms of self-interested decision-making (Kirby & Davis, 1998; 
Loughry & Tosi, 2008; Schaefer & Welker, 1994; Tosi, Gomez-Meija, Loughty, Werner, 
Banning, Katz, & Silva, 1999)—and induce more effort (Kandel & Lazear, 1992; Widener, 
Shackell, & Demers, 2008). This is not only because peer monitoring facilitates the 
detection of undesirable behaviors by individuals less willing to engage in such behaviors, 
but also because it generates conformity to the firm’s standards (Loughry & Tosi, 2008). 
The audit setting is already familiar with ex-post peer monitoring practices, be it by another 
audit firm (in the case of the joint audit: Francis, Richard, & Vanstraelen, 2009) or by the 
firm itself (in the form of engagement quality control reviews: Bedard et al., 2008; Brazel, 
Agoglia, & Hatfield, 2004). Although such ex-post peer monitoring practices have been 
found to affect auditor judgment and audit quality (Bedard et al., 2008), overcharging is 
hardly observable after the audit has been completed, let alone by a joint audit firm. 
Therefore, enhancing ongoing peer monitoring during the audit process through an 
internal transparency policy will boost the internal control environment within audit firms 
(Chapman & Kihn, 2009) and curb the prevalence of a broad array of overcharging 
practices (Kaptein, 2008). Therefore, we hypothesize: 
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Hypothesis 2: The extent to which a profit orientation affects the prevalence of overcharging 
will be reduced by an internal transparency policy. 
 
Professional –beneficiaries (model 2): baseline relationship. As explained, audit firms also 
face agency problems in their relationship with investors, who are the most important 
beneficiaries of their services. Given that the relationship with investors is vulnerable to 
collusion between audit firms and their clients at the expense of investor interests, the 
organizational factor in audit firms that is most likely to result in GAPS in this relationship 
is the economic dependence of audit firms on the clients paying for their services (Beattie 
et al., 1999). Audit firms become more economically dependent in this way the more their 
income streams come from a single or just a few large clients (Khurana & Raman, 2006). 
Although economic dependence may result from a number of conditions, it is at least 
partially innate to the audit context because audit firms face strong incentives to hold on 
to existing clients because of client-specific investments in set-up costs that they cannot 
recuperate outside particular client relationships (DeAngelo, 1981; Farag & Elias, 2011; 
Levinthal & Fichman, 1988). 
Economic dependence jeopardizes the quality and value of audit services because 
it creates incentives that compromise auditor independence (Dart, 2011; Firth, 1980; 
Frankel, Johnson & Nelson, 2002). More specifically, economic dependence compromises 
the auditor’s ability to resist client pressures to accommodate aggressive or even 
fraudulent reporting (Beck, Frecka & Solomon, 1988; Johnstone et al., 2001; Khurana & 
Raman, 2006; Magee & Tseng, 1990). It may result in a host of audit quality reducing 
behaviors (Braun, 2000; Donnelly, Quirin, & O’Bryan, 2003; Kelley & Margheim, 1990; 
Malone & Roberts, 1996; Otley & Pierce, 1996), such as lowering the amount of work to a 
level below what is considered necessary for a reliable audit, or failing to pursue 
questionable items in the disclosures of their clients (Herrbach, 2001; Malone & Roberts, 
1996; Otley & Pierce, 1996). More generally, economic dependence will diminish the care 
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and skepticism that is necessary for reliable audits, reduce “the level of evidence gathered 
for the audit”, and ultimately jeopardize the validity and reliability of the audit as a whole 
(Herrbach, 2001, p.790). This renders audits unreliable, undermines the public’s trust in 
audit services (Carcello, Hermanson, & Huss, 1996), and eventually harms the interests of 
their most important beneficiaries: investors. Hence, we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The degree of economic dependence will be positively related to the prevalence 
of audit quality reducing behaviors. 
 
Professional - beneficiaries (model 2): moderation effects. In order to secure the intangible 
asset of their reputation, audit firms are prone to implement corporate governance 
practices that mitigate the extent to which economic dependence engenders audit quality 
reducing behaviors. A growing body of research has started to identify several factors 
influencing audit quality reducing behaviors, such as the firm’s internal control 
environment (Margheim & Pany, 1986; Malone & Roberts, 1996; Otley & Pierce, 1996) and 
contextual factors, such as leadership style or time budget pressures (Coram & Woodliff, 
2003; Willett & Page, 1996; Kelley & Margheim, 1990; Kelley, Margheim, & Pattison, 2011).  
Surprisingly, the implementation of quality controls has not been found to 
significantly affect auditor behavior (Malone & Roberts, 1996; Margheim & Pany, 1986). 
This result may be due, however, to the broad and overly inclusive way in which the 
effectiveness of the internal control system was operationalized in these studies. One way 
to resolve this issue is by measuring and analyzing the effects of specific governance 
practices separately by breaking down the quality control system into specific control 
practices targeted at specific behaviors (Bedard et al., 2008).   
 A practice that is particularly suited to reduce audit firm vulnerability to client 
pressures involves a strict client retention policy. Adopting and implementing a strict client 
retention policy can incentivize auditors to flag critical engagements with clients, and 
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support lead partners to terminate relationships in case clients exert too much pressure to 
acquiesce to aggressive reporting. Prior research has not only argued that client retention 
policies are more critical than client acceptance decisions (Gendron, 2002), but has also 
demonstrated empirically that client retention incentives influence audit judgments 
(Chang & Hwang, 2003; Farmer, Rittenberg, & Trompeter, 1987; Goldman & Barlev, 1974; 
Hackenbrack & Nelson, 1996; Lord, 1992). Strict client retention policies therefore reduce 
the vulnerability of audit firms to audit quality-reducing behaviors that arise from high 
degrees of economic dependence. We therefore hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The extent to which economic dependence engenders audit quality reducing 
behaviors will be reduced by the presence of a strict client retention policy.  
 
METHODS 
Data Collection and Sampling Design 
To test our hypotheses, we conducted a web-based survey of all Certified Public 
Accountants (CPAs) registered at the Dutch professional association NBA 
(http://www.nba.nl), as the data for our variables of interest are not publicly available 
through archival sources. The survey administration took place over the course of 10 
weeks starting in mid-May 2011. It consisted of the initial survey invitation and two follow-
up reminders. The invitation e-mail included both an endorsement by the NBA and an 
incentive appealing to respondents’ social motivations, as we pledged to donate 1 euro per 
respondent to the Red Cross to support the victims of the tsunami in Japan. Ultimately, 281 
Dutch CPAs employed by a public audit firm, with an average tenure of 14.5 years, returned 
a completely filled-out survey. This represents an estimated individual-level response rate 
of 9.8 percent. As we are interested in firm-level variables, we aggregated the individual 
responses to the firm level by averaging them. As 112 of the 474 Dutch audit firms 
responded to our survey, our firm-level response rate equals 23.6 percent. The Dutch audit 
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landscape can be categorized into three segments, mainly depending on whether an audit 
firm holds a license to perform audits of public interest entities (PIE) (provided by the AFM, 
the Dutch Financial Market Authority). Our sample captures the extant variety of the Dutch 
audit landscape, as all Big 4 firms are included in our sample, as well as 9 out of 11 AFM-
license holding firms, and 21.6 percent of all smaller firms that are restricted to conducting 
non-PIE audits. The sample description based on audit firm segments can be consulted in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Sample description 
 
Organization type Sampling framea In sample Percentage 
Big Four 4 4 100% 
License holding 11 9 81.8% 
Registered at AFM 459 99 21.6% 
aSource: AFM (2011) 
 
Measures 
The scales used to measure our variables of interest consisted of 52 items capturing 9 
constructs rated on seven-point Likert scales. Whenever possible, we relied on 
psychometric scales validated in prior research (6 scales). The nature of our research 
questions required that 4 scales be purposely developed, as no scales measuring the 
variables of interest were available in the literature (for all scales and corresponding items, 
see Appendix 1). In these cases, we relied on canonical scale development processes to 
establish measurement reliability and construct validity (Hinkin, 1998; Steenkamp & van 
Trijp, 1991). First, we generated a large pool of items for each construct through both 
inductive and deductive item generation. Second, we consulted two expert panels to assess 
the content validity of each measure and to shorten the survey. One expert panel consisted 
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of 11 academics (containing scholars from the fields of accounting and organizational 
research), who mainly evaluated the correspondence between theoretical constructs and 
items, and who reduced the number of items to be measured for each scale. The other 
expert panel consisted of 9 professional auditors (5 partners and 4 seniors, mainly from 
Big 4 companies), who evaluated the survey both on its consistency with practice as well 
as on the use of professional jargon.  
 As a third step, we used structural equations modeling (SEM) to estimate our two 
models, as SEM allows us to take the measurement error of the latent independent and 
dependent variables into account (Kline, 2010). When aiming to understand relationships 
between latent variables in large and complex models containing many items, Little and 
his associates (2002) advocate a partial disaggregation strategy (referred to as parceling) 
for linking indicators to constructs, because parceling reduces the number of parameters 
to be estimated (Kishton & Widaman, 1994; Williams & O’Boyle, 2008). Parceling is also 
preferred over the use of individual indicators, as these often have a lower reliability and 
smaller common-to-unique variances (Coffman & McCallum, 2005; Little, Cunningham, 
Shahar & Widaman, 2002). We created three parcels of items using the so-called domain 
representativeness approach, in which the item with the highest factor loading on the 
latent construct is assigned to parcel 1, the item with the second-highest loading to parcel 
2, and the item with the third-highest loading to parcel 3. Items 4 – 6 are then assigned in 
reversed order, and so on (Kishton & Widaman, 1994).  
Dependent variable model 1: audit quality reducing behaviors. Audit quality reducing 
behaviors were measured using the four-item scale developed by Otley and Pierce (1996) 
measuring the “poor execution of an audit procedure that reduces the level of evidence 
gathered for the audit, so that the collected evidence is unreliable, false or inadequate 
quantitatively or qualitatively” (Herrbach, 2001, p.790). This scale was also used 
successfully by Malone & Roberts (1996) and Herrbach (2001). The Cronbach’s alpha for 
this scale is satisfactory (α = .87). A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) confirmed the 
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internal consistency of this scale as all factor loadings were significant (p <.05). The 
unidimensionality of this scale was established through exploratory factor analysis (EFA), 
with the first factor capturing 73.0 percent of the total variance. 
Dependent variable model 2: Overcharging clients. This purposely-developed nine-item 
scale aims to capture the extent to which auditors overbill their clients in relation to the 
quality or quantity of the services rendered. Respondents had to answer on a scale of 1 
(never) to 7 (very often) how often certain types of behaviors occurred within their firm. 
This scale included items such as “suggesting unnecessary additional services to clients”, 
“reducing the number of hours without reimbursing the client”, “shifting hours from audit 
to audit-related services” and “charging senior fees when a junior carried out the work”. 
The Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was again satisfactory (α = .90). CFA confirmed the 
internal consistency of this scale as all factor loadings were statistically significant (p <.05). 
This scale proved to be unidimensional with the first factor explaining 81.2 percent of the 
total variance. 
Independent variable model 1: Profit orientation. This seven-item scale is based on the 
three-item profit orientation scale developed by Wallace and Kay (2008, p.1034), who 
“asked respondents to indicate the degree to which they felt that the practice of their 
profession was primarily concerned about the generation of profit”. We decided not to use 
this scale directly, as its reliability score (α =.65) was below the conventional cut-off point 
for scale reliability, which Nunnally (1978) puts at .70. We generated five additional items 
to arrive at a more inclusive measure of the profit orientation construct. We followed the 
advice of our academic expert panel, which suggested that we drop one of the original 
Wallace and Kay (2008, p.1034) items (“in order to succeed in [accounting] one has to be 
aggressive and business oriented”). The academic experts found this item more applicable 
in its original context (law firms) than in accounting. The remaining seven items included 
examples like: “the bottom-line orientation of my firm is the generation of profits”, “we 
closely monitor our financial performance”, and “my firm is mainly concerned about the 
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generation of profits”. Cronbach’s alpha for the new scale was .77, indicating a sufficient 
degree of reliability (cf. Nunnally, 1978). CFA showed that all factor loadings were 
statistically significant (p <.05). EFA demonstrated unidimensionality, as the first factor 
captured 67.1 percent of the total variance. 
Independent variable model 2: Economic dependence. This purposely-developed four-item 
scale aims to measure the degree to which a public accountant perceives his office as being 
economically dependent on a particular client. Items included “the bankruptcy of one of 
our clients could jeopardize the survival of my firm” and “losing one of our clients can 
impact the revenues of my firm / business unit considerably”. The items produced a 
Cronbach’s alpha of .77, indicating a sufficient degree of reliability. The CFA indicated 
satisfactory internal consistency, as all factor loadings were statistically significant (p 
<.05). EFA confirmed the unidimensionality of the scale, with the first factor accounting for 
66.7 percent of the total variance.  
Moderating variable model 1: Transparency. A six-item scale developed by Kaptein (2008) 
was used to measure internal transparency, which captures “the degree to which employee 
conduct and its consequences are perceptible to those that can act upon it, that is 
colleagues, supervisors, subordinates, and the employee(s) concerned” (Kaptein, 2008, 
p.926). The scale shows satisfactory reliability, through a Cronbach’s alpha of .80. CFA 
further showed that all factor loadings were statistically significant (p < .05). EFA 
established the unidimensionality of this scale, with the first factor explaining 52.6 percent 
of total variance. 
Moderating variable model 2: Client retention. This purposely-developed five-item scale 
aims to capture the extent to which audit firms support their members in their decision to 
terminate relationships with clients exerting undue pressure to accommodate aggressive 
reporting. The scale included items like: “my firm would back my decision to walk away if 
a client exerts too much pressure”, “walking away from a threatening client will positively 
affect my career” and “I am supported when I discontinue the relationship with a client 
44_Erim Pruijssers BW Stand.job
Chapter 2 
 
  
32 
exerting too much pressure”. The scale proved to be sufficiently reliable, with a Cronbach’s 
alpha of .84. CFA showed all factor loadings to be statistically significant (p <.05). EFA 
confirmed the unidimensionality of the scale, as the first factor explained 62.3 percent of 
total variance. 
Control variable: Professional commitment. This seven-item scale developed by Suddaby et 
al. (2007) measures the “relative strength of identification with and involvement in one’s 
profession” (Morrow & Wirth, 1989, p.41). We included this measure as a control variable 
because the professional commitment of individual auditors is expected lower the degree 
to which GAPs might materialize in audit firms’ external agency relationships. The scale 
showed sufficient reliability, with a Cronbach’s alpha of .87. CFA likewise showed that all 
factor loadings were significant (p < .05). Unidimensionality was established through EFA, 
with the first factor accounting for 56.8 percent of the total variance. 
Control variable: Specialization. This purposely-developed five item scale aims to capture 
the extent to which members of an audit firm can serve a select set of clients based on their 
expertise. We included this measure as a control variable because it is expected to increase 
the degree to which GAPs materialize in audit firms’ external agency relationships because 
it reduces a professional’s redeployability in an audit firm. The scale included items like 
“because my work is specialized, I can only serve a limited amount of clients”, “I lack proper 
training for certain services my firm offers” and “my expertise enables me to serve every 
client in any sector” (reverse coded). The scale proved to be sufficiently reliable, with a 
Cronbach’s alpha of .70. CFA further showed all factor loadings to be significant (p < .05). 
EFA confirmed the unidimensionality of the parceled scale, as the first factor explained 
71.8 percent of the total variance.  
Control variable: Centralization. This five-item scale developed by Aiken and Hage (1968) 
measures the hierarchy of authority in an organization (p.501) and was adapted to the 
audit context. This scale has been successfully used by Jaworski and Kohli (1993). We 
included this measure as a control variable because centralization forms an integral part 
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in the modern MPB (Cooper et al., 1996). Centralization makes monitoring professional 
behavior at the client interface more complex (Teece, 2003) and can therefore positively 
influence GAPs. The scale showed sufficient reliability with a Cronbach’s alpha of .85. CFA 
likewise showed that all factor loadings were significant (p < .05). Unidimensionality was 
established through EFA, with the first factor accounting for 63.3 percent of the total 
variance. 
Control variable: Reputation. This construct was dichotomously operationalized, assigning 
a value of 1 to an audit firm if it belongs to the big four, and 0 if otherwise.  
Control variable: Size and strategic capabilities. Size and strategic capabilities were also 
dichotomously operationalized, taking on the value of 1 if the audit firm obtained a license 
from the AFM to carry out audits at PIEs and 0 if not.  
 
Validity and Reliability 
Sample validity. Out of the 281 complete surveys, we identified 40 early and 40 late 
respondents according to the date and time their surveys were completed (Grafton, Lillis 
& Widener, 2010). We evaluated non-response bias by comparing the two groups 
according to both demographic variables and constructs of interests. A lack of significant 
differences between the two groups supports the view that our data is not hampered by 
non-response bias.  
Convergent/discriminant validity.  Our constructs display convergent validity, as all 
indicators are positively and significantly related to their associated latent variables 
(Carmine & Zeller, 1979; Kline, 2010). In order to establish discriminant validity, we 
compared the fit of the unconstrained measurement model to that of a series of 
measurement models in which a pair of constructs was constrained to correlate fully by 
setting the covariance between the latent constructs to 1 (Kline, 2010). If the 
unconstrained model demonstrates better fit than the constrained model, this test 
supports the view that the corresponding pair of constructs possesses discriminant 
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validity (Carmine & Zeller, 1979; Kline, 2010). All possible pair-wise constrained models 
were estimated, and all demonstrated poorer fit through significantly higher chi-square 
values.  
Common method variance. As all the data for this study are extracted using a single 
measurement instrument, there is a potential risk of common method variance. We 
followed the procedures suggested by Podsakoff and associates (2003), in which common 
method variance is captured through a single unmeasured latent method factor in the 
analysis. This entails comparing the fit of a full measurement model in which all indicators 
are loaded onto their latent variables, to a measurement model in which all indicators are 
loaded onto a single method factor. The full measurement model of Model 1 yielded an 
adequate fit (χ² 1656.41; p < .001; RMSEA .09; CFI .82), as did Model 2 (χ² 1066.24; p < 
.001; RMSEA .09; CFI .85). The single method factor model fit was worse for both model 1 
(χ² 3457.56; p < .001; RMSEA .16; CFI .58; ∆ χ² 1801.15; ∆d.f. 21; p < .001) and model 2 (χ² 
2466.97; p < .001; RMSEA .17; CFI .59; ∆χ² 1400.73; ∆d.f. 21; p < .001). Subsequently, we 
estimated a trait-and-method model by adding a single method factor latent variable to the 
full measurement model. The presence of common method variance can be established if 
this trait-and-method model exhibits better fit than the full measurement model lacking a 
method factor latent variable. For both model 1 and model 2, the trait-and-method model 
fitted our data better (model 1: χ² 1282.46; p < .001; RMSEA .07; CFI .88; ∆χ² 373.75; ∆d.f. 
125; p < .001; model 2: χ² 940.01; p < .001; RMSEA .08; CFI .89; ∆χ² 126.23; ∆d.f. 43; p < 
.001). Using the sum of squared loadings, we established that the amount of variance 
explained by the common method factor accounted for 4.5 percent in model 1, and for 1.75 
percent in model 2. Both values are well below the critical 25 percent cut-off point 
(Williams, Cote, & Buckely, 1989). 
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RESULTS 
Overall Model Results 
We use the LISREL 8.80 software program with maximum likelihood estimation routines 
to estimate our two models. Table 2 contains descriptive statistics, reliability scores, and 
correlations. To account for moderation in structural equations modeling (MSEM), we used 
Ping’s (1995; 2006) two-step approach for testing interaction effects amongst latent 
variables. This approach involves using a single indicator for the latent product and setting 
the loading2 and error3 for the indicator of the latent product to a fixed value obtained from 
the additive version of the measurement model (Cortina, Chen & Dunlap, 2001; Ping, 1996, 
2006). Fixing certain parameter values in a structural model based on values of the 
measurement model is justified as long as the latent variables are unidimensional 
(Anderson & Gerbing, 1988; Cortina et al., 2001).   
In general, we confirm that aggravating organizational factors do indeed increase the risk 
that GAPs materialize in auditor-client and auditor-beneficiary relationships, while 
governance mechanisms reduce the risk that such agency problems occur. This is 
evidenced by the good fit of our two models to the data (model 1: χ² 506.36; d.f. 257; 
RMSEA .08; CFI .86; GFI .76; model 2: χ² 516.06; d.f. 308; RMSEA .08; CFI .89; GFI .75). Even 
though the chi-square test is significant, the models fit the data well. Not only do the 
goodness-of-fit indices show satisfactory values, but the path coefficients are also 
significant and in the directions hypothesized (see Table 3). 
 
Hypotheses Testing 
Hypothesis 1 stated that profit orientation leads to overcharging of clients in the auditor-
client relationship. Our results support this hypothesis, as profit orientation has a positive 
                                                     
2 𝜆𝑥:𝑧 = (𝜆𝑥1 + 𝜆𝑥2)(𝜆𝑧1 + 𝜆𝑧2) Where x1 and x2 are indicators of latent variable X and where z1 
and z2 are indicators for the moderating latent variable Z. 
3 𝜃𝜀𝑥:𝑧 = (𝜆𝑥1 + 𝜆𝑥2)
2𝑉𝐴𝑅(𝑋)(𝜃𝜀𝑧1 + 𝜃𝜀𝑧2) + (𝜆𝑧1 + 𝜆𝑧2)
2𝑉𝐴𝑅(𝑍)(𝜃𝜀𝑧1 + 𝜃𝜀𝑧2) + (𝜃𝜀𝑧1 +
𝜃𝜀𝑧2)(𝜃𝜀𝑧1 + 𝜃𝜀𝑧2) 
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and significant direct effect on overcharging clients (β = .30, t = 2.70). Hypothesis 2 
predicted a moderating effect of an internal transparency policy on this base-line 
relationship, as transparency enhances the visibility of undesirable behaviors within the 
audit firm. Our results confirm Hypothesis 2. The interaction term (profit orientation * 
internal transparency) has a negative and significant effect on overcharging clients (β = -
.22, t = -2.17). To interpret these interactions further, interaction plots were created using 
the standardized path coefficients based on the Aiken and West’s (1991) procedure (see 
Figure 3; Cortina, Chen, & Dunlap, 2001). These plots suggest that in an organizational 
context characterized by high profit orientation, a strong internal transparency policy 
results in lower degrees of overcharging. Except for centralization, which has a significant 
positive effect on overcharging, (β = .20, t = 2.04), the control variables are insignificant. 
Hypothesis 3 stated that economic dependence fuels audit quality-reducing 
behaviors because it enhances the perceived dependence on the client. The results support 
Hypothesis 3 as economic dependence has a positive and significant effect on audit quality 
reducing behaviors (β = .32, t = 2.66). Hypothesis 4 predicted a moderating effect of a strict 
client retention policy on the base-line relationship. This hypothesis was supported, as our 
results show evidence of a negative and significant effect of the interaction term (economic 
dependence * client retention) on audit quality reducing behaviors (β = -.30, t = -2.95). To 
interpret these interactions further, an interaction plot was created using the standardized 
path coefficients based on the Aiken and West’s (1991) procedure (see Figure 4; Cortina et 
al., 2001). These plots suggest that in an organizational context characterized by high 
economic dependence, audit quality reducing behaviors can be reduced by the presence of 
a strong client retention policy. A weak client retention policy increases audit quality 
reducing behaviors in a high economic dependence context. The control variables are not 
significant. 
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Internal Transparency 
 
Internal Transparency 
Low Profit Orientation 
 
High Profit Orientation 
Robustness Checks 
Next to the robustness tests reported in the methods section, we performed several 
additional analyses in order to ensure the robustness of our results (untabulated). As is 
recommended when conducting SEM analyses, many alternate models were estimated, 
and their fit assessed (Kline, 2010). As these alternate model specifications never fitted the 
data significantly better than our stakeholder-agency models, and usually fared far worse, 
we conclude that the foundational tenets of the stakeholder-agency models we develop of 
gatekeeper failure are empirically grounded.  
 
 
Figure 3        Interaction Plot for Professional-Client Agency problem 
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Client Retention 
 
 
Client Retention 
Figure 4 Interaction Plot for Professional- Beneficiaries Agency Problem 
 
  
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this study we developed a stakeholder–agency model of gatekeeper failure and tested 
the foundational tenets of this model using survey data from the Dutch audit industry. In 
support of this model, we found that the profit orientation and economic dependence of 
audit firms increases the risks of GAPs materializing in their relationships with their clients 
and beneficiaries, while specific governance practices that they feature, such as internal 
transparency practices and client retention policies, reduce the risk of GAPs encumbering 
these relationships. As such, this study has made three contributions to the literature. 
 
Stakeholder–Agency Theory 
Although stakeholder–agency theory is a powerful conceptual framework, with Hill and 
Jones’ (1992) seminal contribution being one of the most highly cited papers in the 
stakeholder theory literature (Parmar, Freeman, Harrison, & Wicks, 2010), the empirical 
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development of this framework has not kept pace with its theoretical advancement, with 
only a few papers directly testing the foundational tenets of this theory (Agle, Mitchell, & 
Sonnenfield, 1999; Arora & Alam, 2005; Chen, 2009; Collier, 2008; Coombs & Gilley, 2005; 
Moroney, Windsor, & Aw, 2012). One reason for this is that it is inherently difficult to model 
and operationalize agency problems in firm-stakeholder relationships on account of there 
not being a readily available metric, such as firm value for example, that enables a valid 
operationalization of agency problems for different stakeholder groups (Jensen, 2002). 
Another problem involves data availability. Because the financial disclosures that public 
firms feature predominantly serve to inform equity investors, they will typically not be 
equally useful for capturing the costs that agency problems impose on non-shareholding 
stakeholders of the firm (Laplume, Sonpar & Litz, 2008). 
This study shows, however, that one way to overcome these problems is by 
developing a contextualized stakeholder–agency model of audit firm-stakeholder 
relationships, and by using survey methods to operationalize the specific agency problems 
that encumber this type of firms, as well as the equally specific governance measures that 
they feature to remedy these problems. It also shows that the stakeholder–agency model 
is particularly useful to theorize and operationalize the stakeholder–agency relationships 
of gatekeepers more generally, as such firms routinely deal with conflicts of interests 
between different stakeholder groups and even owe their economic existence to mediating 
such conflicts. As such, this study has not only empirically corroborated the foundational 
tenets of the stakeholder–agency model it developed of gatekeeper failures, but it has also 
illuminated some of the core governance challenges that gatekeepers have to deal with, as 
well as certain specific governance practices they feature to meet these challenges. These 
challenges and practices are also relevant for the literature on the PSFs providing these 
services, which brings us to our second intended contribution. 
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Professional Service Firms 
By showing how governance challenges and practices of audit firms affect the risk of GAPs 
materializing in their external stakeholder relationships, our research also contributes to 
the literature on the organizational design challenges of PSFs (Greenwood, Deephouse, & 
Li, 2007; Greenwood & Miller, 2010; Greenwood, Morris, Fairclough, & Boussebaa, 2010), 
particularly the design challenges faced by PSFs in traditional professions such as law and 
accounting (Greenwood & Empson, 2003). In a provocative contribution to the literature, 
Von Nordenflycht (2010) raised the question whether the configuration of practices that 
characterize such “classic PSFs” derive from their economic challenges of managing their 
critical dependency on human capital-intensive inputs and the delivery of intangible 
service outputs, or whether they can be traced instead to their professional context in 
which strong conflicts of interest between different stakeholders (Nanda, 2003) have 
resulted in the development of high degrees of professionalization and institutionalization 
(Von Nordenflycht 2010).  
As this study demonstrates that at least some of the governance practices that 
audit firms feature are functional in mitigating the agency problems that encumber their 
relationships with clients and beneficiaries, it provides empirical support for the view that 
extant configurations of organizational practices in classic professions such as law and 
accounting can at least partially be traced to the conflicts of interests between different 
stakeholders characteristic for these professions. Although at first sight such practices may 
not appear to be efficiency enhancing (Von Nordenflycht 2010), they are nevertheless 
useful in mitigating conflicts of interests between different stakeholders that will need to 
be resolved in a sustainable way in order to secure the integrity and livelihood of the 
profession as a whole. Consequentially, the stakeholder–agency model that we develop in 
this study can fruitfully be extended in future research on the governance and 
organizational design practices of other PSFs types. Specifically, we expect that our model 
will generalize towards PSF types that either routinely face conflicts of interests between 
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their most important stakeholders, such as law firms or investment banks, or that are 
inherently involved in serving multiple stakeholder groups simultaneously, such as 
business schools (Trieshmann, Dennis, Northcraft, & Niemi, 2000). 
Finally, our finding that the profit orientation and economic dependency of audit 
firms increase the risk of GAPs materializing in relationships with clients and beneficiaries 
signals that the documented move in the audit context from more professional 
organizational templates, such as the P2 configuration (Greenwood & Empson, 2003; 
Greenwood et al., 1990), towards more commercial organizational templates, such as the 
MPB configuration (Cooper et al., 1996; Muzio, Kirkpatrick & Kipping, 2011), may come at 
the price of harming those vulnerable stakeholder interests that professional institutions 
and traditional organizational configurations have sought to protect. This creates new 
challenges for both regulators and audit firms, to which we turn now.  
 
Organizational Remedies for Gatekeeper Failures 
Although the predominant response to gatekeeper failures has been to tighten regulation 
and proliferate enforcement measures, several scholars have voiced the concern that an 
over-reliance on external regulation and enforcement will not effectively remedy 
gatekeeper failures in general and audit failures more specifically (Bayou et al., 2011; 
Carnegie & Napier, 2010; Hogan & Wilkins, 2008; Humphrey, 2011; Sikka, 2009; Wyatt, 
2004). An important reason for this is that the behaviors involved in these failures are 
difficult to observe and detect by external enforcement agencies, and therefore cannot be 
sufficiently deterred by regulation.  
Through the present study, we discovered that the specific governance practices 
that audit firms feature, such as internal transparency practices and client retention 
policies, reduce the risk of GAPs materializing in the agency relationships these firms 
maintain with their clients and beneficiaries. From this we conclude that effective 
mechanisms to combat audit failures frequently reside at the level of the organizations 
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providing these services (Malone & Roberts, 1996). Both policy makers and researchers 
designing future studies on the topic of gatekeeper failure are therefore advised to focus 
more on the organizational context in which audit services are produced (Gendron, 2002; 
Hopwood, 1996; Humphrey et al., 2009; McNair, 1991; Pierce and Sweeney, 2004; Power, 
1995; Power, 2003). We believe that such a focus on the organizational level of analysis 
would be conducive to overcoming “the apparent contradiction between [audit] firms’ 
espoused commitment to audit quality and the apparent absence of measures that deal 
directly with prevention and detection of quality threatening behaviors” (Pierce & 
Sweeney, 2006, p.36). 
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APPENDIX A  EMPLOYED SCALES 
 
Audit quality reducing behaviors (α: 0.87) 
How often do these behaviors present themselves at your firm? 
1. Reduction of the work below what is considered reasonable. 
2. Superficial review of client documentation. 
3. Acceptance of weak client explanations. 
4. Failure to research a questionable item. 
 
Overcharging (α: 0.90) 
How often do these behaviors present themselves at your firm? 
1. Overestimating clients’ risk in order to engage in more audit procedures. 
2. Suggesting unnecessary additional services. 
3. Charging senior fees when a junior performed the job. 
4. Overstating the amount of work that needs to be done. 
5. Shifting hours from audit to audit-related services. 
6. Shifting hours from audit to non-audit services. 
7. Reducing the number of hours without reimbursing the client. 
8. Appointing a less qualified team than promised in the offer. 
9. Reducing the number of hours within the fixed-fee contract. 
 
Profit orientation (α: 0.77) 
Could you please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements? 
1. My firm is mainly concerned about the generation of profits. 
2. The ‘bottom line’ orientation of my firm is the generation of profits. 
3. We closely monitor financial performance. 
4. Our partners emphasize market performance. 
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5. Generating revenues is what matters most in my firm. 
6. My income depends on the profit I realize for my firm. 
7. Our incentive structure rewards revenue generation. 
 
Economic dependence (α: 0.77) 
Could you please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements? 
1. The income of my office/business unit depends to a large extent on revenues 
coming from one or two of our largest clients. 
2. The bankruptcy of one of our clients could jeopardize the survival of my firm. 
3. My office/business unit does not economically depend on any particular client.  
4. Losing one of our clients can impact the revenues of my firm/business unit 
considerably. 
 
Internal transparency (α: 0.80) 
Could you please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements? 
1. If a senior does something which is not permitted, someone in the organization 
will find out about it. 
2. If a junior does something which is not permitted, a senior will find out about it. 
3. If a colleague does something which is not permitted, I or another colleague will 
find out about it. 
4. If I criticize other people’s behavior, I will receive feedback on any action taken 
as a result of my criticism. 
5. In my immediate working environment, there is adequate awareness of potential 
violations and incidents in the organization. 
6. Management is aware of the type of incidents and professional misconduct that 
occur in my immediate working environment. 
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Client retention (α: 0.84) 
Clients can sometimes exert too much pressure to sign off on doubtful items. ‘Walking 
away’ from such a client means the discontinuation of the relationship with that client. 
Could you please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements? 
1. My firm would back my decision to walk away if a client exerts too much 
pressure. 
2. It is seen as positive by my firm to walk away when a client exerts too much 
pressure. 
3. I am supported when I discontinue the relationship with a client exerting too 
much pressure. 
4. Walking away from a threatening client will positively affect my career.  
5. Walking away from a threatening client will negatively affect my relationship 
with colleagues.  
 
Professional commitment (α: 0.87) 
Could you please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements? 
1. I am deeply glad that I chose this profession over others I was considering at the 
time I joined. 
2. My RA is a significant part of my working life. 
3. I consider the RA designation as a significant accomplishment in my career. 
4. I am proud to tell my friends that I am a RA. 
5. I identify myself as a RA in my working environment. 
6. I feel pride when I see other RAs being recognized. 
7. I deeply care about the future of the RA profession. 
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Specialization (α: 0.70) 
Could you please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements? 
1. I can be employed for any service my firm provides.  
2. I lack proper training for certain services my firm offers. 
3. My expertise enables me to serve every client in any sector.  
4. Because my work is specialized, I can only serve a limited amount of clients. 
5. I am competent in every field of expertise my firm offers. 
 
Centralization (α: 0.85) 
Could you please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements? 
1. There can be little action taken until a managing partner approves a decision. 
2. A junior who wants to make his own decision would be discouraged here. 
3. Even small matters have to be referred to the managing partners for a final 
answer. 
4. Consent of managing partners is needed before any decision can be made. 
5. Seniors have to approve all decisions.  
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CHAPTER 3. WINNING AT A LOSING GAME? ADVERSE BEHAVIORAL 
CONSEQUENCES OF TOURNAMENT-LIKE PROMOTION SYSTEMS4  
 
 
Abstract 
Tournament-like promotion systems are believed to provide powerful incentives to 
employees to maximize work effort. A less frequently acknowledged consequence of 
tournament-type incentives, however, is that they can also trigger self-interested and 
strategic behavior. Prior research on tournament-like promotion set-ups has identified 
two influential design parameters that could trigger such behaviors, notably the degree of 
intensity of competition and the relative difference in pay between winners and losers. 
This study comprehensively tests whether or not these two design parameters explain self-
interested and strategic behavior in a unique empirical context in which tournaments are 
highly prevalent and behavioral risks have serious consequences, namely the audit 
partnership. Survey results from a European sample of non-partnered auditors suggest 
that intense competition produces self-interested and strategic behavior. Yet, contrary to 
our expectations, the relative pay difference has no significant effect on self-interested 
behavior, but does negatively affect strategic behavior. Overall, our study suggests that 
tournament-like promotion systems in audit partnerships yield unintended behavioral 
consequences that can have a very negative societal impact.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
4 This chapter is co-authored with Prof.Dr. Pursey P.M.A.R. Heugens and Prof.Dr. J. (Hans) 
van Oosterhout. It has been presented at the Accounting, Behavior and, Organizations 
section meeting of the American Accounting Association Annual Meeting (2014). 
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INTRODUCTION 
A prevalent feature of the contemporary organizational landscape is the use of rank-order 
contests to organize labor competition (Connelly, Tihanyi, Crook, & Gangloff, 2013). These 
contests are used widely when employers are faced with monitoring problems and 
information asymmetries (Becker & Huselid, 1992; Lazear & Rosen, 1981), though there is 
only limited research available in the management field on their use (Bothner, Kang, & 
Stuart, 2007). At the market level, investment funds (Acker & Duck, 2006; Brown, Harlow, 
& Starks, 1996) and the chicken broiler industry (Knoeber & Thurman, 1994) organize 
labor competition by basing rewards on rank-order performance. Contests are also 
prevalent in the area of innovation where rank ordering is used to generate the most 
creative ideas (Boudreau, Lacetera, & Lakhani, 2011; Terwiesch & Xu, 2008). At the 
organizational level, rank-order contests are used in the context of intra-organizational 
strategic human resource practices, such as the allocation of CEO positions (Conyon, Peck, 
& Sadler, 2001; Kini & Williams, 2012; Main, O’Reilly, & Wade, 1993; O’Reilly, Main, & 
Crystal, 1988), the organization of internal promotion in law firms (Kordana, 1995; Price, 
2003), and the organization of academic tenure (Gomez-Meija, Trevino, & Mixon, 2009). In 
these contests, rank is the most important thing that matters and, therefore, the chance of 
winning and reaping the rewards depends not only on one’s own performance, but also on 
the performance of his or her competitors (Becker & Huselid, 1992; Ehrenberg & 
Bognanno, 1990). 
The dominant framework used to analyze the design and outcomes of rank-order 
contests is tournament theory (Lazear & Rosen, 1981; Rosen, 1986; Rosenbaum, 1979). 
The crux of tournament theory is that several contestants compete for a prize that is 
awarded based on relative rank rather than absolute performance (Lazear & Rosen, 1981). 
Two design parameters define the structure of any rank-order tournament, namely (1) the 
degree of intensity of competition, also referred to as crowding, and (2) the relative value 
of the prize for winning the contest, also referred to as the pay spread (Connelly et al., 2013; 
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Harbring & Irlenbusch, 2003). While these design parameters are thought to provide 
powerful incentives to contestants to maximize effort, a less frequently acknowledged 
consequence of tournament-type incentives is that they trigger self-interested and 
strategic behavior (Dye, 1984; Lazear, 1989), and that this behavior can have detrimental 
consequences.  
 Even though tournament theory is a powerful framework with which to analyze 
the behavioral outcomes of rank-order contests, we still lack a comprehensive assessment 
of the behavior produced by tournaments in an organizational setting (Bothner et al., 2007; 
Connelly et al., 2013). Research in this area is scarce for the same reason that tournaments 
are used to begin with: data on individual performance and behavior are difficult to obtain 
in an organizational setting (Bothner et al., 2007; Connelly et al., 2013; Main et al., 1993). 
Sports competition, however, has provided a natural research setting that has informed 
management scholars of the potential limitations of rank-order tournaments (Becker & 
Huselid, 1992; Bothner et al., 2007; Ehrenberg & Bognanno, 1990). We intend to develop 
tournament theory by analyzing an empirical context in which tournaments are highly 
prevalent and the behavior they produce is of great consequence. 
 The audit industry is an ideal context in which to test the behavioral implications 
of tournaments. As professional partnerships, audit firms deliver intangible and 
customized services that are the product of team effort (von Nordenflycht, 2010). The 
resulting indivisibility of audit work makes it particularly difficult to observe and assess 
individual auditor performance (Causholli & Knechel, 2012). This is why the vast majority 
of audit firms have adopted tournament-like, up-or-out promotion systems to manage 
their human capital (Greenwood & Empson, 2003). The tournament’s design parameters 
set powerful incentives that influence auditor behavior. Given the societal importance of 
the audit in terms of corporate accountability, investor confidence, and the integrity of 
financial systems, understanding what drives auditor behavior is particularly significant.  
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We develop a model to assess whether or not the two design parameters of 
tournament-like, up-or-out promotion systems induce auditors to either improve their 
own performance by engaging in self-interested behavior (behavior that reduces the 
quality of the audit or that deliberately distorts its information value; Baiman, 1990; 
Harbring & Irlenbusch, 2008) or to behave strategically by undermining the performance 
of competitors (by reducing both organizational citizenship behavior and professional 
skepticism; Lazear, 1989). Ultimately, in potentially reducing the quality of the audit, this 
behavior may diminish the public’s trust in the financial system in general and in audit 
firms as corporate gatekeepers in particular (Francis, 2011). 
To investigate the influence of crowding and pay spreads on self-interested and 
strategic behavior in audit firms, we use structural equation modeling on survey data from 
405 German, Dutch, and Belgian non-partnered auditors. Our results extend tournament 
theory to the context of the audit firm by establishing that crowding increases both types 
of self-interested behavior (audit quality reducing behavior and deliberate distortion) and 
one type of strategic behavior (reduction of professional skepticism). Contrary to our 
theoretical expectations, we find that greater pay spreads actually reduce one type of 
strategic behavior (economizing on organizational citizenship behavior). As such, we 
demonstrate that the behaviorally relevant organizational design parameters defined by 
tournament theory are consequential in the context of audit firms and possibly other types 
of professional partnerships. 
Our study contributes to the organizational literature in three ways. First, unlike 
most current studies that focus on the effects of the tournament prize on increasing 
contestants’ effort (Bognanno, 2001; Connelly et al., 2013; O’Reilly III et al., 1988), we 
provide a comprehensive assessment of the effects of two design parameters of 
tournament set-ups, crowding and pay spreads, on behavior. We also refine our current 
understanding of the unwanted behavior that might be produced by tournament-like 
promotion systems. Second, we extend tournament theory’s scope by applying it in a new 
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context and to a new organizational form. The audit industry is a relevant area of 
application, because of the central role audit firms play in safeguarding the integrity of 
financial markets. The great societal stakes involved thus make it worth our while to 
explore whether tournament-type promotion systems are a desirable human resource 
management practice in this context. Furthermore, all audit firms are organized as 
professional partnerships, allowing us to apply tournament theory to this novel 
organizational setting (Connelly et al., 2013). The professional partnership form enables 
us to assess the behavioral response of a range of lower-level professionals to tournament-
like promotion set-ups, whereas most prior researchers have confined themselves to 
studying top management teams (Conyon et al., 2001; Kini & Williams, 2012; O’Reilly III et 
al., 1988; Ridge, Hill, & Aime, 2014). Third, our study also directly speaks to the literature 
on professional partnerships, the dominant form of enterprise organization in gatekeeping 
professions (Greenwood & Miller, 2010; von Nordenflycht, 2010). We show that auditors 
face perverse incentives that have the potential to produce behavioral outcomes that 
undermine the trust attributed to gatekeepers (Francis, 2011; Knechel, Niemi, & Zerni, 
2013). Professional partnerships therefore need to balance the risk of unintentionally 
producing self-interested and strategic behavior with the economic benefits associated 
with managing human capital through tournament-like, up-or-out promotion systems. 
 
THEORY 
Tournament Theory 
The key idea underlying tournament theory is that contestants compete for a prize that is 
attributed based on relative rank rather than absolute performance (Lazear & Rosen, 1981; 
Lazear, 1989). Given that the tournament’s prize can only be granted to a single contestant 
or team, the winner’s gain directly results in the other contestants’ loss and tournaments 
are thus characterized as zero-sum games (Becker & Huselid, 1992; Lazear & Rosen, 1981; 
O’Reilly et al., 1988). 
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 Usually, all contestants in a tournament have comparable credentials and formal 
qualifications upon entry, while differences in ability level tend to be largely unobservable 
prior to the start of the tournament. This makes determining and metering the absolute 
level of an individual’s performance extremely difficult (Kini & Williams, 2012). Absolute 
levels of individual performance are often only perceptible to the individuals in question, 
and therefore remain largely opaque to assessors. Rank ordering the relative performance 
of competing individuals then provides a more viable solution, because it enables assessors 
to distinguish between competitors on the basis of both objective and subjective criteria 
over the course of time, without having to assess each contender’s performance against 
absolute or universalistic benchmark criteria (Bothner et al., 2007; Lazear & Rosen, 1981).  
 
Tournament Design 
The two design parameters, crowding and the pay spread, should, in theory, provide 
powerful incentives for contestants to increase effort levels (Becker & Huselid, 1992; 
Connelly et al., 2013; Conyon et al., 2001; Greenwood et al., 2005; Price, 2003). In general, 
crowding is understood as a measure of the intensity of competition as it refers to the 
number of contestants vying for the tournament’s prize (Bothner et al., 2007). The number 
of contestants directly affects the chances of winning the tournament and can therefore 
influence the contestants’ behavior (Coffey & Maloney, 2010).  
The second design parameter, the value of the prize for winning the contest 
(Connelly et al., 2013; Ericksson, 1999; Harbring & Irlenbusch, 2003; Lazear & Rosen, 
1981; Main et al., 1993; Ridge et al., 2014) is generally understood in terms of the absolute 
difference between the winner’s compensation and the compensation of the runner-up, or 
the pay spread (Becker & Huselid, 1992; Connelly et al., 2013; Knoeber & Thurman, 1994). 
More so than absolute compensation, it is the pay spread that drives contestants to exert 
the maximum amount of effort to win the tournament because it creates a meritocracy in 
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which greater effort is rewarded by higher (future) returns (Bloom, 1999; Knoeber & 
Thurman, 1994; Lazear, 1989; Ridge et al., 2014; Shaw, Gupta, & Delery, 2002).  
 
Tournament Behavior 
An important question is whether tournaments elicit the desired kind of effort (Becker & 
Huselid, 1992; Lazear, 1989). Given the low probability of winning a significant prize, 
contestants might reduce productive effort (Nalebuff & Stiglitz, 1983; Taylor & Trogdon, 
2002). Instead, contestants might be compelled to outstrip the competition (Bernheim, 
1984; Dixit, 1987; Harbring & Irlenbusch, 2008) or even to engage in behaviors that 
damage other contestants’ relative standings (Nalebuff & Stiglitz, 1983). Therefore, to 
increase the probability of receiving the prize, contestants can either engage in self-
interested behavior to maximize their individual performance without regard for team 
objectives or act strategically to diminish the performance of their competitors (Drago & 
Turnbull, 1988; Henderson & Fredrickson, 2001; Lazear, 1989).  
In order to outperform their competitors, contestants can choose to maximize 
their position in the rank ordering by engaging in self-interested behavior (Henderson & 
Fredrickson, 2001; Hvide & Kristiansen, 2003). Self-interested behavior includes all 
opportunistic acts that make one relatively better off and thus maximize the expected gains 
to the contestant (Baiman, 1990; Bothner et al., 2007). Self-interested behavior can 
materialize in two ways. First, contestants may opt to shirk, or exert less effort, cut corners, 
or produce less rigorous work to finish more quickly, move on to the next task, and appear 
more productive, thereby improving their standing in the rank ordering (Dye, 1984; 
Henderson & Fredrickson, 2001). The incentive to shirk is exacerbated by the difficulty of 
‘standing out in the crowd’ and the notion that shirking can go unnoticed in large groups 
(free riding). Secondly, contestants may opt for compromising behavior. Compromising 
entails acts involving the willingness to make concessions (Chen, Ham, & Lin, 2011; 
Druckman, 1994), and therefore actively deviate from the desired option (more productive 
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effort) towards an alternative that may entail more risk in order to get ahead in the rank 
ordering (Hvide & Kristiansen, 2003). 
Tournaments can also prompt contestants to act strategically to undermine the 
performance and ranking of the competition (Dixit, 1987; Harbring & Irlenbusch, 2008; 
Lazear, 1989; Rankin & Sayre, 2011). Strategic behavior entails all conscious acts taken to 
improve one’s position in the race at the expense of competitors (Ansoff, 1987; Kilduff, 
Elfenbein, & Staw, 2010). Contestants are aware of the fact that the results of their own 
decisions are dependent upon the decisions made by the other contestants (McClintock & 
Liebrand, 1988), and will thus anticipate competitors’ actions before making decisions in 
an effort to diminish their competitors’ performance (Rankin & Sayre, 2011). Tournaments 
can induce two types of strategic behaviors. First, tournaments have the potential to reduce 
cooperative behaviors (Baiman, 1990; Lazear, 1989; Hayward & Hambrick, 1997). Second, 
because contestants can win the tournament by undermining other people’s efforts, 
tournaments can even induce the outright sabotage of competitors (Dye, 1984; Harbring & 
Irlenbusch, 2008; Lazear, 1989). As saboteurs focus their efforts on diminishing their 
competitors’ performance, they are able to retain the same probability of winning with less 
productive effort and reduce the chance of a competitor winning (Drago & Turnbull, 1988; 
Main et al., 1993). See Table 1 for the typology of undesirable behaviors that tournaments 
can produce. 
Even though the behavioral limitations of a tournament set-up have been explored 
in the realms of athletics and promotions to CEO positions (Becker & Huselid, 1992; 
Bothner et al., 2007; Conyon et al., 2001; Ehrenberg & Bognanno, 1990; Main et al., 1993; 
Rankin & Sayre, 2011), we know little about how this behavior will materialize in specific 
organizational contexts (Connelly et al., 2013). The difficulty of gaining access to sensitive 
performance and effort data makes researching the unintended, unwanted behavioral 
consequences of tournaments in the organizational context particularly challenging. Our 
private and unique survey data in the audit context enables us to apply, test, and extend 
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tournament theory in an organizational setting in which the use of tournaments is 
prevalent and where negative behavioral consequences carry particularly large societal 
risks. 
 
Table 1 Key Concepts and Operationalization 
 
 Self-interested behaviors Strategic behaviors 
Impacts Conceptualization Operationalization Conceptualization Operationalization 
Internal Shirking: avoid 
doing what should 
be done 
Audit quality 
reducing behaviors 
Cooperating: work 
together for 
mutual benefit 
Organization 
citizenship 
behaviors 
External Compromising: 
risky concession-
making 
Deliberate 
distortions 
Sabotaging: 
intentional 
withdrawal of 
efficiency 
Professional 
skepticism 
 
AUDIT CONTEXT 
External auditors play an important role in society by providing financiers and other 
stakeholders with an independent assessment of the accuracy and honesty of their publicly 
listed clients’ financial statements (Barnier, 2010). By verifying and certifying financial 
information, they ensure that capital is allocated efficiently and that investors are 
protected (Coffee, 2006). Auditors are therefore seen as gatekeepers of the financial 
markets because capital market stability has come to depend heavily on their services 
(Coffee, 2006).  
Auditors, however, have attracted increasing public interest due to their 
connection to the large corporate accounting scandals at the beginning of the millennium 
as well as to the 2008 financial crisis. In these instances, it seems auditors failed to meet 
the expectations associated with their gatekeeping role (Suddaby et al., 2009; Wyatt, 
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2004). This has not only weakened the credibility of the external audit, but has also 
increased awareness of the serious societal risks posed by auditor misbehavior.  
In light of the important role that auditors play, it is crucial to understand why 
auditors might engage in behavior that appears to undermine the quality of their services 
(Barnier, 2010). Scholarly attention is currently being directed to the impact of audit firm 
ownership and governance on auditor behavior (Barnier, 2010; Jenkins, Deis, Bedard, & 
Curtis, 2008). In particular, audit firms’ promotion and compensation systems are 
beginning to attract increased scrutiny (Knechel et al., 2013; Liu & Simunic, 2005).  
 
Use of Tournaments in the Audit Industry 
Because most audit firms are internally owned, outsiders know very little about their 
governance (Greenwood, Li, Prakash, & Deephouse, 2005; Jenkins et al., 2008). What we 
do know is that the primary source of competitive advantage for professional partnerships 
is human rather than financial capital (Greenwood et al., 2005; Hitt, Biermant, Shimizu, & 
Kochhar, 2001; von Nordenflycht, 2010). Recruitment of the best and the brightest 
business school graduates is essential to guaranteeing a firm’s strong performance in the 
future and is the first human resource challenge the firm faces (D’Aveni, 1996; Hitt et al., 
2001). Once these individuals are recruited, audit firms then face the challenge of retaining 
these highly mobile professionals (Pierce & Sweeney, 2004). Retention is critical to 
maintaining sufficient human capital as well as preserving the relational capital of auditors 
(Greenwood & Empson, 2003; Groysberg & Lee, 2009; Phillips, 2002). 
In order to manage these human resource challenges, audit firms are almost 
universally run as professional partnerships (Lowendahl, 2005; Maister, 1993). This 
entices auditors to work for the firm by offering the prospect of a generous profit-sharing 
scheme, high status, and a say in strategic decision-making once they are promoted to 
partner (Greenwood & Empson, 2003). The resulting pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
compensation gap between a partner and a non-partner is substantial and serves to attract 
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and retain achievement-oriented and status-driven candidates (Ridge et al., 2014). The size 
of the partnership ‘prize’ is therefore comparable to an above-market wage rate and is 
thought to constitute a pay premium necessary to attract a promising auditor and prevent 
him or her from being bid away by competing firms (Capelli & Cascio, 1991; DeVaro & 
Waldman, 2012).  
Yet, given the limited number of partner slots, choosing who will join the 
partnership is problematic (O’Keefe, Simunic, & Stein, 1994; von Nordenflycht, 2010). 
Performance evaluation is challenging because audit firms are burdened by severe 
information asymmetries (Eisenhardt, 1989; Greenwood & Empson, 2003). These result 
not only from largely unobservable processes by which an intangible service is arrived at 
(Balachandran & Ramakrishnan, 1987; Bedard, Deis, Curtis, & Jenkins, 2008), but also the 
notion that the quality of the output produced is opaque and typically reflects a team effort 
(Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). The difficulty of evaluating individual performance is 
compounded by the fact that auditors usually work at the client’s location, out of sight of 
the partners, and that auditors work on different assignments, making comparison 
difficult. 
In order to reach an internal promotion decision, audit firms rely on a unique up-
or-out5 promotion system. The system is based on the premise that only the best 
candidates will be promoted to partner, and everyone else will be asked to leave the firm 
(Maister, 1993; Morris & Pinnington, 1998). In order to identify the best candidates, the 
up-or-out promotion policy assesses relative (rather than absolute) individual 
productiveness in order to produce a rank ordering of competitors (Greenwood & Empson, 
                                                     
5 The Cravath model was the first instance of this type of promotion system, prevalent in 
traditional US and UK law firms (Sherer, 1995). It consisted of hiring a stable group of non-
partners and creating a system of internal competition (Malhotra et al., 2010). It was a 
means to optimally develop human assets by thoroughly training and mentoring lawyers 
before they went up for partnership. Young lawyers were not seen as a source of revenue, 
but as long-term investments (Cunningham, 2012; Price, 2003). The final promotion 
decision was based on a rank order of the young lawyers’ performance. 
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2003). In theory, the promotion decision is based on the total contribution a non-partner 
has made to the audit firm compared to the contributions made by other competitors 
(Morris & Pinnington, 1998). This total contribution can be divided into two components. 
One consists of the measurable, tangible qualities of the non-partner, such as his or her 
technical skills, work experience, profit contributions, and client retention and acquisition 
abilities (Gilson & Mnookin, 1989; Kornberger, Justesen, & Mouritsen, 2011). The second 
component consists of more subjective, immeasurable personal attributes such as 
cooperativeness, temperament, integrity, and stewardship (Gilson & Mnookin, 1989; 
Morris & Pinnington, 1998). In practice, however, due to differences in measurability, these 
two components will not be evaluated equally, as partners are likely to disproportionally 
weigh the measurable, tangible qualities of competitors more heavily. This enables 
partners to determine a final score for each competitor that is used to determine the rank 
ordering.  
Like other rational players in the economy, we expect auditors to be susceptible to 
the incentives implicit in the design parameters of an audit firm’s promotion system (Liu 
& Simunic, 2005). We will now investigate how the two design parameters of tournament-
like promotion systems, crowding and pay spreads, have the potential to influence auditor 
behavior. These parameters have been shown to produce self-interested and strategic 
behavior in other organizational contexts (in sports, for example), and we argue that that 
the same may hold in this context as well. 
 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT  
The Impact of Crowding 
In the audit firm, non-partnered auditors experience at least some degree of crowding as a 
direct consequence of up-or-out policies. The degree of crowding is defined as the number 
of available partner slots divided by the number of non-partnered auditors who are in 
direct competition for promotion to partner. The limited availability of partner slots is 
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necessary for the achievement of an optimal amount of profit per partner (DeVaro & 
Waldman, 2012; Lowendahl, 2005). Taking on too many partners could risk decreasing the 
profits per partner (Maister, 1993; Morris & Pinnington, 1998). Therefore, the number of 
partner slots in any professional service firm is generally low and, consequently, the level 
of crowding is generally high (DeVaro & Waldman, 2012; Morris & Pinnington, 1998). 
From the perspective of individual auditors, crowding determines the likelihood 
of being promoted to partner. Given the generally high degree of crowding, the likelihood 
of being promoted to partner is low (Bothner et al., 2007; Coffey & Maloney, 2010; Connelly 
et al., 2013). Fiercer competition could, therefore, adversely affect career prospects. 
Crowding also involves a process dynamic, since several years separate the moment at 
which a fresh graduate enters the firm and the moment a final rank ordering is disclosed 
(Bothner et al., 2007). In this period of time, which lasts thirteen years, on average, in large 
audit firms (Guinn et al., 2004), crowding around a particular position will influence 
behavior (Bothner et al., 2007; Hvide & Kristiansen, 2003). Being uncertain of the outcome 
for this length of time could, therefore, elicit self-interested behavior (Sitkin & Pablo, 
1992). Furthermore, crowding also complicates the monitoring of performance and 
behavior because of the reduced visibility of auditors’ actions (Kandel & Lazear, 1992). 
This provides contestants with the freedom to behave in self-interested ways in order to 
secure their position in the race. 
The first type of self-interested behavior seen in tournaments is shirking (Dye, 
1984). In the audit context, shirking may reduce audit quality. Audit-quality-reducing 
behavior can be defined as ‘auditors’ failures to properly execute audit steps’ (Malone & 
Roberts, 1996, p.49). This behavior includes cutting corners, failing to pursue questionable 
items in client disclosures, or decreasing the amount of work to a level below what is 
considered necessary to produce a reliable audit (Herrbach, 2001; Otley & Pierce, 1996). 
Shirking has the positive side-effect of reducing the costs involved in the audit and of 
freeing up time to pursue other billable hours (McNair, 1991). Because audits are executed 
76_Erim Pruijssers BW Stand.job
Chapter 3 
 
  
64 
on a fixed-fee basis, these gains can be retained in the firm’s profit pool (Ettredge, Bedard, 
& Johnstone, 2003). The subsequent increase in revenue is visible to and appreciated by 
the partners. Because monitoring auditors is difficult, this may result in partners assessing 
shirking auditors more favorably. By cutting corners, auditors reap the individual, short-
term benefits of the cost savings, and only share in any long-term, negative effects, if at all. 
The second type of self-interested behavior tournaments may induce is 
compromising (Hvide & Kristiansen, 2003). In the audit setting, crowding can tip the 
balance when non-partnered professionals weigh the risks associated with deliberately 
distorting the audit findings against the risk of losing the client. Compromising behavior, 
therefore, manifests itself in risky, deliberate distortion. Deliberate distortion is defined as 
all intentional misrepresentation of the evaluation of financial statements by auditors, 
which, if discovered, would damage the credibility of the profession. Satisfying clients by 
succumbing to pressure to turn a blind eye to inaccurate (or even fraudulent) reporting 
can promote client retention as well as improve the prospects for future business (Suddaby 
et al., 2009). As such, engaging in deliberate distortion has the potential to put a competitor 
in a relatively better position in the rankings. Therefore, auditors may deliberately distort 
audit findings by biasing sample selection towards less troublesome items or consciously 
misestimating items in order to please the client and secure future business. Hence, we 
hypothesize: 
 
H1a: The higher the degree of crowding, the greater the incidence of self-interested behavior 
in audit firms.  
 
Secondly, crowding may also influence strategic behavior (Dixit, 1987; Lazear, 
1989). Strategic behavior refers to all acts aimed at undermining the performance of 
competitors in order to increase one’s own rank-order position. Auditors know their 
competitors and frequently share a workplace with them, and recognize that their goal 
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attainment is negatively linked to that of these fellow contestants. This relational tie 
between auditors creates rivalry (Kilduff et al., 2010, 2012). Rivalry is fostered by 
(increased) crowding. In acknowledging that the odds against him or her grow the more 
participants enter the contest, the auditor will be disproportionately focused on achieving 
superior relative performance (Kilduff et al., 2012). Rivalry, therefore, has the power to 
raise the stakes of the competition and drives contestants to outperform their rivals 
(Kilduff et al., 2012). As a result, rivals engage in strategic behavior in order to secure their 
position in the race. 
In a tournament set-up, strategic behavior can manifest itself as a decrease in 
cooperative behavior (Baiman, 1990; Lazear, 1989). As the audit is a product of team effort, 
auditors may want to strategically avoid cooperating with competitors in order to prevent 
them from moving up in the rank ordering (Drago & Turnbull, 1988). Declining 
cooperation will result in less organizational citizenship behavior, or helpful behavior 
towards colleagues that cumulatively benefits the firm (Podsakoff, Mackensie, Paine, & 
Bachrach, 2000). This type of behavior involves actions such as helping new recruits, doing 
rigorous work, or adjusting one’s agenda to help colleagues. Podsakoff and colleagues 
(2000) specify that this type of behavior is ‘discretionary, not directly or explicitly 
recognized’. Therefore, even though, at the aggregate level, this type of behavior may 
benefit the firm as a whole, it is difficult to observe for the partners and creates an 
unrecognized, heavier workload for the helpful auditor. Furthermore, an auditor’s helping 
a competitor may improve that individual’s relative position in the rankings at the expense 
of his or her own.  
A second type of strategic behavior consists of the outright sabotage of a 
competitor’s performance for the personal gain of the saboteur (Dye, 1984; Lazear, 1989). 
As audits are the product of team effort, auditors can sabotage competitors’ performance 
by riding free on their efforts. One way of doing this is by individually reducing professional 
skepticism. Professional skepticism refers to ‘the propensity of an individual to defer 
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concluding until the evidence provides sufficient support for one alternative explanation 
over others’ (Hurrt, 2010, p.151; Nelson, 1992). This includes double-checking information 
and seeking advice from experts (Hurrt, 2010). In a team setting, it is very difficult to 
discern which members exert more or less effort, so refraining from being professionally 
skeptical can go undetected. Failing to exercise professional skepticism can deprive the 
team of important and/or necessary information, thereby reducing the overall quality of 
the audit and diminishing the public’s trust in the profession (Harbring & Irlenbusch, 
2011). Hence:  
 
H1b: The higher the degree of crowding, the greater the incidence of strategic behavior in 
audit firms. 
 
The Impact of Pay Spreads 
The pay spread is the absolute difference between an auditor’s pay at his or her current 
level and what he or she would be earning as a partner. Given that partners share in the 
profits while non-partnered professionals are salaried, there is a substantial pay gap 
between partners and non-partners (Malos & Campion, 1995). From the perspective of the 
individual auditor entering the promotion contest, the substantial pay spread is a very 
powerful incentive. 
Drawing on agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989), the principals of the audit firm are 
the partners who delegate some of their decision-making to the non-partners (the agents) 
(Herrbach, 2001). Given that the partners have their economic as well as reputational 
capital tied to the firm, they are more risk-averse than the non-partners who have 
relatively less to lose if they are fired (Aranya & Ferris, 1984; Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). 
According to behavioral agency theory (Tosi & Gomez-Meija, 1989; Pepper & Gore, 2012; 
Wiseman & Gomez-Meija, 1998), agents have a higher propensity to take short-term risks 
in order to advance their own interests (i.e. increasing their rank-order position).  
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Although employing an up-or-out promotion system is believed to align the 
interests of the agents with the interests of the firm by enhancing performance (Wiseman 
& Gomez-Meija, 1998), this practice might actually exacerbate self-interested behavior. 
Given that auditors stand to gain a great deal if they are promoted, but will lose relatively 
little if they do not make the cut, auditors are compelled to increase self-interested 
behavior and risk taking in order to be promoted to partner (Devers, Wiseman & Arrfelft, 
2008; Sanders, 2001). Given that large gains require big risks (Core, Guay & Larcker, 2003; 
Sanders & Hambrick, 2007), auditors might engage in more self-interested behavior, such 
as audit-quality-reducing behavior and deliberate distortion to diminish the relative 
standing of competitors, since they will only reap the benefits for as long as the firm bears 
the residual risk these behaviors entail. 
 
H2a: The greater the pay spread, the higher the incidence of self-interested behavior in audit 
firms.  
 
Second, greater pay spreads may also lead to an increase in strategic behavior by 
decreasing the likelihood of competitors engaging in cooperative behavior (i.e. decreased 
organizational citizenship behavior) and increasing the likelihood of sabotage (i.e. 
decreased professional skepticism) (Henderson & Frederickson, 2001; Fredrickson et al., 
2010). Drawing on deprivation theory (Cowherd & Levine, 1992; Milgrom & Roberts, 
1988), if competitors feel that they receive less compensation than they are entitled to or 
deserve compared to others, they will perceive this as unjust (Boivie, Bednar, & Barker, 
2012) and will therefore feel deprived. This leads to employee dissatisfaction (Martin, 
1981), which is associated with a reduction in cooperation, team-cohesiveness, and 
commitment to the broader goals of the organization (Henderson & Fredrickson, 2001; 
Milgrom & Roberts, 1988). A large pay spread is likely to result in feelings of deprivation 
amongst non-partnered auditors generated by the prospect of the winning competitor 
80_Erim Pruijssers BW Stand.job
Chapter 3 
 
  
68 
earning (so much) more than the ‘losers’ in the future. As a direct consequence of this 
deprivation, auditors will be more likely to engage in strategic behavior such as decreasing 
organizational citizenship behavior as well as decreasing professional skepticism. 
In addition, the size of the prize is not always the main motivator of individual 
behavior (Connelly et al., 2013). Individuals derive utility not only from financial rewards, 
but also from social ones. Therefore, as Connelly and his colleagues (2013) suggest, 
researchers should also pay attention to more complex psychological phenomena. 
According to motivation crowding theory (Frey & Jegen, 2001), competitive environments 
emphasizing pecuniary rewards (extrinsic rewards) will lower, or ‘crowd out’, the utility 
derived from social rewards (intrinsic rewards). Intrinsic rewards consist of gratifying 
interpersonal relationships, personal fulfillment resulting from excelling at one’s job, the 
esteem of other colleagues, and job security, for instance (Connelly et al., 2013). However, 
by emphasizing (large) extrinsic rewards, audit firms may ‘crowd out’ the motivation to 
pursue intrinsic rewards (Osterloh & Frey, 2000; Foss, 2011). This happens in two ways. 
First, focusing predominantly on pecuniary rewards reduces self-regulation (Deci et al., 
1999; Frey & Jegen, 2001). This means that extrinsic control replaces intrinsic motivation 
and, as a consequence, auditors may take less responsibility for motivating themselves, and 
may therefore reduce effort (Deci et al., 1999). Second, extrinsic rewards can diminish self-
esteem because auditors may feel that their intrinsic motivation and competence are not 
acknowledged (Frey & Jegen, 2001). Again, this reduction in self-esteem may negatively 
affect effort. Overall, by emphasizing formal, extrinsic rewards, audit firms prioritize 
behavior that can be directly linked to enlarging the profit pool over behavior that is pro-
social in nature and benefits the entire firm (Connelly et al., 2013; Gore & Pepper, 2012;). 
As a consequence, professional skepticism and organizational citizenship behavior may be 
crowded out in firms with high pay spreads (Frey & Jegen, 2001). Therefore, we 
hypothesize: 
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H2b: The greater the pay spread, the higher the incidence of strategic behavior in audit firms. 
 
METHODS 
Data Collection and Sampling  
As no public data are available to test our hypotheses, a web-based survey was issued 
among all non-partnered certified public accountants (CPAs) registered with the German, 
Dutch, and Belgian professional associations. It consisted of an initial invitation e-mail and 
two follow-up reminders endorsed by either the Belgian professional association (IBR-
IRE) or Dutch or German top national business schools.6  
 The sampling frame consisted of the e-mail addresses of all CPAs registered with 
the respective national professional associations. This resulted in a total of 8246 e-mail 
addresses for Germany, 9070 for the Netherlands, and 1021 for Belgium. These e-mail 
addresses included both CPAs working for audit firms and CPAs working for other 
institutions. The CPAs of interest to us are salaried auditors, employed by an audit firm as 
they face the tournament-like promotion pressures we are investigating. Partners are 
excluded because they no longer compete in the tournament (Ridge et al., 2014). In order 
to sample the auditors of interest to us, the first page of the survey filtered out the CPAs 
that do not work for an audit firm. The next page then screened the hierarchical level of the 
respondents (partner or salaried auditor). 819 CPAs completed the survey in full, of which 
405 CPAs were salaried (43 Belgian, 95 Dutch, and 267 German salaried CPAs). The other 
respondents were partners who were presented with a different set of questions intended 
for a different study. The participants were employed by the Big Four audit firms (PwC, 
KPMG, Deloitte, EY) in the three countries and 112 other public audit firms. The lack of ex-
ante information on the employing organization and hierarchical status of CPAs makes 
calculating the precise response rate impossible.   
                                                     
6 Names not disclosed in order to maintain the anonymity of the authors. 
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The audit markets in the three countries of interest are comparable, as 85% of the 
publicly-listed firms are audited by the Big Four audit firms (Barnier, 2010). All three 
countries are also home to a strong mid-tier audit segment serving large non-listed firms. 
The organization of the profession is comparable across these countries with a central 
national professional association responsible for monitoring the profession. These 
countries are also similar at an institutional level as audit firms are all subject to code law 
and similar levels of regulatory enforcement (Leuz et al., 2003). 
 
Instrument Development 
The survey consisted of seven psychometric scales. We relied on four existing scales 
validated in prior research. The remaining three scales were developed specifically for this 
study. The corresponding items of these scales were developed based on commonly 
accepted theoretical definitions of the constructs (Ghiselli, Campbell, & Zedeck, 1981). 
Following canonical scale development procedures and after item reduction from a pool of 
items, we generate five concise and theoretically precise items per construct in order to 
minimize response bias without compromising construct validity (Hinkin, 1998; 
Schrieschiem & Eisenbach, 1990; Schwab, 1980) (see Appendix 1). In order to avoid order 
effects, the items for each scale were presented in a random order to the participants.  
In order to make sense of complex relationships between latent variables 
consisting of many items, we make use of structural equation modeling. To rigorously 
estimate the structural equations, we first use a partial disaggregation strategy (parceling) 
to link our indicators to their corresponding constructs (Little, Cunningham, Sharar, & 
widaman, 2002). Parceling is preferred over the use of single indicators not only because 
single indicators often have lower reliability and smaller common-to-unique variances, but 
also because parcels reduce the number of parameters to be estimated (Coffman & 
McCallum, 2005; Kishton & Widaman, 1994; Little et al., 2002; Williams & O’Boyle, 2008). 
By using the domain representativeness approach, we created three parcels for each latent 
83_Erim Pruijssers BW Stand.job
Winning at a losing game?  
Adverse behavioral consequences of tournament-like promotion systems 
 
71 
variable (Kishton & Widaman, 1994). This entails the item with the highest factor loading 
on the latent construct being assigned to parcel 1, the item with the second-highest loading 
to parcel 2, and the item with the third-highest loading to parcel 3. The other items are 
assigned in reverse order. 
 All items were measured on seven-point Likert scales. Our dependent variables 
consisted of four general constructs operationalized in the audit context (Table 1). Two 
constructs capture self-interested behavior. Audit-quality-reducing behavior (α: .89) is a 
proxy for shirking. It is an existing five-item scale that assesses the ‘poor execution of an 
audit procedure reducing the level of evidence gathered for the audit, so that the collected 
evidence is unreliable, false, or inadequate quantitatively or qualitatively’ (Herrbach, 2001, 
p.790; Otley & Pierce, 1996). It required participants to rate how often behaviors such as 
‘accepting weak client explanations’ or ‘superficial review of client documentation’ 
occurred at their firm. Deliberate distortion (α: .89) is a proxy for compromising behavior. 
The scale is purposely developed for this study and consists of five items capturing the 
degree to which auditors consciously distort their evaluations of financial statements. 
Participants were asked to rate how often behavior such as ‘consciously biasing sample 
selection towards less troublesome items’ or ‘signing off on materially misstated items’ 
occurred at their firm. The two other constructs measure our second category of 
dependent variable, namely strategic behavior. Organizational citizenship behavior (α: .83), 
a proxy for cooperative behavior, is a nine-item scale adapted from Smith and colleagues 
(1983) by using those items with the highest factor loadings. It measures ‘“behavior that is 
discretionary, not directly or explicitly recognized by the formal reward system and that 
in the aggregate promotes the effective functioning of the organization’” (Podsakoff et al., 
2000). It includes items like ‘In my firm, we frequently adjust our agendas to help other 
colleagues’ and ‘We perform our job duties with extra-special care’. A reduction in 
Professional skepticism (α: .81) is used as a proxy for sabotage. It is an eight-item scale that 
was adapted from a multi-dimensional scale developed by Hurrt (2010). It aims to gauge 
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the ‘propensity of an individual to defer concluding until the evidence provides sufficient 
support for one alternative explanation over others’ (Hurrt, 2010, p.151). The scale has 
been adapted from the individual to the firm level and has been reduced to eight items by 
retaining those items that loaded highest on the five applicable underlying factors. One 
factor (self-confidence) was removed, as it is not applicable to the firm level and was 
replaced by the firm-level item ‘My firm stimulates independent thinking’. Other items 
included ‘In my firm, we take our time before making decisions’ and ‘In my firm we tend to 
accept what other people say at face value’.  
We use two constructs as our independent variables. Crowding (α: .80) is a 
purposely-developed five-item scale capturing the competitive intensity within the audit 
firm. It can be understood as the perceived chance of partnership. It includes items like ‘In 
my firm, only a small number of lower level auditors will become partners’ and ‘Many 
lower-level auditors compete for very few partner positions’. Pay spread (α: .90) is also a 
purposely-developed five-item scale measuring the perceived difference between a non-
partnered auditor’s pay and a partner’s compensation (i.e. the prize for winning the 
contest). It includes items like ‘Partners earn substantially more than any other rank in my 
firm’ and ‘In my firm, the pay gap between partners and the rest of the professionals is 
substantial’.  
One construct served as a control variable. Profit orientation (α: .83) is a 
purposely-developed six-item scale capturing the extent to which respondents perceived 
that their firm was primarily concerned with the generation of profits. This scale has been 
included as a control variable because the degree of an audit firm’s profit orientation is 
expected to affect the incidence of self-interested and strategic behavior (O’Keefe et al., 
1994). It includes items like ‘My firm is primarily concerned with generating profit’ and 
‘Our partners emphasize market performance’. Several other items were also included in 
the survey as control variables. Audit firm size was operationalized using a dichotomous 
variable, assigned the value of 1 for a Big Four audit firm and 0 otherwise. A stream of audit 
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research contends that audit firm quality is not independent of audit firm size (DeAngelo, 
1981). Therefore, we control for audit firm size as this may be positively related to the 
incidence of self-interested behavior and strategic behavior. Gender is captured by a 
dichotomous variable assigned the value of 1 if the participant is female, 0 if male. The 
literature suggests that women tend to be more risk-averse (Darley & Smith, 1995) and 
process information more carefully than men (Breesch & Branson, 2009). Organizational 
level is accounted for by including a dichotomous variable in the analyses that is assigned 
the value of 1 if the participant is a senior, 0 if the participant is a junior. Arguably, the 
closer the person is to promotion to partner, he or she will be more cautious in order to 
remain in the tournament in an attempt to win the prize (Ridge et al., 2014). Academic 
achievement is measured by a dichotomous variable assigned the value of 1 if the 
participant obtained a university degree, 0 otherwise. Age is also included as a control 
variable. Country dummies were included to control for any unobserved characteristics of 
the natural institutional context that could possibly have an influence on auditor behavior. 
 
Data Reliability and Validity 
We used several means to assess the reliability and validity of our data in order to avoid 
biased results (Hinkin, 1998; Shook, Hult, & Kacmar, 2004; Steenkamp & van Trijp, 1991). 
In order to test construct validity we assessed both convergent and discriminant validity. 
We confirm convergent validity as CFAs established that all indicators are significantly 
positively related to their associated latent variables (Carmines & Zeller, 1979; Kline, 2010; 
Steenkamp & Van Trijp, 1991). Convergent validity is further corroborated with the 
average variance extracted (AVE) for our latent constructs ranging between .57 and .80 
(see Table 2). 
We then assessed discriminant validity. First, we analyzed the multicollinearity 
between our variables of interest (Greene, 1993; Farrar & Glauber, 1967). The severity of 
multicollinearity was assessed using the variance inflation factor (VIF) (O’Brien, 2007). We 
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concluded that multicollinearity was not a concern given that the VIFs of all possible 
pairwise comparisons were appropriate (O’Brien, 2007). Second, we compared the fit of 
the unconstrained measurement model to that of a measurement model in which a pair of 
constructs is constrained to correlate fully (Hinkin, 1998; Kline, 2010). All possible 
pairwise comparisons were estimated and all constrained models demonstrated a poorer 
fit except for the combination profit orientation-pay spread and audit-quality-reducing 
behavior-deliberate distortion. This is not surprising, as both profit orientation and pay 
spread draw on the importance of the generation of revenues within the audit firm. The 
same goes for audit-quality-reducing behavior and deliberate distortion, which are 
marginally different because deliberate distortion refers to the same type of audit-quality-
reducing behavior but with the addition of an element of intentionality. The combination 
of the absence of discriminant validity between sets of our endogenous variables and the 
high correlations between these variables urges us to take this into account in specifying 
the model. We therefore allow for the covariance between audit-quality-reducing behavior 
and deliberate distortion as well as the covariance between professional skepticism and 
organizational citizenship behavior. This decision was made because it makes sense to 
allow theoretically distinct, though related constructs to covary without having to fully 
combine both (Farrell, 2010; Howell, 1987; Scott & Bruce, 1994).  
Construct reliability was established as the composite reliabilities of our 
constructs range between .85 and .98 (see Table 3). Additionally, the Cronbach alpha 
coefficients ranged between .80 and .90, which is well above the .70 cut-off point (Nunally, 
1962).  
We also checked the validity of our sample, which consists of three data sources. 
In order to assess the differences in means of our variables of interest, we conducted a one-
way ANOVA. Through post-hoc testing, we concluded that no significant differences in 
means exist between Belgium and the Netherlands. Significantly higher means, however, 
were found for crowding, pay spreads, organizational citizenship behavior, and profit 
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orientation in Germany. The robustness checks will therefore include the models run 
separately on the German sample. 
Lastly, as all the data included in this study are extracted from a common 
measurement context, there is a potential risk of common method variance (CMV) (Bagozzi 
& Yi, 1991; Podsakoff et al., 2003, p.879). As an ex-ante precaution, we randomized the 
order of items of different scales (Chang, van Witteloostuijn, & Eden, 2010). We also 
ensured that the relationships we tested through our study vary in terms of their 
directionality, to avoid ‘capitalizing’ on individuals’ response styles. Post-hoc statistical 
techniques were also used to assess CMV. The Harman’s single factor test rendered 
diagnostic evidence of the absence of CMV (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986; Podsakoff et al., 
2003). However, it does not provide any evidence of method effects. Therefore, following 
Podsakoff and colleagues (2003), we compared the fit of a full measurement model to a 
measurement model in which all indicators are loaded onto a single method factor. The full 
measurement model yielded an adequate fit (χ2 306.62; p < .001; RMSEA .04; CFI .99; GFI 
.93).  The single factor model was worse (χ2 4206.27; p < .001; RMSEA .31; CFI .60; GFI .36; 
Δ χ2 3959.23; Δd.f. 21 p < .001). Hereafter, a trait-and-method model was estimated by 
adding a single method factor latent variable to the full measurement model (Cote & 
Buckley, 1987). This trait-and-method model fit the data better (χ2 228.60; p < .001; 
RMSEA .04; CFI .99; GFI .95; Δ χ2 78.02; Δd.f. 21; p < .001). Using the sum of squared 
loadings, we established that the amount of variance explained by the common method 
factor was 11 percent, which is well below the critical cut-off point of 25 percent (Williams, 
Buckley & Cote, 1989). Therefore, we can conclude that CMV is not critical to the analyses. 
 
 
Model Specification 
To empirically test our theoretical predictions, we run a structural equation model by using 
LISREL 8.80 with maximum likelihood estimation routines model (Jöreskog, 1966).  
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RESULTS 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics, reliability and validity coefficients, and 
correlations of the latent variables, whereas Table 3 contains the SEM results pertaining to 
Hypotheses 1a – 2b. The theoretical model (Figure 1) fits our data well (χ2 706.56; d.f. 244; 
RMSEA .07; CFI .96; GFI .89). The ratio of chi-square to degrees of freedom is 2.49, which 
is below the cut-off point of 3 (Carmines & McIver, 1981).  
Hypotheses 1a and 1b predicted a positive effect of crowding on self-interested 
and strategic behaviors. The results fully support H1a, as crowding has a significant 
positive effect on audit-quality-reducing behavior (β = .26; t = 2.84) and on deliberate 
distortion (β = .23; t = 2.40). H1b, however, is only partially supported with a significant 
decrease in professional skepticism (β = -.23; t = -2.35). Hypotheses 2a and 2b predicted 
that higher pay spreads lead to more self-interested and strategic behavior. Our results do 
not support these hypotheses. We did, however, find the opposite of H2b to hold, with pay 
spreads increasing organizational citizenship behavior (β = .20, t = 2.06). In the discussion, 
we will provide an explanation of this counterintuitive finding. 
Furthermore, we found a significant positive effect of audit firm size on 
professional skepticism and a significant negative effect of audit firm size on audit-quality-
reducing behavior and deliberate distortion. This suggests that auditors at Big Four firms 
engage less often in self-interested behavior. Furthermore, women are significantly less 
likely to report audit-quality-reducing behavior and deliberate distortion than men. 
Women also tend to report significantly more professional skepticism than men. Lastly, a 
negative significant relationship exists between an auditor’s age and his or her tendency 
to report audit-quality-reducing behaviors. This shows that when an auditor is closer to 
the final promotion to partner, he or she will be more cautious in order to remain in the 
tournament in an attempt to win the prize (Ridge et al., 2014). This is consistent with Miller 
and Chen’s (2004) and Chen’s (2008) findings, which establish that the closer someone is 
to promotion, the more risk averse that person will become. This also provides further 
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confirmation of the findings of Rosen (1986) and Knoeber & Thurman (1994) who 
establish that less-skilled and lower-ranked competitors are more likely to take risks as 
they have less to lose.  
 
Robustness Checks 
As the means of several of our variables of interest differ significantly between the German 
and the Belgian/Dutch samples, we ran the same theoretical model on the German 
subsample. The German sample supported H1a and H1b fully. The effect of crowding on 
audit-quality-reducing behavior was significantly positive (β = 4.20; t = 4.38), as was the 
effect on deliberate distortion (β = 4.53; t = 4.40). Crowding also significantly reduced the 
likelihood of engaging in professional skepticism (β = -4.03; t = -4.83) and organizational 
citizenship behavior (β = -3.21; t = -4.59). Hypotheses H2a and H2b, however, were not 
supported. This finding indicates that crowding and pay spreads enact different frames of 
mind. The incentives implicit in pay spreads do not seem to work in the same way as those 
of crowding. The importance of the organizational context of the professional service may 
be critical in explaining the observed effects (Kordana, 1995; Malos & Campion, 1995). We 
will elaborate on the underlying reason for this in the discussion. 
 The control variables in the German sample also produced some interesting 
insights. Respondents with a university degree tended to report more self-interested 
behavior and less strategic behavior. While the literature on the link between education 
level and ethical behavior provides an inconsistent picture, there is evidence that 
individuals with more education display greater ethical sensitivity due to higher moral 
development (Trevino, 1986). An auditor’s organizational level and age have the opposite 
effect. That is, older auditors having achieved a senior level, report significantly less self-
interested behavior and more professional skepticism. It is likely that these auditors have 
survived the up-or-out promotion system thus far and are now more cautious about 
reporting self-interested behavior (Miller & Chen, 2004; Chen, 2008). Counter-intuitively, 
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however, a stronger profit orientation in a German audit firm leads to significantly less 
reported self-interested and strategic behavior. It could be argued that audit firms with 
strong profit orientations are resourceful firms. Hence auditors in these firms do not need 
to engage extensively in self-interested behavior, as these firms are already profitable 
enough. More importantly perhaps, given that very profitable audit firms are by definition 
wealthy, they have deeper pockets (Dye, 1993). In terms of the risk of litigation penalties 
and reputation-damaging criticism, audit firms with more wealth have more to lose if 
misconduct is discovered (Lennox, 1999). Thus, the deep pockets of these audit firms 
dissuade auditors from engaging in strategic behavior. 
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DISCUSSION 
Our study finds that the organizational design parameters of tournament-type promotion 
systems create powerful incentives that influence behavior in audit firms that is critical to 
the successful functioning of the statutory audit of public firms. In line with the suggested 
limitations of tournament theory (Dye, 1984; Lazear, 1989), we find that crowding in audit 
firms produces self-interested and strategic behavior. In contrast to crowding, however, 
we establish that large pay spreads do not produce self-interested behavior, but actually 
promote cooperative behavior. As such, this study has made several contributions to the 
organizational literature. 
 
Tournament Theory in the Organizational Context 
To date, organizational research has, for the most part, used tournament theory to describe 
and explain compensation differentials in organizations (Connelly et al., 2013; Ridge et al., 
2014) and has disproportionately focused on the effects of the tournament’s prize on the 
solicitation of effort (Ericksson, 1999; Conyon et al., 2001; Main et al., 1993). This has 
resulted in the forwarding of a one-sided view of tournament theory in the organizational 
setting (Connelly et al., 2013). We make an important contribution by extending the scope 
of application of tournament theory in management research along two dimensions. First, 
in addition to the effects of the tournament’s prize on contestants’ conduct, we 
simultaneously investigate the unexplored behavioral effects of crowding (Connelly et al., 
2013). By analyzing the behavioral effects of both pay spreads and crowding, we provide a 
comprehensive assessment of tournament-like promotion systems in the organizational 
context.  
Second, whereas prior research on promotion systems has focused mainly on the 
capacity of pay spreads to stimulate optimal effort levels in the organization (Bloom, 1999, 
Connelly et al., 2013), we investigate the downside of a full tournament model. Specifically, 
we analyze two types of counterproductive behavior that might be seen as the negative 
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side effects of tournament-like promotion systems. Even though scholarly attention has 
started to be focused on counterproductive behavior that results from tournament-like 
promotion set-ups, such as sabotage (Dye, 1984; Henderson & Fredrickson, 2001; 
Hayward & Hambrick, 1997), we provide a more comprehensive treatment of a range of 
this behavior in the organizational context. We distinguish between self-interested and 
strategic behavior as means of getting ahead in the rankings. The subsequent teasing out 
of behavior along these two categories allows for a subtler typology of the negative 
byproducts of tournaments. Competitors may thus either shirk or engage in compromising 
behavior to bolster their own relative position or may strategically exert less cooperative 
and more sabotaging behavior in order to diminish the performance of their peers. In line 
with Connelly and colleagues (2013), we encourage further research to deepen our 
understanding of the full range of behaviors that tournaments may elicit.  
In addition, we extend tournament theory to the audit context. This is an 
interesting context of application because of the nature of the audit and the organizational 
specificities of the audit firm. An audit is the product of a team effort and is characterized 
by a strong need for cooperation. Because the tournament-like promotion system 
stimulates competition instead of cooperation and because behavior is difficult to observe 
given the decentralized nature of the audit, the quality of the audit can be impaired as a 
result of this type of system. If the negative byproducts of tournaments diminish the quality 
of the audit, this may have important societal ramifications. Additionally, we extend 
tournament theory to the professional partnership, which is the dominant form of 
enterprise organization of audit firms. This setting allows us to investigate the behavioral 
incentives of tournament set-ups for all non-partnered professionals in the quest to 
become partner. This focus on a range of lower hierarchical levels differentiates our study 
from other tests of tournament theory in the organizational context that focus exclusively 
on promotion to CEO or top management teams (Ericksson, 1999; Conyon et al., 2001; 
Henderson & Fredrickson, 2001; Main et al., 1993; Ridge et al., 2014). By investigating 
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lower-level employees, we provide empirical evidence of Rosen’s (1986) suggestion that 
less-experienced employees are more likely to take risks.  
Contrary to what skeptics of tournament-like promotion set-ups have suggested, 
we find that large pay spreads do not promote self-interested and strategic behavior. We 
see three plausible explanations that would benefit from further scholarly scrutiny. First, 
the counter-hypothesized result could be due to the comprehensive nature of our model. 
Having included both design parameters of tournament theory in our empirical model 
allows us to more carefully specify the model and obtain a cleaner estimation of the effects. 
The second potential explanation for the results lies in the focus of our explanation. Instead 
of the customary dependent variables, effort or performance (Connelly et al., 2013), we 
focus on types of self-interested and strategic behavior. Since our explanatory variables 
are different, it is makes sense that we find different results. Third, the counter-
hypothesized results could be due to the specific context in which we apply the theory. The 
audit firm is a professional partnership and therefore does not completely meet the 
assumptions of the general tournament theory. In contrast to the general tournament set-
up, professional partnerships only have a few large steps before partnership (Malos & 
Campion, 1995), they do not allow the contestants to stay at a particular level (Malos & 
Campion, 1995), and they include professionals not actually participating in the contest for 
partnership as they do not have the ambition to become partner (Kordana, 1995; Price, 
2003). These incongruences complicate predicting the behavioral limitations of 
tournament-like promotion systems in professional partnerships, influence the behavioral 
outcomes of tournaments, and could explain why our results do not fully align with the 
limitations of tournament-like promotion set-ups. We urge researchers to delve deeper 
into our interpretations of the counter-hypothesized behavioral effects of pay spreads.  
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Professional Partnerships and Audit Firms 
Reflecting on the context of study as a potential explanation of the counter-hypothesized 
results brings us to our contribution to the professional partnership literature. To date, 
Malos and Campion (1995, 2000) are the only scholars that have researched the unique 
dynamics of the up-or-out promotion system in professional partnerships. They 
conceptualize the hiring of junior professionals as an investment made by the existing 
partners in a portfolio of options. When an option matures, the partners can decide 
whether or not to exercise it and grant the professional access to partnership (Malos & 
Campion, 2000). Even though their approach is insightful and has empirical merit, it only 
considers the promotion decision from the existing partner’s perspective and does not 
account for any behavioral effects on the professional contenders in the up-or-out 
tournament. Omitting the non-partners’ perspective from their model risks glossing over 
the unique dynamics of career mobility and its unintended behavioral consequences. In 
this study, we critically assess the applicability of tournament theory in a classic 
professional partnership from a non-partner’s perspective. This is perhaps more relevant 
because only the non-partners are exposed to the tournament’s high-powered incentives 
and competitive pressures and therefore it is primarily their behavior that will be affected. 
As such, we refine our understanding of the implications of the tournament-like promotion 
system in professional partnerships. 
Our study should also be of interest to audit partnerships, the audit profession, 
and regulators, more specifically, to help them evaluate the effects of high-powered 
incentives in the tournament-like promotion system on auditor behavior and audit quality. 
We show that the way in which audit firm partners are selected can have a large impact on 
the behavior of non-partnered auditors. We conclude that audit firms have to carefully 
balance the risks of undesirable behavior with their economic desire to secure human 
capital through these promotion systems. Auditors may sacrifice long-term performance 
for short-term results in order to secure their rank-order position (Connelly et al., 2013). 
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Given that the non-partners are the majority of the professionals working at the audit firm 
and that their work serves as the primary input for the partner’s sign-off decisions, the 
quality of the audit could be jeopardized (Francis, 2011; Knechel et al., 2013), which may 
have serious societal ramifications. 
 
Limitations 
In addition to the limitations inherent to survey research, our survey data was collected 
across three different European countries. Differences in institutional contexts may 
therefore impact our results. Our sample validity tests and robustness checks indicate the 
possibility of minor differences between Germany and the Netherlands-Belgium duo.  
There is, therefore, considerable opportunity for future research to build on our model by 
including formal, country-level institutions, such as rules that govern employment 
conditions, as well as informal institutions, such as the degree of individualism or 
collectivism in the culture, to further explain how tournament-type incentives influence 
behavior in different institutional settings (Connelly et al., 2013).  
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APPENDIX B EMPLOYED SCALES  
 
Audit quality reducing behaviors (α: 0.89) 
How often do these behaviors present themselves at your firm? 
1. Reduction of the work below what is considered reasonable. 
2. Superficial review of client documentation. 
3. Acceptance of weak client explanations. 
4. Failure to research a questionable item. 
5. False sign-off. 
 
Deliberate distortion (α: 0.89) 
How often do these behaviors present themselves at your firm? 
1. Consciously biasing sample selection towards less troublesome items. 
2. Misestimating certain items on the financial statements. 
3. Signing off on materially misstated items. 
4. Insufficient execution of control procedures. 
5. Insufficient attention to the existence and functioning of rules and procedures at 
the client. 
Professional skepticism (α: 0.81)   
1. My firm stimulates independent thinking. 
2. In my firm, we take our time before making decisions. 
3. In my firm, we tend to accept what other people say at face value. (reverse 
coded) 
4. In my firm, we like to understand the reason for our clients’ behavior. 
5. We doublecheck every piece of information in our firm. 
6. My colleagues strive to continue learning about their profession. 
7. Outsiders think that my firm often questions things that we see or hear. 
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8. In my firm, we like to consider most available information before making a 
decision. 
 
Organizational citizenship behaviors (α: 0.83)  
In my team, 
1. we go out of our way to help co-workers with work-related problems. 
2. we voluntarily help new employees settle into the job. 
3. we always go out of the way to make newer employees feel welcome in team. 
4. we frequently adjust our agendas to help other colleagues. 
5. we always meet or beat deadlines for completing work.  
6. we never take unnecessary time off work. 
7. we assist supervisors with their work. 
8. we frequently communicate to co-workers suggestions on how the team can 
improve. 
9. we perform our job duties with extra-special care.  
 
Crowding (α: 0.80) 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
In my firm, 
1. the chances of becoming partner are slim. 
2. there are sufficient chances for juniors and seniors to become partner. 
3. only a small number of lower-level auditors will become partners. 
4. competition for partnership is stark. 
5. many lower-level auditors compete for very few partner positions. 
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Pay spreads (α: 0.90) 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
1. The pay differences are increasingly large between ranks in the partnership. 
2. Partners earn substantially more than any other rank in my firm. 
3. The raises before partnership are not comparable to the raise for partnership.  
4. In my firm, partners earn a lot more than the rest of the professionals. 
5. In my firm, the pay gap between partners and the rest of the professionals is 
substantial. 
 
Profit orientation (α: 0.83) 
Could you please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements?  
1. My firm is primarily concerned with generating profits. 
2. The ‘bottom line’ orientation of my firm is the generation of profits. 
3. We take corrective action when we do not meet our financial performance 
targets. 
4. Our partners emphasize market performance. 
5. Generating revenues is what matters most in my firm. 
6. My income depends on the profit I realize for my firm. 
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CHAPTER 4. LOGICS UNDER PRESSURE: HOW STRATEGIC RESPONSES 
TO INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEXITY UNDERCUT INSTITUTIONAL 
MICROFOUNDATIONS7 
 
 
Abstract  
Organizations are confronted with institutional complexity whenever they face 
incompatible prescriptions from an existing incumbent logic and from emerging 
challenger logics. While institutional scholarship has started to generate insight on the 
organizational level strategic responses to institutional complexity, much less is known 
about the individual level behavioral implications of institutional complexity. In this study, 
we advance and test theoretical claims on how organizations internally manage 
institutional complexity and how their strategic responses to institutional complexity 
influence individual member behavior. More specifically, we propose that organizations 
manage institutional complexity by selectively adopting organizational practices 
embedded in incumbent and challenger logics. The unwanted consequence hereof is that 
the behavior triggered by the practices embedded in the challenger logics may lead to 
unintended institutional disruption. Member behaviors may unwittingly undercut the 
socio-cognitive microfoundations of incumbent logics by undermining the assumptions 
and beliefs of the incumbent logic, disassociating incumbent organizational practices from 
their moral foundations, and disconnecting sanctions and rewards from the prescriptions 
of the incumbent logic. We apply and test our theoretical claims through a field study in 
the audit industry, a context where disruption behaviors can have highly consequential 
societal repercussions. By critically reflecting on the dynamics of institutional complexity, 
                                                     
7 This chapter is co-authored with Prof.Dr. Pursey P.M.A.R. Heugens and Prof.Dr. J. (Hans) 
van Oosterhout. 
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organizational practices, and individual member behavior, our findings contribute to a 
better understanding of the microfoundations of institutional logics.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
In many fields that were once home solely to a monolithic incumbent logic, we currently 
observe institutional complexity in the form of emerging or established challenger logics 
durably co-existing with the incumbent logic. This is true in organizational fields ranging 
from commercial banking to college textbook publishing and from health care to drug 
courts (Almandoz, 2012; Dunn & Jones, 2010; Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007; McPherson & 
Sauder, 2013; Thornton, 2002; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). Firms embedded in such fields 
therefore face multiple, sometimes competing or contradictory, institutional prescriptions 
and associated compliance pressures (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & 
Lounsbury, 2011). In many fields, the management of firm-environmental relations is 
currently therefore more complex than in earlier periods, when monolithic institutions 
exerted singular compliance pressures on embedded firms. 
 A number of recent studies have investigated how firms choose to respond 
strategically to such institutional complexity (Chandler, 2014; Greenwood et al., 2011; 
Kraatz & Block, 2008; Purdy & Gray, 2009). A strategic response being one that allows 
firms to maintain their strategic maneuverability and that ensures that institutional 
pressures do not interfere with its ability to achieve its objectives, even in the face of 
multiple competing prescriptions. Some studies have focused on structural changes, 
through which firms become structural hybrids seeking ‘strategic isomorphism’ (Aurini, 
2006; Deephouse, 1996) with multiple norm sets. Other studies have focused on practice 
adoption, through which organizations develop activities and responses that are congruent 
with the manifest logics of a field (Lounsbury, 2007; Smets et al., 2012; Thornton, 2002, 
2004). Through strategic isomorphism or practice adoption, organizations seek to gain 
institutional legitimacy in order to secure support or endorsement by external actors, 
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stabilize resource flows from resource-controlling parties, and thus heighten their chance 
of survival (Scott & Meyer, 1991; Thornton et al., 2012; Zucker 1987). 
 To this date, however, we know very little about how strategic responses to 
institutional complexity affect organizational behavior. A latent assumption of most 
studies on strategic responsiveness is that newly adopted organizational structures and 
practices can wholly or in part be decoupled from organizational task behaviors (but see 
Pache and Santos’ (2010) discussion of selective coupling). Most studies have therefore 
focused on the strategic response in and of itself, that is, without further exploring the 
repercussions such responses have for task performance.  A few studies have delved 
deeper by analyzing practice adoption in more detail and have contributed to a richer 
understanding of the organizational repercussions of institutional complexity (Kraatz & 
Block, 2008; Pache & Santos, 2010, 2013). Battilana and Dorado (2010) for instance 
assessed the performance implications of practice adoption strategies. At the micro-level, 
studies have advanced our understanding of the effect of multiple logics on organizational 
identity (Reay & Hinings, 2005, 2009) and on economic responses to market forces (such 
as downsizing) (Greenwood, Diaz, Li, & Lorente, 2010). Despite these theoretical and 
empirical efforts, we still know too little about the behavioral consequences of firms’ 
strategic responses to institutional complexity (Greenwood, Hinings, & Whetten, 2014). 
This hampers our knowledge of the interpretive frames and other socio-cognitive 
platforms that form the basis of organizational action, better known as the 
microfoundations of institutions (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Powell & Colyvas, 2008; 
Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2009). We will therefore seek to understand how an 
organizational level strategic response to institutional complexity influences individual 
level behavior in relation to task performance.  
 Our findings show that the emergence of new logics in an organizational field often 
gives rise to individual behaviors that can undermine or disrupt the incumbent logic 
(Clemens & Cook, 1999; Empson, Cleaver, & Allen, 2013; Jazarbkowski, Matthiesen, & van 
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de Ven, 2009; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010). Importantly these disruption behaviors are not 
performed by external challengers of the prevailing institutional order, but by 
institutionalized actors themselves, who may thus undercut the microfoundations of the 
very institutions in which they are embedded (Empson et al., 2013). These disruption 
behaviors are, often unwantedly and unwittingly, triggered by practice adoption strategies 
(Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Colyvas, 2007). Because new practice adoption does not always 
allow for decoupling, new practices can therefore wittingly or unwittingly change 
individual members’ attitudes and behaviors. In other words, our study shows that 
incompatible logics do not always or necessarily lead to momentous clashes between 
ideologies or worldviews (Besharov & Smith, 2014; Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007), but 
rather that new logics gradually emerge, undercut, and disrupt existing ones 
(Jazarbkowski et al., 2009; Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Oliver, 1992). 
 Our data comes from a survey amongst Dutch, Belgian, and German auditors.  The 
societal role of auditors as independent information intermediaries that verify and certify 
financial information in order to ensure the efficient allocation of capital and investor 
protection heightens the relevance and importance of our context of study. Especially since 
auditor behavior has been attracting increasing scrutiny in relation to auditors’ 
involvement in large corporate accounting scandals. The audit industry is therefore a 
unique ‘natural laboratory’ for a field study to advance our understanding of institutional 
complexity, strategic organizational responses, and (unintended) institutional disruption. 
Institutional complexity is a fact of life in the audit field because the incumbent 
professional logic, which emphasizes that work be conducted according to procedures that 
are deemed skilled and appropriate by society at large and by professional associations 
(Evetts, 2006; Malsch & Gendron, 2013; Suchman, 1995), durably co-exists with a 
challenger commercial logic, which emphasizes that work be conducted in a manner that 
maximizes both firm revenues and pecuniary returns to the firm’s owners (Malsch & 
Gendron, 2013; Suddaby, Cooper, & Greenwood, 2007; Suddaby, Gendron, & Lam, 2009). 
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The strategic response of audit firms to this complexity has been to adopt several 
institutionalized practices from both logics. It is important to emphasize that the two logics 
and associated practices are not upheld and defended by different organizations 
representing alternative organizational forms (as in commercial banks versus community 
banks (Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007)), but are found in ‘sedimented’ form (Cooper, Hinings, 
Greenwood, & Brown, 1996) in almost every audit firm, albeit to varying degrees. Practices 
such as engagement quality control reviews and internal transparency, which serve to 
safeguard the quality of work procedures essential to the public role of auditors, are 
embedded in the incumbent professional logic. Practices like revenue-based profit sharing 
and variable compensation, which represent incentives to enhance profitability, are 
embedded in the challenger commercial logic. With this study, we will show that the 
practices embedded in the commercial logic lead to (unintended) institutional disruption 
(Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006) because they trigger two disruption behaviors that 
undermine the microfoundations of the incumbent professional logic. The two disruption 
behaviors are inappropriate partner behaviors, or “regulatory violations that have the 
potential to lead to an audit failure” (Carcello, Hermanson, & Huss, 1996, p.246) and 
underinvestment in reputation, or the failure to exert sufficient effort to maintain audit 
firm reputation (Greenwood & Empson, 2003; Hitt, Bierman, Uhlenbruck, &Shimizu, 2006; 
Wilson, 1983). These behaviors are diametrically opposed to professional norms and 
therefore threaten the quality and societal value of the audit. The practices embedded in 
the professional logic (engagement quality control reviews and internal transparency) lead 
to institutional maintenance (Dacin, Munir, & Tracey, 2010; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; 
Zilber, 2009), in the sense that they reduce these institutional disruption behaviors.  
 With this study we intend to make three contributions. First, as one of the few 
behavioral studies in the logics field, we reply to repeated calls for greater behavioral and 
microfoundations-oriented research in institutional theory (Dunn & Jones, 2010; 
Greenwood Hinings & Whetten, 2014; McPherson & Sauder, 2013). Thus far, research has 
108_Erim Pruijssers BW Stand.job
Chapter 4  
 
 
96 
been overly concerned with explaining institutions and their overarching logics instead of 
analyzing the behavioral repercussions of these logics (Empson et al., 2013; Greenwood et 
al., 2014). In particular, we show that as the challenger institutional logic emerges and 
institutionalizes, embedded social actors engage in disruption behaviors that undermine 
the microfoundations of the incumbent logic by challenging the taken-for-granted nature 
of professional norms as the ulterior yardstick for evaluating professional conduct. Second, 
we also provide a new perspective on institutional conflict (Lounsbury, 2007; Marquis & 
Lounsbury, 2007; Pache & Santos, 2010; Thornton, 2002) by showing that conflict is often 
latent rather than manifest. We thus propose that the concept of institutional conflict 
should be broadened, such that it not just encompasses highly visible clashes of ideology 
in the public domain (e.g., see Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007), but also covert and perhaps 
even unintended processes undercutting the microfoundations of competing logics. A 
more refined understanding of institutional conflict would provide a foundation to enable 
a more systematic prediction of its behavioral implications. Additionally, this more refined, 
intra-organizational view on institutional conflict also shows that the outcome of such 
strife is not necessarily a shift in prevalence of one organizational form at the expense of 
another, but may encompass intra-organizational change in which new coalitions 
challenge the prominence of incumbent coalitions (Empson et al., 2013). A case in point is 
that many audit firms are currently led by representatives of their more recent consulting 
branches. Third, this study provides interesting insights for the literature on professional 
service firm (PSF) design and performance (Greenwood & Empson, 2003; Greenwood & 
Miller, 2010; Greenwood, Deephouse, & Li, 2007). We show that profit-seeking practices in 
PSFs often unwantedly and invisibly undercut the public and gatekeeping roles of PSFs. 
Thus far regulatory action has been the default response in many jurisdictions (Bayou, 
Reinstein, & Williams, 2011; Carnegie & Napier, 2010; Sikka, 2009), we expect 
organizational solutions in terms of compensation policies (Knechel, Niemi, & Zerni, 2013) 
or ongoing internal quality controls (Bedard, Deis, Curtis, & Jenkins, 2008) to be fruitful 
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remedies. The implication of these findings is therefore that the prevention of gatekeeper 
failure cannot straightforwardly be accomplished by means of regulatory remedies, but 
will require deeply organizational solutions aimed at restoring adherence to an 
institutional logic – professionalism – that is under threat of being supplanted by a 
challenger logic. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Institutional Complexity 
Institutional logics guide social action by providing “assumptions and values, usually 
implicit, about how to interpret organizational reality, and what constitutes appropriate 
behavior, and how to succeed” (Thornton, 2004, p.70). Abiding by the cultural 
prescriptions of institutional logics provides organizations with external legitimacy and 
heightens their chances of survival (Scott & Meyer, 1991; Thornton et al., 2012; Zucker 
1987). Most organizational fields do not host a singular and dominant institutional logic, 
but are confronted with multiple institutional logics operating in concert (Greenwood et 
al., 2010). This gives rise to institutional complexity, or the situation where organizations 
face multiple and possibly incompatible prescriptions from a plurality of institutional 
logics (Greenwood et al., 2010; Kraatz & Block, 2008). Institutional theorists have come to 
recognize that institutional complexity has become the norm rather than the exception in 
nearly every organizational field (Greenwood et al., 2010). This entails that institutional 
complexity is not a temporary or fleeting phenomenon, but a typification of the ‘modern 
organizational condition’.  
 In fields once dominated by a single monolithic incumbent logic, institutional 
complexity either flows from within the field, due to changes in competition, client 
requirements, business opportunities or cost pressures for example, or originates from 
within the organizations, due to internal diversification strategies, the development of new 
practices, or increasing scale of operations for instance (Empson et al., 2013; Greenwood 
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& Hinings, 1996; Greenwood & Langley, 2014). The emergence of challenger institutional 
logics that are either new to the organizational field or previously present in a latent and 
subdued form results in institutional complexity. Most striking examples of institutional 
complexity can be found in the service industry. Hospitals and audit firms, for instance, 
face normative prescriptions and demands emanating from both a professional logic and a 
commercial logic (Dunn & Jones, 2010; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006). Organizational 
action in publishing houses is constrained by craft and market logics (Thornton, 2002; 
Thornton & Ocasio, 1999), while mutual funds camp with community and market logics 
(Almandoz, 2012; Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007). In most organizational fields we now 
observe a permanent co-existence of multiple incompatible logics at par with each other 
(Besharov & Smith, 2014; Greenwood et al., 2011; Jazarbkowski, Smets, Bednarek, Burke, 
& Spee, 2013; Kraatz & Block, 2008; Zilber, 2011).   
This enduring co-existence of incumbent and challenger logics creates the 
potential for internal tensions as the underlying assumptions, values, beliefs, and cultural 
prescriptions of the incumbent logic usually conflict with those of the challenger logics. At 
the organizational level, these tensions materialize in design challenges. Each institutional 
logic prescribes a delimited set of practices organizations can adopt to ensure conformity 
with institutional demands and gain institutional legitimacy (Greenwood et al., 2010; 
Thornton, 2002, 2004; Thornton et al., 2012). Institutional complexity, however, makes a 
broader repertoire of organizational practices available to organizations (Besharov & 
Smith, 2012; Tracey, Philips, & Jarvis, 2011). This enhanced repertoire is at the same time 
an enabling and a constraining force on the organization. That is, even though 
organizations face a wider choice set, the underlying inconsistencies between incumbent 
and challenger logics makes the organizational design task more delicate and complicated. 
Organizations could, for instance, end up adopting antagonistic practices (Besharov & 
Smith, 2012; Tracey et al., 2011).  
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Several strategic responses to institutional complexity are available to 
organizations. Earlier studies focused on strategies seeking to eliminate pluralism 
(Jazarbkowski et al., 2013). Drawing on Oliver’s (1991) work, prior studies have found that 
organizations may resist or avoid institutional pressures by denying the validity or 
legitimacy of certain logics (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Kraatz & Block, 2008; 
Jazarbkowski et al., 2013; Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007; Townley, 1997). Organizations 
may, for instance, defy institutional pressures, as was observed in the case of how English 
and German banking lawyers shifted the governing logic of their newly founded 
international law firm by practice improvisation (Smets, Morris, & Greenwood, 2012). 
Alternatively, a less documented strategy is compromise (Kraatz & Block, 2008; Oliver, 
1991). In this case, organizations create hybrid practices including the requirements of 
both incumbent and challenger logics in a slightly altered form. Microfinance organizations 
have, for instance, set interest rates below market expectations and above the demands of 
development stakeholders in an attempt to partially attend to dual institutional demands 
(Carrick-Cagna & Santos, 2009). Yet another strategy consists of decoupling normative 
structures from operational structures (Lounsbury, 2001; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; 
Westphal & Zajac, 2001) in an attempt to safeguard legitimacy (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 
2008). Organizations can do this by “symbolically endorsing practices prescribed by one 
logic while actually implementing practices promoted by another logic” (Pache & Santos, 
2013, p.974). This has been observed in the General Accounting Office in the United States 
where the technical work process was decoupled from the externally directed symbolic 
displays of the audit reporting process (Basu, Dirsmith, & Gupta, 1999). These defensive 
strategic responses are centered on the incompatibilities of logics and see institutional 
complexity as transitory (Jazarbkowski et al., 2013). A limitation of these strategies is that 
organizations will not fully secure institutional support in the long run. Even though their 
aim is to avoid institutional collision, these strategic responses often give rise to highly 
visible ideological clashes in the public domain (Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007).  
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 Rather than seeking the elimination of institutional complexity, more recent 
studies recognize that institutional complexity is an enduring fact of organizational life. 
These studies suggest that organizations should reconcile and balance the demands of 
incumbent and challenger logics (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Dunn & Jones, 2010; Kraatz & 
Block, 2008; Purdy & Gray, 2009; Reay & Hinings, 2009). This alternative strategic 
response embraces institutional complexity by seeing it as an opportunity to draw from a 
broader repertoire of practices (Binder, 2007; Greenwood et al., 2010; Greenwood et al., 
2011; Pache & Santos, 2013). The aim is to selectively combine practices in order to seek a 
cooperative solution between the logics (Kraatz & Block, 2008; Reay & Hinings, 2009; 
Pache & Santos, 2013). In order to reconcile contradictory ideologies, practices from the 
different logics should govern different activities (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Friedland & 
Alford, 1991). Dunn and Jones (2010), for instance, observed that hospitals handled 
institutional complexity by adopting practices embedded in the professional logic to guide 
expertise and practices embedded in the commercial logic to guide practice8. This 
approach aims to strategically position the organization by satisfying the variety of 
institutional demands in an attempt to secure endorsement from the field (Greenwood et 
al., 2011; Pache & Santos, 2013; Tracey et al., 2011). Selectively coupling practices from 
different institutional logics is therefore a common way to manage institutional complexity 
as it reduces the risk of losing institutional legitimacy (which could be a byproduct of 
resistance strategies or of decoupling practices) and avoids the cost of having to create 
alternative practices (when organizations compromise) (Pache & Santos, 2013). Selective 
coupling however, has an inherent weakness, since practices associated with the 
challenger logic might trigger behavior that is not desired by the defenders (Marquis & 
Lounsbury, 2007) of the incumbent logic. 
 
                                                     
8 Selectively coupling practices can, therefore, create variation in practices across organizations in 
the same field (Lounsbury, 2007, 2008).  
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Organizational Member Behavior 
The fact that multiple logics persistently coexist within a field without there being manifest 
conflict does not mean that the co-existence is always peaceful (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; 
Pache & Santos, 2013; Tracey, Phillips, & Jarvis, 2011). Specifically, the emergence and 
institutionalization of a challenger logic has two field-wide consequences that together 
threaten the microfoundations of the incumbent logic. The first consequence is on 
organizational design. The adoption of practices embedded in a challenger logic entails that 
fewer resources will be available to devote to practices embedded in the incumbent logic 
(Malsch & Gendron, 2013). In the accounting field for instance, the rise of a commercial 
logic has been paired with the adoption of practices spurring on financial gain, such as the 
coupling of auditor compensation to short-term profitability or low-balling practices to 
win audit contracts (Malsch & Gendron, 2013; Sikka & Willmott, 1995). The consequence 
hereof was that audit firms had fewer resources left to invest in practices promoting 
professional oversight. In addition, the adoption of practices embedded in challenger logics 
also entails that some practices embedded in the incumbent logic have to be removed in 
order to give way to the new practices. It is important to stress that there is not a complete 
replacement of practices or an overhaul in organization design, but a careful combination 
of practices. Some incumbent practices are kept intact in order to ensure institutional 
maintenance (Dacin et al., 2010; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Pache & Santos, 2013; Zilber, 
2009). The emergence and institutionalization of a challenger logic therefore results in a 
so-called ‘sedimented’ organizational design (Cooper et al., 1996; Empson et al., 2013; 
Hinings & Greenwood, 1988; Jazarbkowski et al., 2009). Organizational sedimentation 
refers to the persistence of incumbent values and practices along challenger values and 
practices in an organization, even when there may be incoherences (Cooper et al., 1996).  
Organizational members need to make sense of this sedimented organizational 
design. Therefore, the second consequence of selectively combining practices in 
institutionally complex environments is its distorting effect on actor behavior, which could 
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lead to activities that engender or encompass institutional disruption (Lawrence & 
Suddaby, 2006). Practices are vehicles used to convey desired values in organizations 
(Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Lounsbury, 2007), shape individual interests, and frame the 
opportunities and constraints for actor behavior. Practices are visible to all organizational 
members and are the tangible communication devices that signal and incite certain types 
of behavior (Bowen & Ostroff, 2004). Organizational members need to interpret and 
translate these signals into behavior (Cooper et al., 1996; Covaleski, Dirsmith, Heian, & 
Samuels, 1998; Grey, 2003; Kornberger, Carter, & Ross-Smith, 2010). The selective 
combination of practices, however, will confront organizational members with 
inconsistent signals that they need to make sense of, interpret, and translate into 
behaviors. Some members will reinforce the incumbent logic by reproducing its taken-for-
granted ideals, while others will question these previously taken-for-granted behaviors 
(Colyvas, 2007; Powell & Colyvas, 2008). Even though the logics are enacted in different 
areas of the organization, interpretations of organizational signals can be transposed from 
one area to another (Powell & Colyvas, 2008).  
The unwanted consequence hereof is that the behavior diffused by the challenger 
logics may actually undercut or disrupt the microfoundations of the incumbent logic 
(Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). The availability of alternative behavioral signals within the 
organization will lead members to question the legitimacy of their previously taken-for-
granted behaviors. Members will reassess the appropriateness of incumbent institutional 
prescriptions (Creed, Hudson, Okhuysen, & Smith-Crowe, 2014; Greenwood, Suddaby, & 
Hinings, 2002; Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Thornton, 2002) and might fail to reproduce the 
previously taken-for-granted incumbent organizational behaviors. The repeated 
production of challenger-logic congruent behaviors will replace the prevailing behavioral 
norms within the organization. Through the daily reproduction of these challenger 
congruent behaviors, the challenger logic will evolve from ‘unfamiliar and unusual to 
plausible and appropriate, and finally to a core component of [the organization]’ (Powell & 
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Colyvas, 2008, p.288). As challenger logic-congruent behaviors become the norm, the core 
assumptions and beliefs of the incumbent logic will be undermined (Empson et al., 2013; 
Jazarbkowski et al., 2009; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Maguire & Hardy, 2002; Wicks, 
2001). Organizational member commitment to the incumbent logic will therefore decrease 
(Voronov & Vince, 2012) and members will justify (instead of simply and unreflectively 
repeating and habituating) challenger logic-congruent behaviors (Colyvas, 2007; Powell & 
Colyvas, 2008; Seo & Creed, 2002). In addition, members will challenge the previously 
taken-for-granted nature of incumbent norms as the ulterior benchmark for assigning 
rewards and sanctions (Jazarbkowski et al., 2009; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). Their 
behavior will induce a disconnect of the rewards and sanctions from the incumbent logic’s 
pre- and proscriptions. The spread of challenger logic-congruent behavior will further 
gradually diminish the institutional pressures of the incumbent logic. While practices 
embedded in the incumbent logic will persist, their existence will become more symbolic, 
in the sense of maintaining institutional legitimacy, rather than substantive (Ahmadjian & 
Robinson, 2001; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). Practices embedded in the incumbent logic 
will therefore become disassociated from their moral foundations (Ahmadjian & Robinson, 
2001; Jazarbkowski et al., 2009; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Maguire & Hardy, 2009). 
These challenger logic-congruent behaviors “attack and undermine the mechanisms that 
lead members to comply with institutions” (Empson et al., 2013, p.813) and can therefore 
be seen as institutional disruption behaviors, or behaviors that contribute to institutional 
disruption. (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). The selective combination of practices could 
therefore lead to the disruption of the incumbent logic (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; 
Maguire & Hardy, 2009). Ultimately, this could jeopardize the organization’s customer and 
public support as well as its chance of survival (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Lawrence & 
Suddaby, 2006; Scott & Meyer, 1991; Zucker, 1987). 
The above illustrates that managing institutional complexity comes with a 
potentially serious threat. The durable sedimentation of organizational practices (Binder, 
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2007; Greenwood et al., 2010; Greenwood et al., 2011; Pache & Santos, 2013) gives rise to 
inconsistent behavioral signals (Colyvas, 2007; Powell & Colyvas, 2008). While the 
organizational practices embedded in the incumbent logic elicit incumbent logic-
congruent behaviors, organizational practices embedded in the challenger logic trigger 
challenger logic-congruent behaviors. Cumulatively, these challenger logic-congruent 
behaviors undermine the assumptions and beliefs of incumbent practices, disconnect the 
rewards and sanctions from incumbent practices, and disassociate incumbent practices 
from their moral foundations (Empson et al., 2013; Jazarbkoski et al., 2009; Lawrence & 
Suddaby, 2006; Maguire & Hardy, 2009). These challenger logic-congruent behaviors 
therefore disrupt the microfoundations of the incumbent logic by “dismantling the 
normative, cognitive, and regulatory mechanisms supporting the [incumbent logic]” 
(Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010, p.195). Therefore, we propose: 
 
Proposition 1: Practices embedded in the incumbent institutional logic reinforce behaviors 
congruent with that logic. 
 
Proposition 2: Practices embedded in the challenger logics lead to the disruption of the 
incumbent institutional logic by engendering disruption behaviors that undercut its 
microfoundations. 
 
CONTEXT OF APPLICATION AND HYPOTHESES 
We seek to understand the disruptive behavioral implications of institutional complexity 
in the audit field. The audit field provides an ideal context of application because of the 
persistence of institutional complexity. Audit firms are subject to two contradictory 
institutional logics: a professional and a commercial logic (Muzio, Brock, & Suddaby, 2013; 
Suddaby et al., 2009). Their enduring co-existence enables us to highlight the latent 
organizational struggles and disruptive behavioral implications of institutional complexity. 
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The audit field is also a highly appropriate context of application because of its societal 
importance. Recent developments in the audit industry have highlighted several cases of 
auditor failure and systemic crises of confidence as auditors failed to meet the expectations 
of the users of financial statements. The scale and recurrence of financial scandals 
involving auditors have raised the highly consequential risks of auditor (mis)behavior 
(Wyatt, 2004; Zeff, 2003). Understanding what drives auditor (mis)behavior is therefore 
on the agendas of policy-makers and academics alike. We take steps in this direction by 
analyzing the effects of institutional complexity on auditor disruption behaviors, which we 
hypothesize to be influenced by the adoption of organizational practices that are more or 
less congruent with the incumbent professional logic and/or the challenger commercial 
logic.  
 
Institutional Complexity in the Audit Field 
The traditional, and therefore incumbent, logic in the audit field is the professional logic. 
The professional logic assumes that auditors are social trustees (Brint, 1996; Robson, 
Willmott, Cooper, & Puxty, 1994) who have clear fiduciary duties to the public (Gendron, 
2002; Gendron & Malsch, 2013). It is premised on the ideology of public service, the 
mythologies of independence and autonomy (Suddaby, Gendron, & Lam, 2009), and a 
disinterest in commercial matters (Freidson, 2001). The professional logic consists of clear 
professional norms and values (Malsch & Gendron, 2013; Suddaby et al., 2009). 
Professional bodies promulgate rules and regulations and secure institutional 
maintenance through specific socialization procedures and continuous professional 
development programs (Covaleski et al., 1998; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005; Suddaby, 
Cooper, & Greenwood 2007, Suddaby et al., 2009). The professional logic has external 
legitimacy not only because it stems from the demands of external stakeholders, but also 
because it is maintained by professional bodies external to the audit firms. 
118_Erim Pruijssers BW Stand.job
Chapter 4  
 
 
106 
Nowadays, the incumbent professional logic durably co-exists with a commercial 
logic (Evetts, 2011; Hanlon, 2004; Leicht & Fennel, 2001). A reduced workload due to 
technology developments in auditing combined with a shrinking client pool with 
increasing demands for consulting services urged audit firms to rethink their organization 
and their services (Suddaby et al., 2007, Suddaby et al., 2009). Audit firms therefore 
expanded their range of services from auditing to strategy, IT, and tax (Hanlon, 2004; 
Suddaby et al., 2007, Suddaby et al., 2009; Zeff, 2003) and hired non-accountants (Wyatt, 
2004; Zeff, 2003). The influx of non-accountants altered the culture in audit firms, as these 
new hires had different and sometimes contradicting social and professional dispositions 
(Greenwood & Empson, 2003). They imported the normality of financial short-termism 
and the managerial rhetoric from other commercial contexts into the audit firm (Wyatt, 
2004; Hanlon, 2004; Suddaby, Cooper, & Greenwood, 2007). This contributed to the 
consolidation of the commercial logic in audit firms. The commercial logic is premised on 
the quest for short-term profitability (Malsch & Gendron, 2013), the generation of 
revenues (Suddaby et al., 2009), and the importance of value-added (Covaleski et al., 2003; 
Pinnington & Morris, 2003). The commercial logic shifts the nature of audit services from 
a public good towards a commercial service sold to the client and is seen as a potentially 
disruptive influence for the professional logic. Even though this logic has its origin inside 
the audit firm, the commercial logic has gained external institutional legitimacy (Malsch & 
Gendron, 2013). Institutes like the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (the 
largest member institution representing the accounting profession in the United States) 
have endorsed the commercialistic agenda of audit firms (Fogarty, Radcliffe, & Campbell, 
2006). Professional bodies further endorse and play an active role in the boundary 
spanning activities of audit firms (Gendron & Barrett, 2004; Greenwood, Suddaby, & 
Hinings, 2002). In addition, society at large accepts that the owners of the audit firm 
ultimately appropriate the economic surplus generated by the provision of their services.  
 Both the professional (incumbent) and the commercial (challenger) logics are of 
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significant importance in the audit field. Audit firms depend on the professional logic for 
their social acceptance and raison d’être and depend on the commercial logic for their 
economic survival. The prescriptions of both logics, however, set contradictory demands. 
Within the customary fixed fee audit contract, for example, the professional logic 
prescribes independence, competence, and professional accuracy while the commercial 
logic vies for cost reductions and time savings. Audit firms are therefore caught in a web of 
institutional complexity. This gives rise to internal tensions and associated organizational 
challenges. How audit firms handle institutional complexity is crucial for their social 
legitimacy, their access to critical resources, their perceived authenticity, and ultimately 
their survival (Greenwood et al., 2011; Scott & Meyer, 1991; Zucker, 1987). 
 
Strategic Organizational Responses to Institutional Complexity 
The responsibility for handling these institutional pressures lies in the hands of the key 
decision-makers of audit firms. Because audit firms are organized as professional 
partnerships, the key decision-makers are the owners or partners (Maister, 2007). 
Partners are the most senior members of the audit firm as they survived the tough 
promotion procedures to qualify as owner and participate in the firm’s profit-sharing 
scheme (Morris & Pinington, 1998). Their ownership entails that their reputational capital 
as well as economic wealth is tied up in the firm (Greenwood & Empson, 2003). Therefore, 
partners’ decisions are believed to be in the best interests of the firm. In addition, partners 
are more receptive to institutional pressures since they have greater ties to the profession 
and connections to the field given their seniority (Greenwood et al., 2011; Lounsbury, 
2001; Suddaby et al., 2009). They are therefore believed to best make sense of, interpret, 
and enact the institutional logics within their firm.  
The importance and persistence of both logics has complicated the organizational 
design task for partners (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, p.973). The most common strategic 
response is to balance and reconcile the demands of both logics. Partners therefore embed 
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values in the firm that conform to the dual institutional standards in order to gain 
legitimacy from both institutional referents (Fogarty, 1996). In spite of professional 
(incumbent) practices based on collegial or peer controls contradicting with the more 
business-like organizational control practices prescribed by the commercial logic 
(Anderson-Gough, Grey, & Robson, 2001; Cooper et al., 1996; Covaleski et al., 1998; Morris 
& Pinnington, 1998), partners have carefully combined practices in order to attend to both 
institutional demands.  
 
Organizational Practices Associated with the Professional Logic 
Partners have chosen to keep intact some of the traditional practices embedded in the 
professional logic to guide audit practice as the values and beliefs of the professional logic 
best correspond with partners’ desire to deliver high levels of audit quality. In order to 
deliver high levels of audit quality, partners must make sure that professional rules and 
standards are strictly followed. Formally detecting violations of professional rules and 
standards, however, is complex because these behaviors are not only difficult for outsiders 
to observe, but also because of the high costs associated with formally monitoring these 
non-routine behaviors (Greenwood & Empson, 2003). The practices embedded in the 
professional logic provide the tools to enforce professional conduct because they rely on 
collegial oversight practices (Cooper et al., 1996). Collegial oversight practices are believed 
to control the risk that auditors violate professional values by detecting and deterring 
unprofessional behavior (Bedard, Deis, Curtis, & Jenkins, 2008). Practices embedded in the 
professional logic therefore ensure institutional maintenance (Dacin et al., 2010; Zilber, 
2009).  
One such practice is the engagement quality control review (EQCR) or concurring 
partner review. The EQCR is a quality control mechanism used to monitor audit quality by 
providing an objective review of an audit engagement by a partner not involved with the 
client (Epps & Messier, 2006; Schneider & Messier, 2007). The EQCR is deeply embedded 
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in the professional logic because the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) 
prescribes this practice. Indeed, the International Standards on Quality Control (ISQC1, 
para.20) provide guidance on EQCR (IFAC, 2007), which 130 member countries have 
adopted and enforced in their national auditing standards. Research has established that 
the EQCR has the potential to increase audit quality if reviewers possess certain qualities 
(Bedard et al., 2008; Gibbins & Trotman, 2002). Reviewers should complete a thorough 
and all-encompassing review (Agoglia, Kida, & Hanno, 2003; Bamber & Ramsey, 2000), 
should proceed to face-to-face reviews (Agoglia, Hatfield, & Brazel, 2009; Brazel, Agoglia, 
& Hatfield, 2004), and should have sound experience in the client’s industry (Owhoso, 
Messier, & Lynch, 2002). Available studies have established that the EQCR encourages 
professional behavior because it enhances risk assessments by engagement partners 
(Ayers & Kaplan, 2003; Tucker & Matsumura, 1997), leads to higher levels of testing 
(Matsumura & Tucker, 1995), and reduces the focus on confirmatory evidence (Tan, 1995). 
The EQCR is therefore an effective mechanism to ensure professional conduct and maintain 
compliance with the professional logic. 
A second practice embedded in the professional logic is internal transparency. 
Internal transparency refers ‘the degree to which [partner] conduct and its consequences 
are perceptible to [other partners]’ (Kaptein, 2008, p.926). Internal transparency therefore 
has the potential to increase the visibility of partner behavior and hone collegial 
monitoring. As partners know the ins-and-outs of the job, are familiar with the potential 
ethical dilemmas, and work in relatively close contact with other partners, they are best 
able to influence colleagues’ behavior (Greenwood & Empson, 2003). Internal 
transparency is therefore an effective mechanism to enable partners to detect and expose 
the unprofessional conduct of their colleagues (Kaptein, 2008, 2011). In addition, internal 
transparency can be an effective deterrent to unprofessional behaviors because it not only 
increases the likelihood of getting caught, but it also makes the consequences of 
unprofessional conduct visible (Kaptein, 2011; McCabe, Trevino, & Butterfield, 1996). 
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Internal transparency therefore ensures the maintenance of professional conduct in the 
audit firm. An internal transparency practice thus contributes to a sound control 
environment.  
 
Organizational Practices Associated with the Commercial Logic 
To secure endorsement from actors promoting and defending the commercial logic, 
partners have adopted a more business-like incentive and reward system (Dunn & Jones, 
2010; Lounsbury, 2008; Malsch & Gendron, 2013). Partners reconsidered their traditional 
equal profit sharing scheme (generally seniority-based) for a profit sharing scheme based 
on performance (Burrows & Black, 1998; Greenwood, Hinings, & Brown, 1990; Huddart & 
Liang, 2005). This new, yet currently well-established, approach to profit sharing allows 
audit firms to optimize profit maximization through the implementation of two practices.  
While traditionally partner compensation was based solely on the equal sharing 
of the overall profits generated by the firm, the performance-based profit sharing scheme 
introduced a variable component in partner compensation (Knechel, Niemi, & Zerni, 2013). 
Variable compensation is a non-fixed pecuniary reward based on performance. Partner 
compensation now consists of two elements: (1) a base component depending on the 
overall profits generated by the firm and (2) a variable component depending on individual 
performance evaluations (Burrows & Black, 1998; Empson et al., 2013; Greenwood et al., 
1990). Even though the weight attributed to this variable component varies among audit 
firms, the variable component of partner compensation is a significant part of total 
compensation in any given firm. It is not only the adoption of this new component, but also 
its relative weight that affects audit firm partners’ incentives. Meeting the standards for 
performance evaluations is now essential to determine the size of their compensation.  
Adding this variable component also added a new perspective to partner 
compensation: profits are awarded based on individual performance (Knechel et al., 2013). 
Profit-based revenue generation is the allocation of profit shares based on revenue 
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generating success (Greenwood et al., 1990). In accordance with commercial beliefs, the 
criteria for partner performance evaluations have become focused on profit (Carcello et 
al., 2000; Knechel et al., 2013). The ability to generate revenues is now a key determinant 
of profit share allocation in audit firms (Greenwood et al., 1990; Knechel et al., 2013). 
Partners should therefore focus on their personal contributions to firm profits, their 
amount of billable hours, and their ability to acquire new clients and retain existing clients. 
The pursuit of material gain has therefore become a key incentive in audit firms (Evetts, 
2011; Grey, 2003; Kornberger, Justesen, & Mouritsen, 2011; Malsch & Gendron, 2013; 
Suddaby et al., 2009). This stands in stark contrast to the norms and values of the 
professional logic. 
These commercial practices have not only been adopted by audit firms to increase 
their revenues and profitability, but also because other actors in the field endorse and 
expect these practices. In the United States, for instance, the SEC details rules about auditor 
compensation (2003). While prohibiting partner compensation based on partners’ cross-
selling abilities, the SEC endorses remuneration based on the selling of services within 
their discipline (for an audit partner, audit services; for a tax partner, tax services). The 
underlying assumption hereof is that partners deliver superior services when they are able 
to gain optimal access and insight into their area of expertise at the client. In a similar vein, 
the European Union recently passed directive 2014/56/EU (2014) which contains rules 
governing the internal organization of statutory auditors and audit firms (Article 24a). A 
special provision concerns profit-sharing policies of audit firms (paragraph J). It indirectly 
acknowledges that commercial skills form a large part of performance evaluations by 
regulating the need to also have ‘sufficient performance incentives to secure audit quality’ 
(L158/209). Like in the United States, audit firm partners are not allowed to be evaluated 
or directly remunerated for the cross-selling of services. The Dutch professional 
association of Accountants (Nederlandse Beroepsgroep van Accountants) takes this pan-
European regulation further by requiring audit firms to disclose the compensation policy 
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for partners, including the portion of variable and fixed compensation and criteria for 
promotion (The Code for Audit Firms, 2012). Therefore, the practices embedded in the 
challenger commercial logic are also institutionalized. Clearly, the rewards and sanctions 
in audit firms have become disconnected from the incumbent logic’s behavioral 
prescriptions. 
 
Behavioral Impact of Institutional Complexity 
Given that audit firm partners are intendedly rational economic players, they have an 
economic incentive to increase their personal wealth (Liu & Simunic, 2005). Prior 
experimental and archival research has established that partners react to pecuniary 
incentives (Carcello et al., 2000; Trompeter, 1994). A more commercial incentive and 
reward system will therefore affect partner behavior (Liu & Simunic, 2005). Partners will 
be sensitive to the commercial criteria embedded in their reward structure because they 
receive direct and personal rewards for good performance. Partners are especially 
receptive to these rewards because they include not only of a financial gain (greater 
allocation of profit shares, and thus greater compensation) but also of a status increase. A 
status increase to a ‘rainmaker’ or star generating most of the firm’s business (Teece, 2003) 
is an important incentive for a partner to perform well because partners not only derive 
their identity and ego from such a status (Groysberg & Lee, 2008; Polzer, Swann, and 
Milton, 2003), but are also able to enhance their value outside of the firm (Groysberg & Lee, 
2009). Partners will therefore strive to maximize their revenue generation. 
Given that the single revenue source for partners is their clientele, partners have 
two possibilities to maximize their revenue generation. First, partners can seek to retain 
existing clients to maintain their revenue stream as losing a client will negatively affect the 
partner’s profitability (Trompeter, 1994). The second option to generate revenue is the 
acquisition of new clients. Acquiring new clients may even be preferred given that new 
acquisitions will generate additional (as opposed to existing) revenues. While too much 
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focus on client retention makes partners vulnerable to client demands for aggressive or 
even fraudulent reporting (Carcello et al., 2000; Trompeter, 1994), too much focus on 
acquiring new clients makes partners vulnerable to cutting corners to reduce their existing 
workload. The increased vulnerability to client demands and the pressure to free up time 
to take on new clients may encourage partners to engage in inappropriate partner 
behaviors. Inappropriate partner behaviors are ‘regulatory violations that have the 
potential to lead to an audit failure’ (Carcello et al., 1996, p.246). Gathering insufficient 
audit evidence or performing inadequate workpaper review are examples of inappropriate 
partner behaviors. Clearly, these behaviors transgress professional norms and directly 
lower the quality and reliability of the audit. Inappropriate partner behaviors are 
diametrically opposed to the public function of the auditor as an independent gatekeeper 
and therefore result in a direct breach of the social contract auditors have with the public 
(Carcello et al., 1996). A recent example highlighting the risks associated with 
inappropriate partner behaviors is the Dutch audit market. The national authority of the 
financial markets has pointed out that a source for the inadequacy of 45% of controlled 
Dutch public interest audits is inappropriate partner behaviors. This provides evidence 
that inappropriate partner behaviors are a real threat to the audit. This observation has 
shattered the public confidence in the auditor. 
In addition, as partners compete with each other for profit shares, they will be less 
inclined to cooperate with each other or engage in activities that put the interests of the 
firm ahead of their personal interests (Carcello, Hermanson, & Huss, 2000). The most 
critical interest of any audit firm is establishing and maintaining a good reputation. 
Research has established that reputation enables the audit firm to charge higher fees, 
attract new clients, and hire the brightest professionals (Craswell, Francis, & Taylor, 1995; 
Greenwood & Empson, 2003; Greenwood, Li, Prakash, & Deephouse, 2005). Audit firm 
reputation is the product of collective effort and cumulatively benefits the firm in the long-
run. Reputation is, however, indivisible in the sense that reputation efforts cannot be 
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directly or explicitly attributed to a single partner. Therefore, partners can only indirectly 
benefit from investing in the reputation of the firm. The absence of direct rewards (in 
financial terms or prestige) associated with reputation maintenance efforts gives rise to 
underinvestment in reputation. Underinvestment in reputation is defined as the failure to 
exert sufficient effort to maintain audit firm reputation (Greenwood & Empson, 2003; Hitt, 
Bierman, Uhlenbruck, &Shimizu, 2006; Wilson, 1983). It can take on several forms. In 
pursuing material gain, partners may treat clients in a way that harms the reputation of the 
firm (by for instance acquiescing to their demands for aggressive reporting). Partners 
could also forgo to actively contribute to reputation building and free-ride on reputation 
efforts of colleagues. The highly consequential societal risks associated to 
underinvestment in reputation are apparent in the involvement of Arthur Andersen in the 
Enron accounting scandal. As a handful of Arthur Andersen’s partners acquiesced to the 
demands for fraudulent financial reporting, Arthur Andersen lost its reputation and 
consequently failed. The consequences of this underinvestment in reputation were not 
only borne by Arthur Andersen, but also spread to the accounting profession as a whole. 
The profession suffered a large loss in the confidence of audit work, and has been working 
to restore public confidence ever since. 
 
Disruption 
Economic factors have caused audit firms to keep intact some of its traditional incumbent 
professional practices and to abandon a deeply institutionalized practice (equal profit 
sharing) in order to replace it with a novel challenger practice (profit sharing based on 
revenue generation). Despite the adoption of antagonistic practices in separate (but 
related) areas regulating partner activities, the behaviors triggered by the challenger 
commercial logic diffused in the organization. The connection of the partner reward 
system to the commercial logic (and implicitly its disconnection from the professional 
logic) not only questions the legitimacy of previously taken-for-granted professional logic-
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congruent behaviors, but will also create awareness of the opportunities and (personal) 
benefits associated with commercial logic-congruent behavior. It will therefore incite 
partners to transpose, prioritize, and justify behavior from their incentive and reward 
system to their collegial control practices. The repetitive engagement in inappropriate 
partner behaviors and underinvestment in reputation can undercut the microfoundations 
of the professional logic (Empson et al., 2013; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Jazarbkowski et 
al., 2009; Maguire & Hardy, 2009). Inappropriate partner behaviors and underinvestment 
in reputation can therefore be qualified as institutional disruption behaviors. Hence, the 
commercial logic is a destabilizing force in the audit field (Gendron & Spira, 2009). 
The above illustrates that partners have reconciled and balanced the demands of 
two contradictory logics by selectively combining practices embedded in the professional 
and commercial logics. While the traditional professional practices spur on the 
professional behavior necessary for institutional maintenance, practices embedded in the 
commercial logic trigger two behaviors that can disrupt the incumbent professional logic 
for three reasons (Empson et al., 2013; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). First, because 
partners are personally rewarded based on their commercial success, partners gradually 
realize that their interests are not met by the prescriptions of the incumbent professional 
logic. Partners thus re-evaluate their previously taken-for-granted professional congruent 
behavior and start to engage in inappropriate behaviors and underinvestment in 
reputation. Even though these behaviors violate professional norms, their reproduction 
makes them become the norm (Wicks, 2001).  This will undermine the underlying 
assumptions and beliefs of the professional logic (Empson et al., 2013; Jazarbkowski et al., 
2009; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010). Second, as challenger logic-
congruent behaviors become accepted and the norm in the audit firm, the taken-for-
granted nature of professional norms as the ulterior yardstick for evaluating professional 
conduct will be challenged. Partner behavior will therefore trigger a wedge between the 
professional logic and partners’ sanctions and rewards (Jazarbkowski et al., 2009; 
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Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). This brings us to the third reason why challenger logic-
congruent behaviors are disrupting forces. The professional practices in place will start to 
lose grip because they will be perceived as mere vehicles to avoid regulatory sanctions 
(Wicks, 2001) and to achieve endorsement from institutional referents. The professional 
practices will therefore be disassociated from their moral foundations (Jazarbkowski et al., 
2009; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). Inappropriate partner behaviors and underinvestment 
in reputation therefore “attack and undermine the mechanisms that lead members to 
comply with [the professional logic]” (Empson et al., 2013, p.813) by undermining the 
assumptions and beliefs of the professional logic, by disconnecting rewards and sanctions 
from professional practices, and by disassociating practices embedded in the professional 
logic from the professional logic (Emspon et al., 2013; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; 
Jazarbkowski et al., 2009; Maguire & Hardy, 2009). They are therefore qualified as 
institutional disruption behaviors. Hence, we hypothesize: 
 
H1: Practices embedded in the professional logic reinforce professional logic-congruent 
behaviors. 
 
H2: Practices embedded in the commercial logic lead to professional logic-disruption 
behaviors. 
 
METHODS 
Data Collection and Sampling 
We relied on survey techniques to collect our data, not only because the data needed to test 
our hypotheses is not publicly available, but also because we are interested in perceptions 
regarding institutional logics, organizational practices, and behavior. A web-based survey 
was sent to all registered certified public accountants (CPAs) of the German, Dutch, and 
Belgian professional associations. The sampling frame consisted of the CPAs’ e-mail 
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addresses available at the public registries of the national professional associations 
(Germany: Wirtschaftsprueferkammer; The Netherlands: Nederlandse Beroepsorganisatie 
van Accountants; Belgium: Instituut voor Bedrijfsrevisoren). In total we collected 8246 e-
mail addresses for Germany, 9070 for The Netherlands, and 1021 for Belgium. These e-
mail addresses were from CPAs working for audit firms and CPAs employed by other 
institutions. In order to test our hypotheses, we needed partners’ perceptions since they 
are the key organizational decision-makers and because their behavior has a potentially 
large societal impact. In order to sample the partners, the first page of the survey filtered 
out the CPAs not working for an audit firm. The next page then screened the hierarchical 
level of the respondents (partner or salaried auditor). 819 CPAs completely filled out the 
survey, 414 of which were audit firm partners (96 Belgian, 111 Dutch, and 207 German 
partners). The others were salaried professionals and were presented with a different set 
of questions intended for another study. It was impossible to calculate the response rate 
due to the lack of ex-ante information about the employing organization and hierarchical 
level of CPAs. The respondents were partners of the 4 Big Four firms in the three countries 
and of 235 other public audit firms. As we are interested in firm-level variables, we 
aggregated the individual responses to the firm level by averaging them (in case of multiple 
respondents per firm). Our final sample therefore consisted of 247 audit firms.  
The three countries of interest to us are similar on four counts. First, 85% of the 
publicly listed firms are audited by the Big Four audit firms (PwC, KPMG, Deloitte, EY) 
(Barnier, 2010). Second, the mid-tier audit market serving non-listed firms has a strong 
national presence. Third, a central national professional association responsible for 
monitoring the profession is available in the three countries. Fourth, all audit firms in our 
sample are subject to code law and similar levels of regulatory enforcement making these 
countries also comparable at an institutional level (Leuz et al., 2003). The audit field in 
Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium is therefore comparable and aggregating the data 
from these sources should not be an issue. 
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Instrument Development 
The survey consisted of 8 psychometric scales. We relied on 2 existing scales validated in 
prior research and on 6 scales we purposely developed ourselves. We followed canonical 
scale development procedures to develop these scales (Hinkin, 1998; Steenkamp & van 
Trijp, 1991). First, we generated a large pool of items based on commonly accepted 
theoretical definitions of the constructs (Ciabuski, Dellestrand, & Martin, 2011; Ghiselli, 
Campbell, & Zedeck, 1981). The content validity was assured by developing theoretically 
precise items. After item reduction, we used between 5 and 8 items per construct in order 
to minimize response biases without compromising construct validity (Hinkin, 1998; 
Schrieschiem & Eisenbach, 1990; Schwab, 1978) (see Appendix A). The items for each scale 
were presented in a random order to avoid order effects.  Internal consistency, goodness 
of fit, and convergent/discriminant validity were then assessed. 
Given the large amount of items and the need to use structural equation modeling 
to rigorously analyze our survey data, we use a partial disaggregation strategy to link our 
indicators to their corresponding constructs (Little, Cunningham, Shahar, & Widaman, 
2002). Parceling is preferred over the use of single indicators not only because single 
indicators often have lower reliability and smaller common-to-unique variances, but also 
because parcels reduce the number of parameters to be estimated (Coffman & McCallum, 
2005; Kishton & Widaman, 1994; Little et al., 2002; Williams & O’Boyle, 2008).  
Three parcels for each latent variable were created based on the domain 
representativeness approach (Kishton & Widaman, 1994). This means that the item with 
the highest factor loading is assigned to parcel 1, the item with the second-highest loading 
to parcel 2, and the item with the third-highest loading to parcel 3. The other items are 
assigned in reverse order. 
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All items were measured on 7-point Likert scales. The two dependent variables 
capture institutional disruption behaviors in the audit setting. Given the highly sensitive 
nature of these variables, prior studies in the audit setting have concluded that the 
potential for underreporting these disruption behaviors could be substantial (Carcello, 
Hermanson, & Huss, 1996; Dreike & Moeckel, 1994). Therefore, a more valid measure 
consists of asking the respondents not to rate their own behavior but to rate observed 
behavior of other partners at their firm. Inappropriate partner behaviors (α: .93) is an 
existing 5-item scale assessing “regulatory violations that have the potential to lead to an 
audit failure” (Carcello, Hermanson, & Huss, 1996, p.246). It consisted of items like ‘the 
amount of audit evidence was insufficient’, ‘a required auditing standard was not applied 
to a material account balance or class of transactions’, ‘an inadequate partner review of a 
critical area of the engagement work papers was performed’. Underinvestment in 
reputation (α: .74) is a 6-item scale capturing the degree of reputation jeopardizing 
behaviors in audit firms. Items like ‘partners in my firm put their personal interests before 
the collective reputation’, ‘In my firm, partners treat clients in a way that could damage the 
collective reputation’, and ‘partners could invest more in maintaining the collective 
reputation’ were included. 
Two constructs serve as independent variables and are proxies for the 
institutional logics present in the audit field. Professional orientation (α: .67) is a 7-item 
scale inspired by individual level scales of professional commitment (Suddaby et al., 2007) 
and organizational level professionalism items developed by Sorensen and Sorensen 
(1972) as well as Schafer (2002). We define it as the relative identification of the firm with 
the goals of the profession. It consists of items like ‘what is best for the welfare of my firm 
is also best for the welfare of the profession’, ‘my firm values professional standards over 
profit considerations’, ‘the bottom line orientation of my firm is to serve the public 
interest’. Commercial orientation (α: .78) is a 6-item scale and assesses the degree to which 
respondents perceived that their firm was primarily concerned with the generation of 
133_Erim Pruijssers BW Stand.job
Logics under pressure: 
How strategic responses to institutional complexity undercut institutional microfoundations 
 
121 
profits. Items included are ‘my firm is primarily concerned with generating profits’, ‘the 
bottom line orientation of my firm is the generation of profits’, and ‘we take corrective 
action when we do not meet our financial performance targets’. 
Four constructs serve as mediating variables capturing the extent to which certain 
practices are implemented in the audit firm. Two of those constructs tap into practices 
embedded in the professional logic. Quality of engagement quality control reviews (α: .82) 
is an 8-item scale based on Epps and Messier (2006) and Gibbins and Trotman’s work 
(2002). These authors generated a list of the essential qualities of excellent reviewers. 
Respondents were asked to rate the extent to which reviewers in their firm reflected those 
qualities by asking whether reviewers ‘engage in face-to-face discussions’, ‘have a good 
understanding of the client and industry’, and ‘provide clear and complete feedback’. 
Internal transparency (α: .85) is an existing 6-item scale developed by Kaptein (2008). It 
included items like ‘If I criticize other partners’ behavior, I will receive feedback on any 
action taken as a result of my criticism’, ‘Management is aware of the type of incidents and 
professional misconduct that occur in the immediate working environment of partners’, 
and ‘if a partner does something which is not permitted, I or another colleague will find out 
about it’. Two other constructs measured practices embedded in the commercial logic. 
Importance of variable compensation (α: .80) is a 5-item scale assessing the relative 
importance of the variable component in the total partner compensation package. It 
consists of items like ‘the base salary constitutes only a small portion of the total partners’ 
compensation’, ‘variable compensation is a substantial amount of total partner pay’, ‘the 
largest share of partners’ pay is based on their performance’. Profit sharing based on 
revenue generation (α: .93) is a 7-item scale assessing the degree to which profit shares are 
awarded based on revenue generation. Respondents were asked to indicate to what extent 
qualities like ‘entrepreneurship’, ‘acquisition of clients’, and ‘declarable hours’ were 
important for the allocation of profit shares. 
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Several other items were included in the survey as control variables. Audit firm 
reputation is a dichotomous variable taking on the value of 1 if the audit firm is a Big Four 
firm and of 0 otherwise. Auditor reputation is perceived to be linked to the ability to 
acquire important clients and charge higher fees. The greater the reputation of an audit 
firm, the more there is at stake for the firm. Hence, Big Four partners might be less likely 
to engage in institutional disruption behaviors. Country dummies were included to control 
for any unobserved institutional characteristics of the national contexts that could 
influence auditor behavior. 
 
Data Reliability and Validity 
Convergent and discriminant validity were evaluated in order to establish construct 
validity. Confirmatory factor analyses established convergent validity because the 
indicators loaded positively and significantly on their latent variables (Carmines & Zeller, 
1979; Kline, 2010; Steenkamp & Van Trijp, 1991). This conclusion is further supported by 
the values of the average variance extracted (AVE) for the latent constructs which range 
between .4 and .8. We then assessed discriminant validity by comparing the fit of an 
unconstrained measurement model to that of a constrained measurement model (Hinkin, 
1998; Kline, 2010). All possible pair-wise comparisons were estimated, and all constrained 
models demonstrated a poorer fit. Hence, discriminant validity is established. This 
conclusion is further corroborated by a multicollinearity analysis, which indicated that all 
variance inflation factors of possible pairwise comparisons were appropriate (O’Brien, 
2007). 
Construct reliability was confirmed by appropriate Cronbach alphas and by 
composite reliabilities ranging between .7 and .9. We further checked the validity of our 
sample as we draw on three different countries. In order to assess the differences in means 
of our variables, we ran a one-way ANOVA. Through post-hoc testing, we concluded that 
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differences exist between the countries. Therefore we will carefully control for the 
countries. 
There is a potential risk for common method variance (CMV) because all the data 
are extracted from a same source in a same questionnaire (Bagozzi & Yi, 1991; Podsakoff, 
Mackenzie, & podsakoff, 2003, p.879). As an ex-ante precaution, we randomized the order 
of items of different scales (Chang, van Witteloostuin, & Eden, 2010). Through post-hoc 
statistical techniques CMV was assessed. First, the Harman’s single factor test rendered an 
8-factor solution with the first factor only accounting for 21.9 % of the variance (Podsakoff 
& Organ, 1986; Podsakoff et al., 2003). This test therefore provides diagnostic evidence of 
the absence of common method variance but does not provide any evidence that accounts 
for method effects. Therefore, following Podsakoff and colleagues (2003), we followed the 
trait-and-method procedures (Cote & Buckley, 1987). The trait-and-method model 
presented a better fit to the data than the full measurement model (Δ χ2 82.56; Δd.f. 36; p 
< .001) attesting to the presence of CMV. To establish whether CMV is a real threat, we 
estimated the amount of variance explained by the common method factor. This accounted 
for 10%, which is well below the critical cut-off point of 25% (Williams, Buckley, & Cote, 
1989). Therefore, we conclude that our results cannot be explained by CMV. 
 
Model Specification 
To empirically test our theoretical model, we run a structural equation model by using 
LISREL 8.80 with maximum likelihood estimation routines (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988; 
Fornell & Larcker, 1981; Jöreskog, 1966; Kline, 2010).  
 
RESULTS 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics, reliability and validity coefficients, and 
correlations of the latent variables. The theoretical model fits our data well (χ2 731.58; d.f. 
299; RMSEA .08; CFI .90; GFI .83). The ratio of chi-square to degrees of freedom is 2.44, 
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which is below the cut-off point of 3 (Carmines & McIver, 1981). This further supports the 
good fit of our data to the structural equations. The structural parameter estimates for the 
hypothesized model can be consulted in table 2. Figure 2 depicts our theoretical model 
including path coefficients and R2 of the latent dependent variables. 
Our data provides ample support for our theoretical predictions. All but three paths are 
significant and in the hypothesized direction. For the equations predicting the practices, 
we find that a professional logic is positively and significantly associated with practices like 
internal transparency (β =.40; t = 4.38) and quality internal reviews (β = .41; t = 4.47). We 
also establish that a commercial logic is positively and significantly associated with 
practices like profit sharing based on revenue generation (β = .20; t = 2.69) and the 
importance of variable compensation (β = .35; t = 4.43). Hypothesis 1 suggests that 
practices embedded in the professional logic reinforce professional logic-congruent 
behaviors. We find significant negative paths between practices embedded in a 
professional logic and disruption behaviors. An engagement quality control review 
practice negatively impacts inappropriate behaviors (β = -.23; t = -3.36) as well as 
underinvestment in reputation (β = -.15; t = -2.03). Internal transparency reduces 
underinvestment in reputation (β = -.35; t = -4.47) but has no significant effect on 
inappropriate behaviors. Hypothesis 1 is therefore (partially) supported. Hypothesis 2 
suggests that practices embedded in the commercial logic lead to professional logic-
disruption behaviors. We find significant positive paths between profit sharing based on 
revenue generation and disruption behaviors such as inappropriate partner behaviors (β 
= .21; t = 3.27) and underinvestment in reputation (β = .20; t = 2.85). We do not, however, 
find a significant path between the importance of variable compensation and disruption 
behaviors. Thus, hypothesis 2 is not entirely supported. Our interpretation is that the 
practice of variable compensation elicits different types of disruption behaviors not 
captured by our measures of disruption behaviors. We further do not find significant paths 
associated with our country control variables or audit firm reputation control variable. 
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Robustness Checks 
We conducted additional analyses to check the robustness of our results. We ran our 
structural model on two carefully selected and meaningful subsamples. First, we ran our 
conceptual model on the subsample of all non Big Four audit firms (n=235). This 
subsample is meaningful because it represents the majority of audit firms. The direction 
and significance of the paths remained identical to the results of the full sample. The fit of 
the model ran on this subsample was comparable to the fit of the model ran on the entire 
sample (χ2 682.22, d.f. 279, RMSEA .08, CFI .90, GFI .82). We can therefore conclude that 
our findings are robust in this subsample.  
Second, we ran our model on the subsample of all German audit firms (n=132). 
This subsample is meaningful because the German firms make up the majority of our 
sample. The fit of this model was slightly worse than the fit of our reported full sample 
model (χ2 498.70, d.f. 259, RMSEA .08, CFI .90, GFI .77). This subsample reveals that the 
effect of revenue-based profit sharing and internal reviews on underinvestment in 
reputation is lost in the German context. This shows that underinvestment in reputation 
might be of less concern in the German context. 
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DISCUSSION 
Our study seeks a better understanding of the microfoundations of institutions 
(Greenwood et al., 2014; Greenwood et al., 2011; McPherson & Sauder, 2013). More 
specifically, this study is one of the first to link the macro- to the micro-level by focusing on 
how organizations strategically manage institutional complexity and on how this strategic 
response affects individual member behavior. We suggest that institutional complexity in 
an organizational field spurs on individual behaviors that can undermine or disrupt the 
incumbent logic through practice adoption. We empirically examine our theoretical claims 
in the audit field. The audit field is a highly appropriate context of application not only 
because it enables us to illustrate different types of institutional disruption behaviors, but 
also because these institutional disruption behaviors have highly consequential societal 
risks. We corroborate earlier studies’ findings (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Pache & Santos, 
2013; Smets et al., 2012; Spicer & Sewell, 2010) by establishing that practices from 
incumbent professional and challenger commercial logics are selectively combined in an 
attempt to reconcile institutional demands. We deepen our understanding of the 
microfoundations of institutions by showing that the adoption of practices embedded in 
the commercial logic often triggers disruption behaviors that undercut the 
microfoundations of the professional logic and in so doing can undermine the public 
gatekeeping role of the auditor. As such, this study has made three important 
contributions. 
 
Behavioral and Micro-oriented Research in Institutional Theory 
At its inception, institutional research sought to understand how institutional processes 
shape organizations (Chandler, 1962; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; 
Zucker, 1987). Academics recognized that organizations were not the outcomes of 
technical contingencies but rather the outcomes of institutional pre- and proscriptions 
regarding socially legitimate ways of organizing. The organization stood at the center of 
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this research and institutions helped explain the organizing of collective effort (Meyer, 
Tsui, & Hinings, 1993). Over the years, however, institutional theorists shifted their 
interest towards understanding and explaining institutions per se (Greenwood et al., 2014; 
Meyer & Hoellerer, 2014; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010). In the face of a continuously evolving 
organizational landscape, economic pressures, and institutional complexity, bringing back 
the original focus of institutional research would improve our understanding of how 
institutional processes shape today’s organizations (Dacin, Goodstein, & Scott, 2002; 
Goodrick & Reay, 2011; Greenwood et al., 2011; Greenwood et al., 2014; Lounsbury, 2008; 
Tolbert, David, & Sine, 2011).  
Even though a few studies have sought to explain organizations through an 
institutional lens, their main focus has been on institutional change as they address how 
and why organizations adopt a single new practice or reject an existing practice 
(Greenwood et al., 2014). These studies did not provide a holistic account of how 
organizations are actually managed and designed in the face of institutional complexity 
(Greenwood et al., 2014). We make an important contribution by not only probing into why 
organizations adopt a set of practices (instead of a single practice) in the face of 
institutional complexity (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Pache & 
Santos, 2013; Smets et al., 2012; Spicer & Sewell, 2010), but also by advancing our 
understanding of how multiple field-level logics actually affect organizational member 
behavior (Greenwood et al., 2014). 
More specifically, in our empirical efforts, we corroborate earlier findings by 
demonstrating that socially embedded actors strategically reply to institutional complexity 
by selectively combining elements of conflicting logics (Pache & Santos, 2013; Smets et al., 
2012; Thornton et al., 2012). In particular, practices embedded in the professional logic 
are adopted in areas to secure audit quality, while practices embedded in the commercial 
logic are adopted in the incentive and reward structure of audit firm partners. We 
therefore confirm that organizations navigate through institutional complexity by 
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adopting elements of the logics in areas of the organization that best correspond to the 
underlying institutional demands (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Friedland & Alford, 1991; 
Glynn & Raffaelli, 2013). Unlike earlier studies, we do not stop at either explaining practice 
adoption or at understanding which elements of the multiple logics actors enact as they 
manage complex institutional demands (Pache & Santos, 2013; Smets et al., 2012; 
Thornton et al., 2012). We take a step further by looking at the behavioral implications of 
this strategic response to institutional complexity. In particular, we find that, through the 
selective combination of practices, institutional complexity can trigger incumbent-
congruent and disruption behaviors. Therefore, by linking the field level to the macro- and 
the micro-levels we bring the study of the microfoundations of institutions (Powell & 
Colyvas, 2008) forward by providing a comprehensive account of the organizational and 
behavioral implications of institutional complexity. 
 
New Perspective on Institutional Conflict. 
We also provide a new perspective on institutional conflict, by showing that conflict is often 
latent rather than manifest. Institutional conflict has been defined as ‘antagonisms in 
organizational arrangements required by institutional referents’ (Pache & Santos, 2010, p. 
457). Prior research has mostly associated institutional conflict with uneasy organizational 
tensions and with visible clashes of ideology (e.g. see Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007). We 
propose an alternative take on institutional conflict by seeing it as a covert and even 
unintended disruption process (Jazarbkowski et al., 2009; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; 
Maguire & Hardy, 2009). This disruption process does not result in a sudden or visible 
conflict. Instead, organizational members first question the previously taken-for-granted 
incumbent behaviors, then justify disruption behaviors, and ultimately their cumulative 
behaviors have the potential to disrupt the incumbent logic (Hardy & Maguire, 2009; 
Jazarbkowski et al., 2009). The disruption process might also not be intended. Our context 
of application is a case in point. Audit firms depend on both logics for their success (Malsch 
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& Gendron, 2013), yet are faced with disruptive forces that threaten their legitimacy 
towards the professional logic. We therefore propose that the concept of institutional 
conflict should be broadened to also include more subtle disruptive forces which undercut 
the microfoundations of competing logics and lead to the reconfiguration of the 
organization. 
To further refine our understanding of the concept of institutional conflict requires 
not only broadening the type of conflict—be it manifest or latent—, but also carefully 
defining the source of institutional complexity in order to systematically predict the 
behavioral implications of institutional conflict. In line with Besharov and Smith (2014), 
we believe that understanding the features of logics and the relationships amongst them is 
a step in this direction. An often unacknowledged assumption of prior research is that 
institutional complexity results from the pressures of institutional logics that originated 
outside the organization. Carrick-Cagna and Santos (2009), for instance, focused on 
microfinance organizations that are caught between an external banking logic and an 
external development logic. Other scholars focused on health care organizations that face 
the medical care logic and the government imposed economic efficiency logic (Scott, 1983).  
In these cases, the external origin of the contending logics results in active conflict (Pache 
& Santos, 2010). Therefore resisting or defying the institutional conflict have been the main 
behavioral responses (Jazarbkowski et al., 2013; Pache & Santos, 2010). Institutional 
conflict can, however, also result from the interplay of logics with different origins. In the 
audit field, for instance, the professional logic originated from the external regulatory, 
social, and cultural environment, while the commercial logic has its origins inside the firm 
as a result of hiring practices (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Malsch & Gendron, 2013). The 
dependence on the external professional logic to secure key resources, such as a license to 
operate and staff, combined with the internal representation of the commercial logic 
bolsters internal commitment to conflict resolution (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Pache & 
Santos, 2010). This results in a much more latent form of conflict with more subtle 
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disruptive forces. We therefore suggest that logic origin is an important aspect that needs 
to be accounted for when understanding the source of institutional complexity in order to 
predict the behavioral response to institutional conflict. 
In addition, in our empirical setting, we observed that the source of institutional 
complexity can also be a function of the level of analysis of institutionalized practices. In 
the audit field, the silent takeover of professionalism by commercialism could be ascribed 
to a shift in the level of analysis of institutionalized practices from the collective to the 
individual level. Professional practices, which are maintained through collective policing 
and reinforcement efforts, are robust as long as there are no individual incentives for 
defection. However, commercial practices prioritize individual performance over 
collective maintenance, thus hollowing out practices with a public good or character. 
Taking into account the level of analysis of institutionalized practices is therefore another 
important aspect for understanding how institutional conflict impacts member behavior.  
This more refined, intra-organizational view on institutional conflict also shows 
that the outcome of such conflict is not necessarily a shift in prevalence of one 
organizational form at the expense of another. Instead, organizations integrate aspects of 
the traditional incumbent logic with aspects of the challenger logic and become 
sedimented (Cooper et al., 1996; Empson et al., 2013). This so-called sedimentation is 
achieved by simultaneous acts of institutional maintenance and disruption (Empson et al., 
2013; Lawrence et al., 2009). Sedimentation therefore encompasses intra-organizational 
change in which new coalitions challenge the prominence of incumbent coalitions. The 
audit industry is a case in point as representatives of the more recent consulting branches 
currently lead many audit firms. 
 
Contextualization in the Audit Field 
This study further also provides interesting insights for the literature on the design 
challenges of professional service firms (PSFs) (Greenwood et al., 2007; Greenwood & 
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Miller, 2010; Greenwood et al., 2010). PSFs are distinct types of organizations in which a 
highly educated and professionalized workforce delivers complex, customized, and 
knowledge-intensive services (von Nordenflycht, 2010). Partly because of the difficulty in 
gaining access to private organizational data, available research has neglected to study the 
design challenges of PSFs (Greenwood & Miller, 2010). The collection of survey data in the 
traditional auditing PSF enabled us to show that audit firms have adopted sedimented 
organizational practices in response to institutional demands (Cooper et al., 1996). We 
therefore conclude that the configuration of organizational practices in PSFs can be traced 
to institutional complexity. 
PSF design is important because it undergirds organizational performance and 
survival (Greenwood & Miller, 2010). Adopting the right combination of organizational 
practices will provide the framework that enables behavior. Our study contributes in 
particular, to the design challenges of PSFs in traditional professions such as law and 
accounting (Greenwood & Empson, 2003) because these PSFs have a mandate to provide 
services intended to benefit the public, or gatekeeping services (Coffee, 2006). The 
behavior of organizational members in these gatekeeping PSFs is therefore particularly 
important. We show that adopting commercial practices in a previously dominant 
professional organization might induce partners to sacrifice professional conduct for 
financial short-term results. This, often unwantedly, threatens the microfoundations of the 
professional logic and can undermine the public role of gatekeeping PSFs. Thus far 
regulatory action to gatekeeper failures has been the default response in many 
jurisdictions (Bayou, Reinstein, & Williams, 2011; Carnegie & Napier, 2010; Sikka, 2009), 
but has not realized the desired behavioral changes. The implication of these findings is 
therefore that the prevention of gatekeeper failure cannot straightforwardly be 
accomplished by means of regulatory remedies. By showing that organizational practices 
significantly influence behavior, gatekeeper failure could be prevented by adopting 
organizational practices aimed at restoring adherence to the professional logic that is 
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under threat of being supplanted by a challenger commercial logic. Based on our study, we 
would suggest organizational solutions in terms of compensation policies (Knechel, Niemi, 
& Zerni, 2013) or ongoing internal quality controls (Bedard, Deis, Curtis, & Jenkins, 2008) 
to be fruitful remedies. 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
Our work provides opportunities for future research as we do not theorize or analyze the 
extent to which members engage in incumbent-congruent or disruption behaviors. Our 
conjecture regarding the pattern of incumbent-congruent and disruption behaviors draws 
upon Swidler’s (1986) toolkit idea. Swidler’s cultural toolkit can be redefined as a 
‘behavioral toolkit’ consisting of the frames of reference and expected behaviors of 
available and enacted institutional logics. Because the elements of the behavioral toolkit 
are fragmented and malleable (Thornton et al., 2012), actors do not just reproduce the 
behavioral expectations of the toolkit. Instead, actors pragmatically invoke and tailor the 
toolkit’s elements to fit particular situations contingent on their interests. Therefore, we 
speculate that in particular situations organizational actors will engage in incumbent-
congruent behaviors, while in others they will suit their interests by engaging in disruption 
behaviors. Applying this to the audit field, partners will be more inclined to invoke the 
elements of the commercial logic because these better fit their personal interests than the 
elements of the professional logic. We encourage future research to build on our work by 
seeking a deeper theoretical understanding of and empirical ground for how this 
behavioral toolkit is used on the ground.   
In addition, next to the usual limitations applicable to survey research, the busy 
schedules of audit firm partners required us to issue a relatively short survey in order to 
maximize the response rate. This hampered us from fully capturing the entire 
organizational design and its variations (Lounsbury, 2007, 2008; Marquis & Lounsbury, 
2008). Therefore, instead of providing a comprehensive picture of the effect of institutional 
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complexity on design, we provide empirical evidence confirming that institutional 
complexity shapes the selective combination of organizational practices. We encourage 
researchers to conduct in-depth field studies to arrive at a comprehensive understanding 
of how institutional complexity affects organizational design. Similarly, we were able to 
collect data on only two types of disruption behaviors. Analyzing a broader spectrum of 
disruption behaviors would provide more refined insights into the effect of institutional 
complexity on member behavior. A first step would be to map the range of disruption 
behaviors by collecting archival data through regulatory agencies as they possess valuable 
information regarding different types of professional violations. Therefore, there is 
considerable opportunity for future research to extend the contributions of this study. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Our study is one of the first to develop and test theoretical predictions on how firm-level 
strategic responses to competing institutional demands can (unwittingly) lead to 
individual-level institutional disruption behaviors. By analyzing the micro-dynamics of 
institutional complexity we strengthen the theoretical and empirical foundations of 
institutional research. Our study further shows the merits of interdisciplinary research. 
Audit firms, regulators, and scholars have much to learn from management theories as we 
show that audit firms’ strategic response to institutional complexity can trigger behaviors 
that disrupt the professional logic of the audit field. These disruption behaviors can 
partially explain the recent audit failures and systemic crises of confidence. While much 
remains to be discovered, we hope that future research can build on our contributions to 
further our understanding of the microfoundations of institutional complexity and of 
auditor (mis)behavior.  
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APPENDIX C EMPLOYED SCALES  
 
Inappropriate partner behavior (α: 0.93) 
How often was an unmodified audit opinion issued while, in your opinion, 
1. the amount of audit evidence was insufficient. 
2. a required auditing standard was not applied to a material account balance or 
class of transactions. 
3. an inadequate partner review of a critical area of the engagement work papers 
was performed.  
4. a required accounting treatment was not applied to a material account or 
transaction. 
5. the engagement partner received unsatisfactory explanations for the client’s 
failure to book material audit adjustments. 
 
Underinvestiment in reputation (α: 0.74) 
1. Partners in my firm put their personal interests before the collective reputation. 
2. When deciding in favor of the firm’s interests instead of their own, partners feel a 
sense of sacrifice. 
3. Partners could invest more in maintaining the collective reputation. 
4. All partners invest the same amount of effort in maintaining the firm’s 
reputation. (reverse coded) 
5. In my firm, partners treat clients in a way that could damage the collective 
reputation. 
6. In my firm, partners treat internal constituents in a way that could damage the 
collective reputation.  
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Revenue-based profit sharing (α: 0.93) 
Please indicate the extent to which the following aspects are taken into account for 
sharing profits in your firm: 
1. Entrepreneurship. 
2. Commercial orientation.  
3. Personal profit contribution.  
4. Cross-selling. 
5. Acquisition of clients.  
6. Growth of existing clients.  
7. Declarable hours.  
Importance of variable compensation (α: 0.80) 
In my firm, 
1. The base salary constitutes only a small portion of the total partners’ 
compensation. 
2. Partners’ base salary is the largest component of their total pay. (reverse coded) 
3. Variable compensation is a substantial amount of total partner pay. 
4. The largest share of partners’ pay is based on their performance. 
5. Variable partner compensation is a small component of their total pay. (reverse 
coded) 
 
Quality of engagement quality control reviews (α: 0.82) 
In my firm, internal reviewers 
1. Focus on the big picture. 
2. Engage in face-to-face discussions. 
3. Have a good understanding of my client and industry. 
4. Provide clear complete feedback. 
5. Give on-the-job training. 
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6. Provide timely feedback. 
7. Are involved in planning. 
8. Are technically proficient. 
 
Internal transparency (α: 0.85) 
Could you please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements? 
1. If a partner does something which is not permitted, someone in the organization 
will find out about it. 
2. If a partner does something which is not permitted, another partner will find out 
about it. 
3. If a partner does something which is not permitted, I or another colleague will 
find out about it. 
4. If I criticize other partners’ behavior, I will receive feedback on any action taken 
as a result of my criticism. 
5. In my immediate working environment, there is adequate awareness of potential 
violations and incidents in the organization. 
6. Management is aware of the type of incidents and professional misconduct that 
occur in the immediate working environment of partners. 
 
Commercial orientation (α: 0.78) 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
1. My firm is primarily concerned with generating profits. 
2. The ‘bottom line’ orientation of my firm is the generation of profits. 
3. We take corrective action when we do not meet our financial performance 
targets. 
4. Generating revenues is what matters most in my firm. 
5. My income depends on the profit I realize for my firm. 
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6. Our incentive structure rewards revenue generation. 
 
Professional orientation (α: 0.67) 
1. What is best for the welfare of my firm is also best for the welfare of the 
profession.  
2. My firm values professional standards over profit considerations. 
3. My firm gives me the opportunity to fully express myself as a professional. 
4. My firm is not very concerned about professional standards. (reverse coded) 
5. The goals of my firm are aligned with the goals of the profession. 
6. The bottom line orientation of my firm is to serve the public interest. 
7. My firm emphasizes the importance of a professional attitude. 
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Summary  
 
Auditor misconduct has played a crucial role in the financial turmoil of the past decades, 
but is hardly understood itself. Research to date has focused almost exclusively on how 
external regulations can secure the integrity and quality of audit services, but has mostly 
ignored the influence of audit firms’ organizational features and practices on auditor 
behavior. This is a serious omission as organizational factors may be potential causes for 
auditor misconduct, and because organizational practices could be potential remedies to 
auditor misconduct. In this dissertation, I seek to contribute to the conversation on auditor 
conduct by taking up an organizational perspective on auditor behavior. 
 The three studies of this dissertation each take an interdisciplinary perspective to 
develop a comprehensive analysis of how the organizational context of audit firms affects 
auditor behavior. The first study draws on stakeholder-agency theory to develop and test 
a theoretical model about the organizational antecedents of audit failures. The model 
identifies the organizational antecedents of auditor failure as well as the organizational 
remedies to auditor failure. The empirical results establish that audit firms’ organizational 
features, such as their economic dependence on their clients or their profit orientation, are 
antecedents of auditor misbehavior. In addition, the findings show that organizational 
practices, such as client retention policies and internal transparency practices, reduce 
auditor misbehavior. This study therefore sets the stage for the rest of the dissertation by 
demonstrating that organizational factors can actually explain auditor misbehavior.  
The second study then zooms into a specific organizational practice and explains 
its behavioral repercussions. This study builds on tournament theory to analyze the 
detrimental behavioral implications of the promotion system used in audit firms. The 
theoretical model identifies two design parameters of tournament-like promotion systems, 
namely the level of competitive intensity and the size of the prize of partnership, that are 
believed to contain powerful incentives that trigger self-interested behaviors and strategic 
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behaviors. The empirical results support the theoretical predictions by showing that the 
design parameters of tournament-like promotion systems affect self-interested and 
strategic auditor behaviors. This study therefore hones our understanding of the 
behavioral implications of a specific organizational practice widely adopted in audit firms. 
The last study takes a wider institutional perspective to refine our understanding 
of the microfoundations of institutions. This study investigates how audit firms 
strategically manage their complex institutional environment and how their strategic 
organizational responses (often unintendedly) influence auditor behavior. More 
specifically, this study posits that audit firms strategically combine organizational 
practices with conflicting professional and commercial objectives in order to satisfy wider 
institutional demands. This strategic combination of practices can have a distorting effect 
on auditor behavior. The empirical results corroborate the theoretical contentions by 
establishing that the strategic combination of professional and commercial organizational 
practices triggers behaviors that disrupt professionalism in audit firms. This study 
therefore advances our understanding of the behavioral implications of the organizational 
context of audit firms by showing that adopting commercial organizational practices in a 
previously professional organization can (often unintendedly) undermine the public role 
of auditors. 
As a whole, this dissertation therefore provides compelling evidence that the 
organizational context of audit firms indeed has a significant role to play in explaining 
auditor behavior. As such, I show that an exclusive reliance on regulatory reforms may not 
be sufficient to foster auditor integrity and that effective remedies to combat audit failures 
reside at the level of the organizations providing the audit. I therefore provide important 
and innovative contributions to both the audit and organizational literatures.  
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Samenvatting (Dutch Summary) 
 
Hoewel het wangedrag van auditors een cruciale rol heeft gespeeld tijdens de financiële, 
mondiale onrust van de afgelopen decennia, is dit wangedrag een fenomeen dat zelf 
onvoldoende is begrepen. Onderzoek heeft bijna uitsluitend gefocust op hoe de externe 
regelgeving de integriteit en de kwaliteit van de audit kan waarborgen maar heeft de 
invloed van de interne eigenschappen en praktijken van auditkantoren zelf op 
auditorgedrag nagenoeg verwaarloosd. Dit is mogelijk een ernstige nalatigheid vermits, 
enerzijds, organisatorische factoren het wangedrag van auditors kunnen veroorzaken en, 
anderzijds, een kritische kijk op organisatorische praktijken mogelijke remedies aan het 
licht kan brengen. In dit proefschrift wordt getracht bij te dragen aan de discussie over het 
wangedrag van auditors vanuit een organisatorisch perspectief. 
De volgende drie studies, beschouwd vanuit een interdisciplinair perspectief,  
geven een uitgebreide en diepgaande analyse over de wijze waarop de organisatorische 
context van auditkantoren het auditorgedrag beïnvloedt. De eerste studie is gestoeld op de 
stakeholder-agency-theorie om een theoretisch model over de organisatorische 
antecedenten van auditor wangedrag te ontwikkelen en te testen. Het model identificeert 
zowel de organisatorische antecedenten van als de organisatorische remedies voor auditor 
wangedrag. De empirische resultaten stellen vast dat organisatorische eigenschappen, 
zoals de economische afhankelijkheid of de winstgerichtheid van auditkantoren, 
antecedenten zijn voor auditor wangedrag. Bovendien tonen de bevindingen aan dat 
organisatorische praktijken, zoals praktijken omtrent het behoud van clientèle en interne 
transparantiepraktijken, auditor wangedrag verminderen. Door aan te tonen dat interne, 
organisatorische eigenschappen daadwerkelijk auditor wangedrag kunnen veroorzaken, 
legt deze studie de basis voor het vervolg van het proefschrift.  
De tweede studie vestigt de aandacht op één specifieke, organisatorische praktijk 
en verklaart de gedragsmatige gevolgen daarvan. Deze studie is gebaseerd op de 
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tournament-theorie om de nefaste, gedragsmatige gevolgen van het promotiesysteem in 
auditkantoren te verklaren. Het theoretisch model duidt twee parameters aan van de opzet 
van toernooi-achtige promotiesystemen die krachtige incentives voor eigenbelang en 
strategische gedragingen omvatten, namelijk de graad van competitieve intensiteit in de 
“prijskamp” en de omvang van de prijs voor partnerschap. De empirische resultaten 
ondersteunen de theoretische voorspellingen. De opzetparameters van toernooi-achtige 
promotiesystemen hebben daadwerkelijk invloed op eigenbelang en strategische 
gedragingen. Derhalve verfijnt deze studie onze kennis over de gedragsmatige gevolgen 
van een specifieke, organisatorische praktijk die vrij algemeen wordt toegepast in 
auditkantoren. 
Ten slotte verdiept de derde studie vanuit een breder, institutioneel perspectief 
de kennis over de micro-fundamenten van instituties. Nader wordt verklaard hoe 
auditkantoren strategisch omgaan met hun complexe, institutionele omgeving en de wijze 
waarop hun strategische reacties (vaak onbedoeld) auditorgedrag beïnvloedt. Deze studie 
duidt met name aan dat auditkantoren organisatorische praktijken met tegenstrijdige 
professionele en commerciële doelen combineren om aan hun algemenere, institutionele 
eisen te voldoen. Deze strategische combinatie van praktijken kan gedrag verstoren. De 
empirische resultaten ondersteunen de theoretische voorspellingen door vast te stellen 
dat de strategische combinatie van professionele en commerciële, organisatorische 
praktijken gedrag kan veroorzaken waardoor professionalisme verzwakt in 
auditkantoren. Deze studie bevordert dus onze kennis over de gedragsmatige gevolgen van 
de organisatorische context van auditkantoren door aan te tonen dat het aannemen van 
commerciële praktijken in een voorheen professionele organisatie (vaak onbedoeld) de 
publieke functie van auditors kan ondermijnen. 
In zijn geheel, levert dit proefschrift zodoende overtuigende bewijzen en 
bevindingen dat de interne, organisatorische context van auditkantoren inderdaad zelf een 
veelbetekende impact heeft op het gedrag van auditors. Daarbij wordt in elk geval 
weerlegd dat uitsluitend steunen op hervormingen in regelgeving voldoende is om de 
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integriteit van auditors te waarborgen. Daarenboven wordt aangetoond dat effectieve 
remedies om auditor wangedrag te bestrijden op het vlak van de organisatie van de 
auditkantoren zelf liggen. Moge dit proefschrift belangrijke en innovatieve contributies 
leveren aan de bestaande, wetenschappelijke literatuur in Organisaties en Audit. 
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l)AN ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON AUDITOR CONDUCT
Auditor misconduct has played a crucial role in the financial turmoil of the past
decades, but is hardly understood itself. Research to date has focused almost exclusively
on how external regulations can guard the integrity and quality of audit services, but has
ignored the influence of audit firms’ organizational features on auditor behavior. This is a
potentially serious omission as organizational factors may be potential causes for auditor
misconduct, and because organizational practices could be potential remedies to auditor
misconduct. In this dissertation, I seek to redirect the conversation on auditor conduct by
taking an organizational perspective. This dissertation therefore provides compelling
evidence that the organizational context of audit firms indeed has a significant impact on
auditor behavior. In so doing, I show that an exclusive reliance on regulatory reforms may
not be sufficient to foster auditor integrity and that effective remedies to combat audit
failures reside at the level of the organizations providing the audit. I therefore provide
important and innovative contributions to both the Audit and Organizational literatures. 
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